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ABSTRACT 
Hazardous operations, such as the operations in process plants, are confronted by three 
major risks: occupational, process and intentional damage risks. Previous works have 
studied these risks independently. Furthermore, these works failed to consider many 
important elements. For example: 1) Hazardous operations are expanding to remote 
areas in harsh environments, and thus harsh environmental factors need to be included 
in the assessment model to deal with this emerging challenge. 2) Scarce prior data can 
cause uncertainty of assessment results. Conventional assessment methods, such as fault 
trees, produce static outcomes which neither reduce the uncertainty caused by scarce 
data nor reflect the latest risks. 3) Variables in the models are considered to be discrete 
(normally binary). This approximation reduces the accuracy of assessment results. 4) 
Influence of intrusion scenarios on security risks is not considered. 5) Safety and 
security have interactions which can influence the real risk level and decision making. 
Existing works neither conduct a dynamic assessment of integrated risk considering 
such interaction in a robust framework, nor do they analyze the measure selection for 
the effective prevention of integrated risks.  
 
To overcome these limitations, this research establishes a dynamic model which 
includes harsh environmental factors to quantify the occupational risks and identify the 
critical causal factors. Moreover, a continuous Bayesian network is proposed to 
represent the continuous variables. Intrusion scenarios have been included in the 
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dynamic assessment model for intrusion risk. The critical intrusion scenarios and weak 
links of the security system are identified. Then the interaction of safety and security is 
analyzed in an integrated framework. Its influence on risk level and decision making is 
studied using a Bayesian network and influence diagram. These methods applied in this 
research not only reduce the uncertainty of assessment results, but also explore a new 
area of integrated risk assessment and management. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement  
With rapid industrialization in the 20th century, complex processes accompanied by 
increasing hazardous substances and risky operation conditions have significantly 
increased the risk in hazardous operations. [1, 2] The major risks confronted by 
hazardous facilities (e.g., chemical plants) come from three sources: occupational, 
process and intentional origins. Occupational risks and process risks are the safety risk 
and they have been a concern for a long time [3, 4], while the intentional risk of 
hazardous operations started to attract attention after 9/11, 2001. [5, 6] Safety concerns 
are caused by accidental failures, and in contrast, a security risk is caused by a human 
with harmful intention. [6] The concept of process safety started to be applied in 
industrial practice with the occurrence of catastrophes across the world between 1960 
and 1990 [3]. With catastrophic damage to humans, facilities and the environment, these 
well-publicized events (see Table 1.1) have served as a driving force for the evolution 
of process safety [2]. 
 
Table 1.1 The catastrophic events influencing the evolution of process safety [2] 
Accidents Years Countries Consequences 
Flixborough explosion 1974 United Kingdom 28 deaths and 36 injured 
Seveso disaster 1976 Italy 
Extermination of more than 
80,000 animals; medical 
examination of thousands of 
people; allowance of abortion, 
based on the mother's decision 
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Bhopal gas tragedy 1984 India At least 3,800 deaths [7] 
San Juanico Disaster 1984 Mexico 
550 deaths and 7000 others 
need medical help; severe 
damage on an area of about 
100,000 m2 [8] 
Sandoz Chemical 
Spill 
1986 Switzerland 
14 people were treated in 
hospital; killed half a million 
fish [9] 
Piper Alpha 1988 United Kingdom 167 deaths 
Exxon Valdez Spill 1989 United States 
Causing one of the most 
devastating human-caused 
environmental disasters.  
Phillips 66 1989 United States 
23 deaths and hundreds of 
people injured 
Baia Mare Cyanide 
Spill 
2000 Romania 
About 80% of life in the 
Serbian section of the Tisza 
has been killed; caused the 
worst environmental disaster 
since the Chernobyl nuclear 
leak in 1986 [10] 
AZF Factory 
Explosion 
2001 France 
31 deaths and numerous others 
injured; material damages of 
two billion Euros [11] 
BP Texas City 2005 United States 
15 deaths and almost 200 
injured 
T2 Explosion 2007 United States 
Four deaths and 32 injured; 
damaged buildings within one 
quarter mile of the facility 
Deepwater Horizon 2010 United States 
11 deaths and caused an 
uncontrolled oil spill lasting 
for almost 90 days 
West Fertilizer 
Explosion 
2013 United States 
15 deaths and more than 160 
injured; More than 150 
buildings were damaged 
 
Another safety risk, occupational risk, started to become a topic of interest for 
organizations in the 19th century [12]. Occupational events can directly threaten (injure 
or kill) workers in hazardous operations; thus, they are a significant challenge for risk 
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management. The distinction between occupational accidents and process accidents is 
that occupational ones (e.g., slips) occur in a working life context and that the main 
influences are limited to the involved workers. [13] The workers are often the 
contributors to and the victims of occupational accidents [13]. Occupational accidents 
occur more often than process accidents (e.g., explosions and fire). The international 
Labor Organization (ILO) reports that over 313 million occupational accidents occur 
worldwide each year [12]. Because of the high frequency, losses caused by occupational 
accidents are significant. For example, UK HSE states that more than a third of all major 
injuries reported each year were caused by slips or trips. [14] The death of workers in 
the oil and gas industry was six times more likely to be caused by a fall than from an 
explosion. [14] Occupational events not only have serious physical and emotional 
influences on employees, but also lead to a loss of approximately 4% of the global gross 
domestic product [12].  
 
To protect workers and facilities from occupational and process risks, research has been 
conducted to enhance the risk analysis of hazardous operations. [1－3, 13, 15] These 
studies can be classified into qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative. [2] 
Qualitative analysis involves a risk with non-numerical results [2]. Semi-quantitative 
analysis provides approximate results rather than exact values by assessing risk using a 
scoring method. Quantitative analysis can provide numerical estimation results, which 
create better understanding and informed decision making [2, 3] The qualitative models 
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include ranking, risk matrix and HAZOP etc. [2], while quantitative models contain 
fault tree (FT), Bow-tie (BT) and Bayesian network (BN) etc. The increasing use of 
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methods has become a trend [2] and the majority of 
new research has focused on quantitative development [3].   
 
Applied in diverse industries (e.g., the nuclear industry and chemical process industry), 
quantitative risk is measured by numerical estimation of accident likelihood and 
consequences. [2] A typical QRA is constituted with the following stages: (1) hazard 
identification; (2) probability calculation; (3) consequence assessment and (4) risk 
measure. [15] 
 
Although conventional quantitative assessment methods have made great contributions 
to safety, they suffer from some drawbacks facing the emerging challenges. [1] Firstly, 
some hazardous operations (e.g., offshore oil industry) have expanded to remote areas 
(e.g., Arctic) with harsh environmental factors, such as extreme temperatures and strong 
winds. Employees are confronted by greater occupational risks working in such a harsh 
environment. To deal with this challenge, assessment methods including the harsh 
environmental factors need to be developed to support effective risk management in the 
new operational environment. Secondly, the conventional assessment methods (e.g., FT 
and BT) are static; thus, they cannot capture the risk changes caused by deviations in 
hazardous operations. The risk can change with various factors such as the aging of 
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facilities; thus, the risk may have increased after the initial assessment and the obtained 
static risk could be outdated for the management of the latest risks. Often only scarce 
data is available for risk assessment. As a result, the input data could be inaccurate, 
which influences the assessment accuracy. The dynamic assessment can involve the 
new observed information from practice and update an assessment result with these 
observations. Thus, dynamic assessment can reduce the uncertainty caused by scarce 
data. The dynamic assessment results can reflect the latest risk with a high accuracy to 
support effective risk management. Thirdly, the variables (i.e., causal factors, accidents 
and consequences) are assumed to be discrete (normally binary) in the conventional risk 
assessment model. The changes of continuous variables continuously influence real-
time risk. When the conventional methods convert continuous variables into discrete 
ones, the continuous influence cannot be captured due to the discrete approximation and 
thus uncertainty is introduced in the assessment. In this way, the discrete assumption in 
the conventional models reduces the accuracy of risk assessment. This proposed 
research partially aims to overcome these limitations of traditional quantitative risk 
assessment methods. 
 
Safety concerns have been studied for a long time. However, besides accidental failures, 
damage in hazardous operations can also be caused by intentional acts. After 9/11, 
intentional threats on hazardous facilities started to attract attention. Hazardous facilities 
(e.g., chemical plants) raise terrorists' interests due to their significant damage potential. 
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Attacks on hazardous facilities have occurred repeatedly (see Table 1.2). These attacks 
have caused major events, such as fire and explosions. [16,17] In such a situation, only 
managing accidental risks is not sufficient; security risks can no longer be ignored [18, 
19]. Realizing the security challenges, some works have studied security risks of 
hazardous facilities. [20, 21－28] These works analyzed the vulnerability of facilities 
based on defence measures, but did not consider the effects of intrusion scenarios. 
However, in practice, the security risk level is not only related to security measures, but 
also depends on what it is protecting against. [29] A plant well designed for preventing 
the clandestine entry of strangers may have significant vulnerability in the case of a 
direct attack with guns. Without including the information of intrusion scenarios, the 
assessment result cannot reflect the real security level of hazardous facilities. 
 
Table 1.2 Physical attacks on hazardous operations 
Year Country Event description 
2005 Spain 
Suspected Basque separatists detonated bombs at two 
chemical plants. [30] 
2006 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Two vehicles carrying explosives attempted to attack a 
major oil production facility. [31] 
2015 France A deliveryman attacked a US-owned chemical plant. [17]  
2015 Iraq 
Islamic State militants detonated explosives and set fire to 
the key infrastructure in Iraq's largest refinery. [16] 
2015 France 
Double blast was caused by criminal acts in two huge fuel 
tanks at a petrochemical plant. [33] 
2016 Algeria An Algerian gas plant was attacked by a rocket. [32] 
2016 Iraq Several Islamic State bombers attacked a gas plant. [34] 
2016 Libya Suicide car bombers attacked main oil terminals. [35] 
2017 
Saudi 
Arabia 
A speedboat laden with explosives was used to blow up 
an Aramco fuel terminal. [36] 
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Safety and security share many commonalities. [37] Both types of events can cause 
damage to hazardous systems. [38] Their risk levels can be determined by the 
occurrence frequency of abnormal events (accidents or intentional events) and their 
consequences. Both of the risks need to be assessed and measures are needed once the 
risk levels become unacceptable. [39] These commonalities provide the basis to manage 
safety and security risks together. These two types of risks have interactions which can 
change the risk level and the effects of management measures. [19, 40] One hazardous 
factor of safety (security) may also contribute to security (safety) risk. Thus, if the 
interaction is not considered, the negative effects of hazardous factors will be partly 
ignored, and the real risk can be underestimated. Similarly, a measure may influence 
both safety and security risks. If the safety and security are not managed together, the 
effects of measures may be underestimated. If the measures are decided based on their 
effects and cost, such an underestimation could lead to incorrect selection of measures. 
To effectively manage risks for hazardous operations, the safety and security risks need 
to be assessed in an integrated framework in which measures are decided considering 
their effects on both safety and security risks. Because of this, some industries (e.g., 
aerospace industry) have conducted the analysis of safety and security risks together. 
[37] However, these industries mainly focus on cyber security instead of physical 
security. [37] In this research, safety and security risks are assessed and managed in an 
integrated perspective considering the interactions of safety and physical security. 
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1.2 Knowledge and technical gaps 
Previous works have conducted research on the risk assessment and management of 
hazardous operations. Much research has focused on causal factor analysis of 
occupational accidents. [41 － 45] Researchers analyzed the causal factors for 
occupational accidents, such as slips, trips and falls from height (STFs), in different 
industries such as helicopter manufacture, the residential construction industry and the 
offshore oil industry. [41－45] Besides the works on causal factor analysis, some 
researchers assessed the occupational risk using different risk models, such as BT and 
quantitative models they proposed [14, 46, 47]. However, these works did not explore 
dynamic occupational risk assessment. Therefore, their works did not capture the 
changes and calculate the latest risks which are important to guide effective risk control. 
Also, their static assessment could not reduce the uncertainty caused by the inaccurate 
inputs. Moreover, those models did not consider the harsh environmental factors. Thus, 
they cannot be applied to hazardous operations in remote areas (e.g., the Arctic). 
 
Process risk has been quantitatively studied using different models. Among these 
models, the discrete BN is widely used for process risk assessment in recent works. [48
－51] It has been used to analyze the risk of a vapor ignition, drilling accidents and dust 
explosion, and its ability to represent dependency and conduct a dynamic assessment is 
demonstrated. [48－51] However, these studies approximate continuous variables using 
discrete ones. Process variables often have continuous change and continuously 
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influence the process risk. Discrete BN models cannot capture such continuous 
influence and thus their assessment accuracy is degraded by the discrete assumption. 
Having recognized the drawback, some researchers have attempted to incorporate 
continuous nodes into BNs. [52－54] However, limited studies have explored the 
development and implementation of a continuous assessment method to reduce the 
uncertainty caused by the discrete assumption of variables.   
 
After 9/11, security studies have been conducted for attack process analysis, 
vulnerability assessment, security system development and security risk management 
of hazardous operations. [20, 21, 22, 26－28] However, the defensive ability of a 
system varies with different intrusion scenarios. These works only analyzed the 
defenders' countermeasures without considering intrusion scenarios of attackers; thus, 
the likelihood of a successful attack and the weakness of barriers for specific intrusion 
scenarios cannot be decided. Furthermore, each intrusion scenario has a corresponding 
intrusion feature. Without considering the intrusion scenarios, the intrusion principle 
and process for different intrusion scenarios cannot be clarified. Moreover, the security 
barriers to prevent the launching of an attack also influence the security risks. Previous 
models did not consider such security barriers. 
 
The preceding works have separately conducted safety and security risk analysis. Since 
safety and security risks exist in the same system and have strong interconnections, 
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accidental and intentional factors are supposed to be studied together [19]. Few works 
have been undertaken on integrated safety and physical security risks. [18] Since 
terrorists have targeted hazardous operations (see Table 1.2), physical security and its 
interaction with safety need to be studied to effectively manage the risks in hazardous 
operations. Previous works also separately studied the decision-making for safety and 
security risk management of hazardous operations based on cost-effective analysis of 
measures. [55－58] A decision model for integrated risks considering both safety and 
security aspects is lacking. No existing studies have analyzed the influence of the 
interaction of safety and security on risk reduction effects of measures. Those previous 
studies may have underestimated the effect of measures, misleading the decision-
making.  
 
Based on this analysis, the following gaps are identified: 
(1) Previous works did not consider the complete risk in hazardous operations from 
three major sources － occupational, process and intentional origins. Thus, the 
hazardous facilities could be exposed to another high risk even if one certain risk 
(e.g., occupational risk) is well controlled.  
(2) Hazardous operations are expanding to remote areas with harsh environments. To 
cope with this challenge, a risk assessment model including harsh environmental 
factors is needed to support the risk management of hazardous operations in remote 
areas.  
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(3) Dynamic models to reduce the uncertainty caused by data scarcity and to provide 
the latest risks are missing for the occupational risk assessment of hazardous 
facilities (e.g., offshore oil facilities). 
(4) Discrete assumptions of the conventional risk assessment models deteriorate the 
assessment accuracy. The assessment models which can represent a continuous 
variable and capture the influence of its continuous change are lacking.  
(5) Security risk analyses of facilities only consider the security measures. The 
influences of intrusion scenarios are not included. 
(6) Safety and security risks have interactions which can change the real risk level and 
the effects of measures. Safety and security risk assessment and management in an 
integrated framework considering their interactions are absent. 
1.3 Scope and objectives  
This study targets the risk assessment and management of hazardous operations, chiefly in 
the chemical and oil industries, considering three risk sources. It dynamically assesses the 
risks confronted by hazardous facilities and manages risks in an integrated way. In this 
research, hazardous operations refer to the operations dealing with hazardous substances. 
Hazardous facilities mean the facilities involved in hazardous operations. Considering the 
priority of preventing accident occurrences over mitigating consequences, this study 
focuses on assessment and management of occurrence probability of abnormal events (i.e., 
accidents and intentional events) instead of loss analysis. The research improves risk 
assessment accuracy in the following areas. Three major occupational accidents (STFs) are 
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studied to obtain the occupational risks in the offshore oil industry. This study represents 
the real logic relationships to reduce the uncertainty of assessment results. It includes harsh 
environmental factors to analyze the impacts of a harsh environment on occupational risks. 
The risk is updated using the available evidence and critical factors are identified to 
effectively guide risk management. Furthermore, the discrete assumption of conventional 
assessment methods is relaxed to accurately assess the occurrence probability of an 
abnormal event. Moreover, the successful intrusion probabilities considering different 
intrusion scenarios are assessed to support the security risk analysis. The analysis of attack 
motivations and the damage process are not covered in this study. After overcoming these 
drawbacks of the existing risk assessment methods, the safety and security risks are studied 
in an integrated framework, and the influence of the interaction of safety and security on 
the occurrence probability of abnormal events is analyzed. Since hazardous facilities attract 
attackers mainly due to their significant damage potential, attackers targeting hazardous 
facilities normally aim to cause major abnormal events such as explosions (see Table 1.2) 
instead of just hurting workers by causing occupational events. Thus, the security risk has 
a stronger interaction with process risks (risks of major accidents). Considering this, the 
research focuses on the interaction of process risk and security risk, and the dependency of 
security risk and occupational risk is not covered. This security risk focuses on the 
physical intentional risk, not covering the cyber causes and state conflicts. 
 
The objectives of this study are to:  
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(1) Develop dynamical methods to increase risk assessment accuracy of hazardous 
operations considering three major risk origins. 
(2) Deal with the challenge of risk assessment for hazardous facilities located in a harsh 
environment. 
(3) Develop effective assessment and management approaches for integrated risks 
considering the interaction of safety and security. 
 
The innovations of this work are identified as follows. It conducts dynamic risk assessment 
for hazardous facilities considering three major sources. The dynamic assessment model 
can obtain the latest risk and reduce the uncertainty caused by scarce data. Harsh 
environmental factors are included in the model to cope with the emerging challenge. The 
discrete assumption of previous methods is relaxed to improve the accuracy of risk 
assessment. The proposed assessment model for security risk considers intrusion scenarios 
and launching barriers. It conducts a dynamic assessment of the defensive ability of process 
plants and dynamic identification of critical intrusion scenarios and weak links in a security 
system for different intrusion scenarios. The safety and security related risk factors are 
analyzed in a unified framework. The integrated risk in hazardous operations is dynamically 
assessed and measures are decided considering the dependency of safety and security.  
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1.4 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is organized in a manuscript format, including five journal papers as chapters. 
Table 1.3 shows the journal papers completed during the research and also demonstrates 
the objectives and related tasks.  
 
Table 1.3 The objectives and tasks of each chapter 
Papers as chapters Objectives Associated tasks 
Chapter 2 Dynamic 
Occupational Risk 
Model for Offshore 
Operations in Harsh 
Environments 
Obtain the dynamic 
occupational risk of 
hazardous operations 
considering harsh 
environmental factors 
 Visually represent the 
occurrence and escalation 
of occupational accidents 
using BTs 
 Quantitatively represent 
the real logic of causal 
factors and occupational 
accidents using conditional 
probability tables (CPTs) 
 Dynamically assess 
occupational risk with 
observed evidence 
 Identify the critical 
causal factors to support 
occupational risk control 
Chapter 3 Predictive 
Abnormal Events 
Analysis using 
Continuous Bayesian 
Network 
 
Reduce the uncertainty 
caused by discrete 
assumption for 
dynamically probabilistic 
assessment and diagnosis 
of abnormal events of 
facilities  
 Establish a continuous 
Bayesian network (CBN) 
to represent continuous 
variables 
 Use Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo to solve CBN 
 Demonstrate the merits 
of CBN for dynamically 
probabilistic assessment 
and diagnosis of abnormal 
events of facilities 
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Chapter 4 Security 
assessment of process 
facilities－Intrusion 
modeling  
 
 Decide the defensive 
ability of system against 
different intrusion 
scenarios  
 Identify critical intrusion 
scenarios and the weak 
links within the security 
system 
Identify potential 
intrusion scenarios 
Propose graphical 
models to represent the 
intrusion processes of 
different intrusion 
scenarios 
Propose BN to quantify 
successful intrusion 
probabilities and security 
potential in different 
scenarios 
Update intrusion 
probabilities and security 
potential using evidence 
Chapter 5 Probabilistic 
Assessment of Integrated 
Safety and Security 
Related Abnormal 
Events: A Case of 
Chemical Plants 
 Analyze the interaction 
of safety and security 
 Dynamically assess the 
integrated probability of 
abnormal events 
considering the 
dependency of safety and 
security 
Propose an integrated 
framework to incorporate 
safety and security-related 
factors 
Establish BN to represent 
the dependency of safety 
and security 
Dynamically analyze the 
influence of the interaction 
of safety and security on 
the integrated risk and 
causal factors' significance 
using BN 
Chapter 6 Integrated risk 
management of 
hazardous processing 
facilities 
Analyze how the 
interaction of safety and 
security influences 
measure decision 
Effectively manage 
integrated risk considering 
both safety and security-
related factors 
Establish influence 
diagram (ID)-based 
management model 
Analyze the real effects 
and cost of measures using 
ID 
Measure selection to 
effectively reduce real risk 
to an acceptable level   
 
The overview of each chapter is explained as follows: 
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Chapters 2－4 improve risk assessment methods to increase assessment accuracy and 
to fit the emerging challenge. Chapters 5 and 6 assess and manage the safety and 
security risks in an integrated framework. In this way, this research assesses risk in an 
integrated perspective with improved assessment methods to obtain the real risks and 
to effectively manage risks. The detailed contents are as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: BT models are established to systematically represent the occurrence and 
escalation process of three occupational accidents (STFs) in the offshore oil industry 
considering the harsh environmental factors. Then the BTs are converted to BNs to 
quantitatively calculate the probabilities of occurrence and consequences of STFs. 
Using CPTs, the BNs represent the real logical relationships (Noisy-OR) between 
causal factors and occupational accidents. The occurrence probabilities and 
consequences of STFs are updated with observed evidence. The critical factors are 
identified based on their posterior occurrence probabilities and likelihood to cause the 
STFs, given their occurrence.  
 
Chapter 3: The drawbacks of traditional discrete assessment models are clarified. To 
overcome those drawbacks, a CBN is proposed to represent the continuous variables 
which continuously influence the abnormal event. This CBN is used to assess the 
probability of abnormal events of facilities and diagnose the states of causal factors. 
The results show that the CBN can incorporate continuous variables and assess the 
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abnormal events of facilities with a higher accuracy. CBN includes various continuous 
distributions and thus it is difficult to solve. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm 
(MCMC) is used to calculate the complex CBN. 
 
Chapter 4: The defensive ability of hazardous facilities against intrusions varies for 
different intrusion scenarios, which influences the security risk. The intrusion processes 
and principles for different intrusion scenarios are clarified using graphical models. The 
defensive ability of hazardous facilities is dynamically quantified for different intrusion 
scenarios and weak links within security systems are dynamically identified based on a 
proposed BN model. The BN model establishes links between different intrusion 
scenarios, enabling to use evidence from one intrusion scenario to update probabilities 
in another intrusion scenario.  
 
Chapter 5: The occurrence probabilities of process accidents and intentional abnormal 
events have interactions, which could change the real risk level and significance of 
causal factors in critical infrastructures. This chapter establishes the dependency of 
safety and security, analyzes how safety and security interact, and quantifies the 
influence of their interaction on the risk level. The integrated risk is dynamically 
assessed considering the dependency of safety and security, and the real significance of 
causal factors is dynamically analyzed to identify critical causal factors. 
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Chapter 6: Hazardous operations are confronted by both accidental and intentional risks. 
If only accidental risk is considered for risk management, there could be hidden risk 
(intentional risk) after the application of measures; thus, the real risk level is still 
unacceptable. To effectively reduce risk, safety and security risks need to be managed 
together. Since a management measure may work for different risks, managing safety 
and security risks together can help scientifically decide the measures. This chapter 
established an ID-based risk management model which includes intentional factors and 
accidental factors. The effects and costs of potential measures are assessed, based on 
which the proper measures are selected.    
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2. Dynamic Occupational Risk Model for Offshore Operations in 
Harsh Environments 
Preface 
A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety 2016; 150: 58－64. As the primary author, I reviewed related 
literatures, developed the BT and BN models and applied these models to analyze risks 
of STFs. I completed the first version of the manuscript and further revised according 
to the suggestions of co-authors and reviewers. Dr. Faisal Khan helped to identify the 
research topic and scope. Dr. Hangzhou Wang, Dr. Zhi Yuan and Hanwen Liu reviewed 
the manuscript and provided revision suggestions. Shelly Leighton helped to collect 
data from industry for the case study.  
Abstract 
The expansion of offshore oil exploitation into remote areas (e.g., Arctic) with harsh 
environments has significantly increased occupational risks. Among occupational 
accidents, slips, trips and falls from height (STFs) account for a significant portion. 
Thus, a dynamic risk assessment of the three main occupational accidents is meaningful 
to decrease offshore occupational risks. Bow-tie Models (BTs) were established in this 
study for the risk analysis of STFs considering extreme environmental factors. To relax 
the limitations of BTs, Bayesian networks (BNs) were developed based on BTs to 
dynamically assess risks of STFs. The occurrence and consequence probabilities of 
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STFs were respectively calculated using BTs and BNs, and the obtained probabilities 
verified BNs' rationality and advantage. Furthermore, the probability adaptation for 
STFs was accomplished in a specific scenario with BNs. Finally, posterior probabilities 
of basic events were achieved through diagnostic analysis, and critical basic events were 
analyzed based on their posterior likelihood to cause occupational accidents. The 
highlight is systematically analyzing STF accidents for offshore operations and 
dynamically assessing their risks considering the harsh environmental factors. This 
study can guide the allocation of prevention resources and benefit the safety 
management of offshore operations. 
Keywords: Occupational accident; dynamic risk assessment; harsh environment; 
Bayesian network; Bow-tie model 
2.1 Introduction 
Occupational accidents are of major concern in the offshore oil industry. Statistics 
indicates fatalities are more likely to be caused by occupational accidents than by 
catastrophic events such as explosions or air transport incidents [1]. According to the 
RIDDOR report [2], slips, trips and falls from height (STFs) lead to approximately one 
third of all injuries in the offshore industry. With the recent expansion to remote areas, 
offshore oil exploitation meets particular challenges caused by the increasingly harsh 
environment, coupled with the remoteness of offshore platforms [3]. The harsh 
environment for offshore oil industry includes poor natural conditions (e.g., strong wind 
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and ice, etc.), as well as the workplace conditions deteriorating the safety situation, such 
as vessel motion. Risk assessment for STFs becomes more meaningful in the offshore 
oil industry while confronted by such increasing challenges.  
 
Some research has been conducted about STFs. Amandus et al. [4] evaluated the causes 
and costs of STFs in a helicopter manufacturing plant by investigating the records of 
4070 helicopter plant workers. Nenonen [5] applied the data mining method to analyze 
factors related to slipping, stumbling, and falling accidents at work. Courtney et al. [6] 
analyzed the likelihood of isolating the contribution of slipperiness to STF-related 
injuries from injury surveillance systems in the USA. Bentley et al. [7] identified large 
numbers of risk factors for STFs in residential construction through incident-centered 
and incident-independent methods of investigation. These studies mainly focus on cause 
analysis of STFs instead of quantifying risks. Furthermore, very few literatures were 
related to risk analysis of STFs of offshore oil industry. Attwood et al. [1, 8] determined 
the relative importance of influencing factors of offshore occupational accidents, and 
established a prediction model for the frequency and costs of offshore occupational 
accidents. However, this model only includes general causes, which limits its capacity 
to provide specific risk information of STFs. Moreover, it cannot dynamically assess 
the occupational risks. In the current research, the risks of STFs in offshore operations 
were dynamically assessed using Bayesian Networks (BNs). A novel point is the 
involvement of harsh environmental factors suffered by offshore platform workers. 
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the fundamentals of Bow-tie 
Models (BTs) and BNs. The dynamic assessment model of occupational risks is 
presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 explains the model application (i.e., probability 
calculation, probability update and critical factor analysis), and the conclusions are 
presented in Section 2.5. 
2.2 Background 
BT and BN are two powerful risk analysis models. BT is the combination of a fault tree 
(FT) and an event tree (ET). Its left part is the FT where the detailed causes are 
systematically identified following a Boolean logic; the right is the ET which starts with 
an accident and identifies the potential consequences depending on the states (success 
or failure) of safety barriers. Therefore, both causes and consequences can be 
incorporated in a graphical BT model [9, 10], thereby clearly presenting the accident 
process and potential consequences. As for BN, it is a directed acyclic graph with Bayes' 
theorem as the key mechanism [11, 12]. The variables in BN (i.e., risk factors, accidents, 
safety measures and potential consequences) are represented by nodes, while arcs are 
used between the nodes to reveal variable causality. The dependency degree of nodes is 
indicated by the conditional probability tables (CPTs). To complete BNs, the prior 
probabilities of root nodes and CPTs for other nodes should be provided [12]. BNs work 
with two inference methods, namely predictive (forward) inference and diagnostic 
(backward) inference [9], which are illustrated using a basic BN (Fig. 2.1) [12]. For the 
predictive inference, probability A is obtained according to its CPT and probability B, 
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following the law of total probability (equation 2.1). Diagnostic inference updates 
probability B given the certain state of node A (evidence) according to the Bayes' 
theorem (equation 2.2). The forward inference can predict the probability of rear 
variables, while the backward inference enables to update the probability of precedent 
variables given evidence. Thus, BNs can conduct predictions as well as diagnostics. 
 
B A
 
Fig. 2.1 Basic BN [12] 
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where n represents the total state of B and k is the kth state of B. 
 
BTs outperform BNs in some aspects. In a cause-accident-consequence order, BTs are 
an organized tool to clarify the occurrence and escalation process of accidents. 
Furthermore, comparing with the fact that no specific semantic guides BNs 
development [12], BTs can be easily established following the development procedure 
of FTs and ETs. However, BTs are unsuitable to dynamically quantify the occupational 
risks because of the limited logic relationship and static structure [10]. Fortunately, 
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these limitations enable to be relaxed by coupling BTs with BNs. The principle for BN 
to relax BT in the area of occupational risk analysis is illustrated in this paper. 
 
As powerful assessment tools, BTs and BNs are extensively used in research. Jacinto 
and Silva [13] proposed a semi-quantitative assessment methodology of occupational 
risks for the ship building industry, in which BT was used to qualitatively identify causal 
pathways and consequences of relevant accidents. Ale et al. [14] introduced the 
concepts and overall structure of a BT-based quantifying occupational model. Martín et 
al. [15] used BNs to establish dependency relationships between different causes of falls 
from height and identified the major causes. Chen and Leu [16] assessed fall risks in 
bridge construction projects using BNs. Bobbio et al. [17] mapped FTs into BNs and 
explored the capabilities of BNs for the analysis of dependable systems. A few papers 
[9, 10, 18] performed dynamic risk analysis in process safety areas by transforming BTs 
into BNs. However, as discussed in this paper, occupational accidents often have a logic 
more complex than traditional OR-gates or AND-gates. Thus, only consisting of 0 and 
1, the CPTs of BNs for process accidents [9] do not fit occupational accidents.  
2.3 The dynamic assessment model of occupational risks 
2.3.1 BT-based occupational risk model 
The risk factors, safety measures and potential consequences were identified for 
offshore STFs (Tables 2.1 and 2.2) according to literature reviews [19－29] and 
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professionals' knowledge. Then BTs for STFs were respectively established based on 
the identified components. For the sake of simplification, this paper only presented the 
BT of slips (Fig. 2.2) whose symbols can be found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The occurrence 
and escalation process of slips is clearly presented through the BT-based occupational 
risk model in Fig. 2.2. 
 
The prior probabilities of basic events should be assigned first to quantify occupational 
risks, and they were obtained using Kirsten method [30]. In this method, experts provide 
the qualitative evaluation using their experience and best judgment, and then 
corresponding probabilities can be obtained according to Table 2.3 [30－32]. This 
method can not only effectively involve expert experience, but also avoids the difficulty 
that experts meet when they directly provide probability values. A group of experts from 
the offshore oil industry (e.g., UTEC Survey Canada) were invited to determine prior 
probabilities of basic events, and the averages are shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Prior probabilities of basic events 
Symbols Description Probability Symbols Description Probability 
X1 
Spillages of 
chemicals on 
floor 
1.0×10-2 X23 Litter on floor 1.0×10-6 
X2 Oil on floor 1.0×10-1 X24 Debris on floor 1.0×10-5 
X3 Water on floor 1.0×10-1 X25 
Other obstacles 
on floor 
1.0×10-5 
X4 Dust on floor 5.5×10-6 X26 
Damaged floor 
surface 
5.5×10-5 
34 
 
X5 
Slips caused 
by slippery 
floor material 
5.5×10-6 X27 
Loose floor 
surface 
5.5×10-5 
X6 Storm 1.0×10-1 X28 
Uneven floor 
surface 
1.0×10-4 
X7 Darkness 5.5×10-4 X29 
Changes in 
level of floor 
1.0×10-4 
X8 
Ice and snow 
on floor 
1.0×10-1 X30 
Unreasonable 
workplace 
arrangement 
1.0×10-4 
X9 Strong wind 1.0×10-1 X31 Crowded area 1.0×10-5 
X10 Vessel motion 1.0×10-1 X32 Lighting glare 5.5×10-4 
X11 Poor fitness 1.0×10-4 X33 Sudden noise 5.5×10-4 
X12 Fatigue 1.0×10-1 X34 
Trip caused by 
poor footwear 
1.0×10-7 
X13 
Loads 
carrying 
1.0×10-3 X35 
Low quality of 
materials of 
high workplace 
floor and 
ladders 
1.0×10-3 
X14 
Lack of 
experience 
1.0×10-1 X36 
Old age of high 
workplace floor 
and ladders 
1.0×10-3 
X15 
Passive 
attitudes 
1.0×10-3 X37 No handrails 1.0×10-6 
X16 Distraction 1.0×10-1 X38 
Slippery high 
workplace floor 
and ladders 
1.0×10-5 
X17 
Stress and 
limited time 
1.0×10-2 X39 
Holes in high 
workplace floor 
and ladders 
1.0×10-6 
X18 
Poor 
supervision 
5.5×10-4 X40 
Extreme low 
temperature 
1.0×10-2 
X19 
Poor safety 
culture 
1.0×10-6 X41 
Poor 
motivation 
1.0×10-3 
X20 
Poor 
housekeeping 
and 
maintenance 
5.5×10-5 X42 
Abnormal 
intelligence 
1.0×10-3 
X21 
Poor safety 
regulation 
1.0×10-6 X43 
Poor safety 
training for 
1.0×10-2 
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high place 
work 
X22 
No sign of 
warnings 
5.5×10-4 X44 
No warning 
and fencing 
around holes 
1.0×10-1 
Table 2.2 Intermediate events, safety barriers and consequences 
Symbols Factors Symbols Factors 
IE1 
Slips caused by 
contamination on floor 
IE16 
Falls caused by poor situation of 
ladders and high workplaces 
IE2 
Slips caused by poor 
floor condition 
IE17 
Falls caused by harsh 
environments 
IE3 
Slips caused by harsh 
environments 
IE18 
Falls caused by poor human 
factors 
IE4 
Slips caused by poor 
physical situation 
IE19 Falls caused by poor management 
IE5 
Slips caused by lack of 
attention 
SB1 Handrails 
IE6 
Slips caused by poor 
human factors 
SB2 
No sharp edge materials & holes 
nearby 
IE7 
Slips caused by poor 
management 
SB3 PPE 
IE8 
Trips caused by 
contamination on floor 
SB4 Emergency rescue 
IE9 
Trips caused by poor 
floor surface condition 
SB1' Harness & backscratchers 
IE10 
Trips caused by poor 
underfoot condition 
SB2' 
Falls within two meters & no 
sharp edge materials at landing 
spots 
IE11 
Trips caused by harsh 
environments 
C1 Near miss 
IE12 
Trips caused by poor 
physical situation 
C2 Minor injury 
IE13 
Trips caused by lack of 
attention 
C3 Lost working-time injury 
IE14 
Trips caused by poor 
human factors 
C4 Unrecoverable major injury 
IE15 
Trips caused by poor 
management 
C5 Fatality 
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Table 2.3 Classes for probabilities of occurrence [30－32] 
Qualitative evaluation Quantitative evaluation 
Certain 1 
Very high 10-1 
High 10-2 
Moderate 10-3 
Low 10-4 
Very low 10-5 
Extremely low 10-6 
Practically zero 10-7 
X2
X1
X4
X3
IE1
X5
IE2
X10
X8
X7
X6
IE3
X14
X13
X12
IE4
X17
X16
X15
IE5
IE6
X21
X20
X19
X18
IE7
X22
Slip
X9X11
C1
C2
C3
C4
C4
C5
SB1 SB4SB2 SB3
C3
 
Fig. 2.2 Bow-tie model for slips (refer to tables 2.1 and 2.2) 
 
Although BT is an excellent risk analysis tool, it has limitations to quantify occupational 
risks. The three main limitations are discussed as follows: 
(1) The traditional logic gates of BTs may not fit occupational accidents. Most basic 
events of STFs have the likelihood to independently cause upper events. However, 
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the occurrence of such a basic event does not necessarily lead to the upper event. 
For example, the event X3 (water on floor) can lead to slips (shown in Fig. 2.2), but 
not all people who walk on the wet floor slip in practice. Therefore, the logic gates 
of BTs cannot express the real logic relationship of occupational accidents. 
(2) BTs cannot accurately describe the potential consequences. Human factors are 
involved in occupational accidents, complicating the consequence determination. 
Particularly, when the same safety barriers fail, it does not necessarily lead to the 
same consequence to humans. For example, even if a worker slips with the failure 
of all safety barriers (refer to Fig. 2.2), several potential consequences (e.g., minor 
injuries, lost working-time injuries, unrecoverable major injuries and fatality) may 
occur in practice with their corresponding probabilities. However, the BT in Fig. 
2.2 only assigns one consequence (fatality) to this scenario. Actually, BTs usually 
consider the most likely potential result for one scenario as the only consequence, 
which is often unrealistic for occupational accidents. 
(3) BTs cannot dynamically assess occupational risks because of its static structure [10]. 
According to the changing operations and working environments, offshore 
occupational risks change over time. The proposed safety measures based on static 
risk analysis may not effectively prevent and mitigate the latest risk. Therefore, 
dynamic risk analysis is required for related decision making in offshore 
occupational areas. 
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2.3.2 BN-based dynamic occupational risk model  
BNs were developed based on the established BTs to relax aforementioned limitations, 
because it has the following advantages: 
(1) BNs can represent the real logic (Noisy-OR) [17] between basic events and their 
upper events of occupational accidents using CPTs, which facilitates the 
quantification of occupational risks.  
(2) CPTs can represent the probability of different potential consequences given the 
same barrier failure.  
(3) BNs are expert in dynamic risk assessment [18, 33]. Thus, it enables to quantify the 
latest occupational risk in offshore operations. 
 
BNs were established for STFs (Figs. 2.3－2.5) based on BTs through two main steps. 
Firstly, the components of BTs (the basic events, intermediate events, top events, safety 
barriers and consequences) are correspondingly converted into root nodes, intermediate 
nodes, pivot nodes, safety nodes and consequence nodes of BNs [9]. These nodes are 
connected by arcs based on their causality. Secondly, CPTs of BNs are achieved 
according to the weights of events which came from the same survey with prior 
probabilities of basic events. The weight of an event refers to the occurrence likelihood 
of its upper events given the event occurrence. The development process of the CPT for 
node IE4 (Fig. 2.3) is demonstrated as follows. 11X , 12X  and 13X represent 
nonoccurrence of these events, and the weights of X11 X12 X13 are a1 (0.001), a2 (0.001) 
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and a3 (0.01) respectively. If X11 and X12 occur while X13 does not take place, the 
occurrence probability P(IE4)=a1+a2 (0.002). This value is added to the CPT of node 
IE4 (column 4 in Table 2.4). Following this rule, P(IE4) in different scenarios can be 
calculated and then the CPT of node IE4 can be completed (Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4 The CPT of node IE4 for slips 
Scenario 131211 XXX
 
131211 XXX
 
131211 XXX
 
131211 XXX
 
131211 XXX
 
131211 XXX
 131211 XXX  131211 XXX  
P(IE4) 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.001 0 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 BN for slips (refer to tables 2.1 and 2.2) 
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Fig. 2.4 BN for trips (refer to tables 2.1 and 2.2) 
 
Fig. 2.5 BN for falls from height (refer to tables 2.1 and 2.2) 
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2.4 Application of occupational risk model 
2.4.1 Probability calculation of accidents and consequences 
BTs and BNs were used to calculate occurrence and consequence probabilities of STFs 
and the results are shown in Table 2.5. According to Table 2.5, the accident probabilities 
calculated by BTs are much higher than those from BNs. UK HSE [2] states that the 
rate of STFs in the deck operations on mobile installations was 0.025. It is obvious that 
the accident probabilities obtained from BTs are too large (all bigger than 0.6) compared 
with those from industry. Such large difference is caused by the fact that BT's logical 
gates do not fit occupational accidents. In comparison, the results from BNs (column 4 
in Table 2.5) are closer to the practical data of UK HSE, which shows the advantage of 
BNs over BTs in occupational risk analysis. Furthermore, the fatality probability 
(column 5 in Table 2.5) shows BNs' rationality. According to UK HSE [34], falls from 
height were the most common cause of fatalities. The result from BNs shows that the 
fatality probability caused by falls from height is much higher than that caused by slips 
and trips, which is consistent with the industry. Moreover, the occurrence probability 
of falls from height calculated by BN is the lowest among the three types of accidents, 
while its fatality probability is the highest. This fits the accident characteristics that the 
consequence severity of falls from height is more difficult to mitigate compared with 
slips and trips.  
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Table 2.5 Accident and fatality probabilities 
Accidents 
Occurrence 
probability 
(BT) 
Fatality 
Probability 
(BT) 
Occurrence 
probability 
(BN) 
Fatality 
Probability 
(BN) 
Slips 9.24×10-1 1.07×10-4 2.08×10-2 2.03×10-6 
Trips 6.15×10-1 9.23×10-5 1.38×10-2 1.34×10-6 
Falls from 
height 
7.35×10-1 5.88×10-4 5.39×10-3 5.62×10-5 
2.4.2 Occupational risk update 
One feature of BNs is the sequential updating (adaptation). When the occurrence of 
basic events is observed, occurrence and consequence probabilities of STFs can be 
updated using the observed evidence. In a certain scenario, it is assumed that four basic 
events (strong wind, lack of experience, stress and limited time, and poor housing and 
maintenance) are observed during eight weeks (Table 2.6). Taking advantage of the 
evidence, BNs updated both the occurrence probabilities and fatality probabilities of 
STFs (Fig. 2.6). As Fig. 2.6 shows, the occurrence and fatality probabilities of STFs 
increased over time. Especially for trips, these probabilities almost doubled through the 
eight weeks. Furthermore, although the increase rate for occurrence probability of falls 
from height is smaller than that of slips and trips, its fatality probability has the largest 
growth. This shows that the changes of the four observed basic events cause more severe 
deterioration to the consequence severity of falls from height. Interestingly, the great 
increases on occurrence and fatality probabilities of STFs in week 1 (with the increased 
percentages 22.4%, 14.8% and 5.7% respectively) are only caused by the harsh 
environmental factor (strong wind). Thus, as a harsh environmental factor, strong wind 
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can considerably deteriorate STFs, which indicates the importance of considering harsh 
environments in offshore risk analysis. Through the adaptation analysis, the updated 
occurrence and fatality probabilities of STFs were obtained, and corresponding safety 
measures can be proposed to effectively reduce risks. 
 
Table 2.6 Observed abnormal events during eight weeks 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Strong wind 2 － 1 － － 2 － 1 
Lack of experience － 1 － － 1 － 2 － 
Stress and limited time － － － 1 － － － 1 
Poor housekeeping and maintenance － － － － 1 － － － 
 
 
  (a) Occurrence probability of STFs           (b) Fatality probability of STFs 
Fig. 2.6 Dynamic occurrence and fatality probabilities of STFs  
2.4.3 Critical factor analysis 
Another feature of BNs is the backward (diagnostic) analysis, which can be used to 
update probabilities of root nodes given accident occurrence. The updated probabilities 
(posterior probabilities) of the basic events mean their most likely probabilities when 
the accident occurs. The basic events with large posterior likelihood to cause STFs are 
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considered as the critical factors in this study. The posterior likelihood can be measured 
by the product of the weights and posterior probabilities of basic events. Two steps were 
taken to obtain the posterior likelihood of basic events. Firstly, the posterior 
probabilities of root nodes were obtained with the help of GeNIe software [35]. Then, 
the posterior likelihood of each basic event to lead to STFs was calculated according to 
its weight and posterior probability, and the basic events with top five biggest posterior 
likelihood are shown in Fig. 2.7. 
 
 
               (a) Slips                  (b) Trips               (c) Falls from height 
Fig. 2.7 Basic events with bigger posterior likelihood to cause STFs (refer to tables 2.1 and 2.2) 
 
According to Fig. 2.7, critical factors causing STFs were determined. Specifically, the 
posterior likelihood of X6 (storm), X8 (ice and snow on floor) and X9 (strong wind) to 
cause slips is much bigger than other basic events, thus they were selected as the critical 
factors for slips. Similarly, X9 (strong wind) and X10 (vessel motion) were identified as 
the critical factors for trips. For falls from height, the critical factors are X43 (poor safety 
training for high place work), X10 (vessel motion) and X44 (no warning and fencing 
around holes). Through the analysis, the critical factors for slips, trips and falls from 
height are different. Thus, when different occupational accidents occur, corresponding 
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critical factors should be given priority for the effective prevention of future accidents. 
Furthermore, X43, with a lower prior probability (0.01), has the largest posterior 
likelihood to cause falls from height, which partly results from its large posterior 
probability (0.11). Moreover, environmental factors (e.g., X6, X8, X9 and X10) can be 
found among the critical factors for all STFs accidents. Especially for slips and trips, all 
the critical factors are harsh environmental factors. This reveals occupational risks can 
be significantly influenced by harsh offshore environments.  
2.5 Conclusions 
This study established BTs to better illustrate the occurrence and escalation process of 
STFs, and then the limitations of BTs were relaxed using BNs. The accident 
probabilities as well as fatality probabilities obtained from BTs and BNs were analyzed. 
These probabilities indicate the rationality and advantage of BNs to quantify 
occupational risks. Furthermore, probability adaptation was completed in a certain 
scenario. Through the adaptation, it is found both accident probabilities and fatality 
probabilities increase over time, and the adaptation consequences also indicate the harsh 
environmental factors can significantly deteriorate STFs. Moreover, the critical factors 
were identified according to their posterior likelihood to cause STFs. It is found 
environmental factors exist among the critical basic factors for all STFs accidents. This 
further reveals that harsh environmental factors pose significant potential hazards to 
occupational safety. Thus, measures should be presented to cope with the influence of 
harsh environments.  
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Some points can be further improved in the future study. Slips, trips and falls from 
height have an interactive relationship. For example, slips may cause falls from height. 
The interactive relationship can be modeled, thereby identifying effective measures to 
prevent various accidents at the same time. 
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3. Predictive Abnormal Events Analysis Using Continuous 
Bayesian Network 
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Abstract 
The reliable prediction and diagnosis of abnormal events provide much needed 
guidance for risk management. The traditional Bayesian Network (traditional BN) has 
been used to dynamically predict and diagnose abnormal events. However, its inherent 
limitation caused by discrete categorization of random variables degrades the 
assessment reliability. This paper applied a continuous Bayesian Network (CBN) based 
model to reduce the above-mentioned limitation. To compute complex posterior 
distributions of CBN, the Markov chain Monte Carlo method (MCMC) was used. A 
case study was conducted to demonstrate the application of CBN, based on which a 
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comparative analysis of the traditional BN and CBN was presented. This work 
highlights that the use of CBN can overcome the drawbacks of traditional BN to make 
dynamic prediction and diagnosis analysis more reliable. 
Keywords: Dynamic analysis, Abnormal events, Uncertainty, Continuous Bayesian 
network, Markov chain Monte Carlo method 
3.1 Introduction 
Risk analysis helps propose effective prevention and mitigative measures of accidents 
[1]. The prediction and diagnosis of abnormal events are an important part of risk 
analysis and management. Many qualitative and quantitative assessment methods have 
been presented. Among them, the Bayesian network (BN) based approach is one of the 
most robust quantitative tools, since it has the capability to analyze dynamic risks given 
new information or data collected from ongoing operations [2－4]. Especially for 
events with very low frequency but severe consequences such as the Macondo blowout 
accident, BN-based approaches can utilize the relatively abundant precursor data to 
estimate accident probability and reduce uncertainty by considering the 
interdependency among the causes of the accident. Khakzad et al illustrated the specific 
process of converting BT into BN, and took accident precursors and conditional 
dependency into account to update the probability of events and the consequent risk for 
a vapor ignition accident using BN [2]. In another study, they conducted risk analysis 
of drilling operations using an object-oriented Bayesian network. The object-oriented 
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Bayesian network makes the model tractable, and demonstrates the dependencies of 
events more clearly. [1] Yuan et al. applied BN to dynamically assess the risks of dust 
explosion considering common cause failures and dependencies among root events and 
possible consequences, and also identified the critical factors given the occurrence of a 
dust explosion [3]. Abimbola et al. used BN to update the belief about the operational 
data considering the dependencies in the constant bottom-hole pressure drilling 
technique [4].  
 
However, the modeling flexibility and preciseness of a BN-based approach is degraded 
by the use of discrete nodes [5－7]. Normally, for the sake of calculation, traditional 
BN based risk models treat causal factors with a continuous nature as discrete variables 
(frequently Boolean). This approximation introduces uncertainty to the assessment 
process. Many variables continuously change with the variation of their causal factors, 
which often fails to be modeled by discrete nodes of traditional BN. For instance, 
‘strong wind’, as a causal factor for a ‘high wave’, is defined as wind with a speed of 
over 10.8 m/s. Although winds of 1 m/s and 9 m/s have significantly different effects 
on wave height in practice, both are categorized as the discrete state of ‘no strong wind’ 
in a traditional BN. Consequently, they will be assigned the same conditional 
probabilities in the conditional probability tables (CPTs) [2, 3]. This means their 
contributions to a ‘high wave’ are considered as identical in this BN. This becomes one 
of the main sources of uncertainty of such BN.  
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To overcome this limitation, a continuous Bayesian network (CBN) is applied to deal 
with continuous factors. CBN is defined as the specific Bayesian network, the nodes of 
which are variables represented by continuous distributions. A few studies have been 
conducted to investigate continuous nodes in BN models [8－10]. However, to the 
authors' knowledge, limited work has been conducted on the development of a CBN 
based safety analysis approach and the implementation of CBN to overcome the 
uncertainty caused by the assumption of discrete states of nodes in traditional BN. The 
rare application of continuous nodes in BN is mainly because of the difficulty in 
computing posterior distributions due to the involvement of various continuous 
distributions and multiple dependent variables. Some research [11－13] uses the 
conjugate method to solve the CBN based on the assumption that the prior and 
likelihood distributions are conjugate pairs (i.e., the posterior distributions are in the 
same family as the prior distributions). However, this assumption produces some level 
of uncertainty.  
 
This paper proposes the development method of CBN and applies the Markov chain 
Monte Carlo method (MCMC) to compute CBN. Although CBN has a higher 
computational cost than traditional BN, it can be solved efficiently using software by a 
personal computer, even given a reasonably large number of nodes in the network. The 
application of CBN is demonstrated using a case study and results are compared with 
those of the traditional BN to prove the effectiveness of CBN in reducing uncertainty 
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of risk analysis. The work is organized as follows: Section 3.2 illustrates the process of 
converting traditional BN to CBN, while Section 3.3 introduces the use of MCMC to 
solve CBN. A case study is presented in Section 3.4 to reveal the advantages of CBN 
for the prediction and diagnosis analysis of abnormal events. Finally, Section 3.5 
captures the conclusions.  
3.2 The algorithm of converting traditional BN to CBN 
The development of traditional BN has been well documented in the existing literature. 
However, there is limited study of the establishment of CBN based on continuous nodes 
and conditional probabilities. A fault tree (FT), an effective tool used to systematically 
analyze the causes of accidents following top down Boolean logic, can be mapped into 
traditional BN [14]. An FT can be easily established due to its organized structure. 
However, an FT is hard to convert directly to CBN, because they not only have 
completely different model structures, but also have different variable types (i.e. FT has 
discrete variables while CBN uses continuous variables.) Since traditional BN has the 
same variable types as FT and an identical structure as CBN, in order to develop CBN 
with ease, FT can be developed first and then converted into traditional BN, followed 
by the conversion of traditional BN to CBN. 
3.2.1 The distinction between traditional BN and CBN  
Figuring out the distinctions is essential to determine how to convert traditional BN to 
CBN. The analytical mechanism of CBN is fundamentally different from that of 
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traditional BN. In CBN, parental nodes are considered to be contributing quantitatively 
to the physical values of their child nodes. This quantitative relationship can be 
represented in the form of a mathematical expression that links the value of the child 
nodes to that of the parental nodes. In contrast, traditional BN links the probability of 
discrete states of child nodes to the discrete state combination of parental nodes using 
CPTs. To quantitatively represent child nodes using parental nodes in CBN, two main 
changes are required from traditional BN. Firstly, the nodes of CBN need to be 
represented using measurable variables rather than discrete states. Secondly, the values 
or distribution parameters of child nodes in CBN are represented as the function of the 
value of parental nodes. Thus, the CPT of traditional BN are converted to conditional 
probability distributions or functions representing the relationship between values of 
child and parental nodes. Compared with traditional BN, CBN is able to obtain the 
continuous state distribution of each node, and this distribution can provide more 
information about the occurrence of an abnormal event and its causal factors. 
3.2.2 Converting traditional BN to CBN 
To develop CBN, FT is applied first to identify the causes of abnormal events and 
determine the logic relationships. Then FT is mapped into traditional BN, and 
consecutively traditional BN is converted to CBN. As the existing literature [14] has 
provided the method of mapping FT into traditional BN, this paper mainly illustrates 
the process to convert traditional BN to CBN (shown in Fig. 3.1).  
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Firstly, the measurable variables reflecting continuous states of the nodes of traditional 
BN are identified to replace the discrete states. For example, wind speed can be 
identified as the measurable variable of ‘strong wind’, and thus the discrete node of 
‘strong wind’ is converted to the continuous node of wind speed. This process to obtain 
continuous nodes of CBN is shown in Fig. 3.2. These continuous nodes are linked 
according to their dependent relationships. Then the prior distributions of root nodes as 
well as the quantitative relationships between nodes are determined according to 
historical data and expert's experience. It is worth noting that the relationships between 
nodes of CBN have two types (probabilistic and deterministic) [15]. The probabilistic 
relationship refers to conditional probability distributions. In this case, the parameters 
of probabilistic distribution of child nodes are represented as the function of the value 
of the parental nodes. Thus, even if parental values are determined, the values of child 
nodes are still random in nature. On the contrary, in a deterministic relationship, the 
values of parental nodes usually directly determine the value of child nodes. It is 
important to determine the proper relationship type between nodes, since it can 
influence the calculation process of CBN. The deterministic link needs to be ignored 
while inferring the full conditional distribution of CBN using the Gibbs algorithm of 
MCMC [15]. After CBN is established, the distributions of nodes can be updated 
through forward and backward inference when evidence is available. 
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Propose the measurable 
variables of nodes of 
traditional BN
Determine the prior 
distributions of  nodes 
Decide nodes’ 
relationship 
(e.g. conditional 
distributions) 
Convert discrete nodes 
into continuous ones of 
measurable variables
Do the measurable variables
represent continuous state of nodes? 
Yes
No
Is information enough 
to decide prior distributions 
and nodes’ relationship?
Collect practical data 
and enquire experts
Yes
No
Link dependent nodes 
 
Fig. 3.1 Procedure to convert traditional BN into CBN 
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Abnormal factors
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Discrete nodes 
of traditional 
BN
Continuous 
nodes of CBN
 
Fig. 3.2 The process to obtain continuous nodes of CBN 
3.3 CBN analysis using MCMC 
The analytical method is unable to compute the complicated posteriors in CBN. MCMC 
has the capacity of deriving complicated distributions with high dimensions. To clearly 
understand MCMC, it is necessary to illustrate its relationship with the Monte Carlo 
and Markov chain. Monte Carlo simulation is a class of computational algorithms used 
to obtain numerical consequences depending on random samples. This method samples 
numerous random data following certain rules (e.g. a distribution), and these sampled 
data are then analyzed to obtain the desired consequences such as mean, variance and 
distribution density function. However, Monte Carlo simulation cannot directly sample 
from complicated distributions containing various dependent variables. To overcome 
this limitation, the Markov chain is applied to help Monte Carlo sampling, and thus 
MCMC is proposed. The basic principle of MCMC is achieving Monte Carlo sampling 
through the Markov chain [15]. The Markov chain is a random process that starts in one 
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state and moves from one state to another on the state space with appropriate transition 
probabilities. Its next state is only dependent on the current state rather than on previous 
ones. The state transition of a point on the state space of a Markov chain is actually the 
sampling process of Monte Carlo simulation. The state parameters of the point in the 
Markov chain are the sampled variable values from Monte Carlo. Detailed information 
about MCMC and its algorithms (e.g., Metropolis-Hastings, Gibbs and slice sampling) 
can be obtained from [15－17].  
 
A simple CBN (Fig. 3.3) is applied to illustrate the process of solving CBN with MCMC. 
 
Y3
Y5Y4
Y2Y1
 
Fig. 3.3 A simple CBN 
 
The prior and conditional distributions for the variables of the CBN in Fig. 3.3 are 
assumed as follows: 
),(~1 GammaY , ),(~
2
2 NormalY , )(~3 lExponentiaY , 
),(~)|( 13314 yyGammaYYYp , ),(~)|( 4324325 yyyGammaYYYYp +  
where  ,,,,  are constants, and iy  are the values of variables iY  (i=1,2,3,4,5).  
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The calculation of )|( 51 YYp  is taken as an example to illustrate how to use MCMC to 
compute the posterior probability distribution of CBN. According to Bayesian theory, 
the posterior probability distribution of Y1 given Y5 is represented as equation (3.1). 
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From equation (3.1) it can be seen that to calculate )|( 51 YYp , five variables and three 
integrations need to be dealt with, and among them, Y3 and Y4 are dependent. This 
posterior distribution is too complicated to be solved with an analytic method or Monte 
Carlo simulation. To overcome the limitation, the Gibbs algorithm of MCMC is applied 
to solve the posterior distributions of Y1 given Y5. Firstly, the full conditional 
distributions of the CBN in Fig. 3.3 are obtained as equations (3.2)－(3.6): 
 
)|(),|()|( 314154321 YYYpYpYYYYYp                  (3.2) 
)|(),|()|( 4325254312 YYYYpYpYYYYYp                 (3.3) 
)|()|()|()|( 4325314354213 YYYYpYYYpYpYYYYYp              (3.4) 
)|()|()|( 432531453214 YYYYpYYYpYYYYYp                  (3.5) 
)|()|( 432543215 YYYYpYYYYYp                       (3.6) 
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The original values for the variables of the CBN (Fig. 3.3) are provided as 
0
4
0
3
0
2
0
1 ,,, yyyy , and the evidence 
e
y5  is constant during the MCMC simulation. The 
full conditional distribution of Y1 is further inferred as in equation (3.7). It is found that 
the full conditional distribution of Y1 is a Gamma distribution with parameters 3y+  
and 4y+  . This kind of posterior distribution with closed form can be directly 
simulated with standard algorithms [16] (e.g., Monte Carlo). Thus, a new value 
1
1y  
can be sampled from Gamma ( 0
3y+  ,
0
4y+  ). It replaces 
0
1y   to serve as the 
parameter of Y3. 
 
),()|(),|()|( 43314154321 yyGammaYYYpYpYYYYYp ++      (3.7) 
 
The full conditional distribution of Y3 is further inferred as equation (3.8). 
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As shown in equation (3.8), the full conditional distribution of Y3 is the product of an 
exponential and two Gamma distributions, and it does not have the closed form. To 
solve this complex full conditional distribution, some other algorithms (e.g., slice 
sampling and Metropolis-Hastings) are required. If the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm 
is applied to deal with the full conditional distribution of Y3, a proposed distribution 
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Gamma (1,2) can be presented first. Samples are drawn from Gamma (1,2) and an 
assessment is made depending on the assessment standard [15], to determine whether 
to accept samples. The accepted sample is 
1
3y  and it replaces 
0
3y  to serve as the 
parameters of the full conditional distributions of other variables. On the other hand, if 
the slice sampling is used to deal with the full conditional distribution of 3Y  , an 
auxiliary variable Z   needs to be introduced. [17] It is assumed 
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and Z  is defined as uniform over the region )(0:),{( 33 YfZZYU = . To sample 
3Y  , we can sample jointly for ),( 3 ZY  and then ignore Z  . The process to obtain 
),( 3 ZY  is as follows: the initial value 
0
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). Then 
1
3y  is sampled uniformly at random in the region })(:{
0
33 ZYfYS = . The obtained 
1
3y  replaces 
0
3y  to serve as the parameters of the full conditional distributions of 
other variables. Through a similar process as described above, 
1
2y  and 
1
4y  can be 
sampled from their full conditional distributions.  
 
After 
1
1y  , 
1
2y  , 
1
3y   and 
1
4y   are sampled, the second round of simulation is 
conducted, and  
2
1y  , 
2
2y  , 
2
3y  and 
2
4y  are obtained. Following this procedure, 
numerous y1 can be obtained. The y1 sampled from the converged Markov chain can be 
considered as data from )|( 51 YYp . Then the posterior distribution of Y1 given Y5 is 
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analyzed through these samples. The whole process to obtain the posterior distribution 
of Y1 is the Gibbs simulation, in which slice sampling and Metropolis-Hastings are tried 
to solve the full conditional distributions. 
 
As described above, MCMC enables solving the complicated posterior distributions 
which Monte Carlo cannot deal with, although it may have a higher computational cost 
than does Monte Carlo.  
 
3.4 Case study 
This case study is used to demonstrate the advantages of CBN compared with traditional 
BN. The dynamic probability prediction and diagnosis of severe vessel roll is presented, 
and the result from CBN is compared with that from traditional BN to illustrate the 
capability of CBN to reduce uncertainty. 
 
3.4.1 The development of traditional BN for the severe vessel roll 
A common hazard for vessels, the ‘severe roll’ is an important contributor to the crew 
falling on vessels. Therefore, it is meaningful to study the occurrence probabilities of 
‘severe roll’ and diagnose its causal factors. This hazard is mainly caused by waves, 
including wind waves, swells and beachcombers. The roll studied in this paper results 
from a wind wave. Theoretically, wave height and wavelength contribute to the vessel 
roll, but for the sake of simplification, wavelength was not considered due to its very 
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complex relationship with wind and vessel roll [18]. Besides waves, vessel width and 
the wind directly acting on vessels contribute to roll as well. Following the steps 
mentioned in Section 3.2, FT was established first (shown in Fig. 3.4), and the meaning 
of symbols is shown in the two left columns of Table 3.1. The classification criteria of 
discrete states are shown in Table 3.2. According to Beaufort wind scale [19], we define 
‘strong wind’ as wind with a speed of over 10.8m/s, and a ‘rough sea’ is defined as 
waves with a height of over 2.5m/s, based on the Douglas sea scale [20]. After 
consulting the staff working on an international freighter, the severe roll angle for 
falling down has been defined as over 10º. The vessel with a width of less than 10m is 
assumed to be a ‘small vessel’. 
 
Table 3.1 Description of symbols in FT, traditional BN and CBN 
Symbols in FT  
and traditional BN 
Description Symbols in CBN Description 
X1 Strong wind I1 Wind speed 
X2 Rough sea I2 Wave height 
X3 Small vessel I3 Vessel width 
TE Severe roll ITE Roll angle 
Table 3.2 Classification criteria of discrete states 
Discrete states Criteria 
Strong wind Wind speed >10.8m/s [19] 
Rough sea Wave height>2.5m [20] 
Small vessel Vessel width<10m 
Severe roll Roll angle>10º 
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TE
X2
X1 X3
X3
X1
 
Fig. 3.4 FT for ‘severe roll’ 
 
Then the FT was converted to traditional BN (shown in Fig. 3.5) where all nodes are 
discrete. The prior probabilities of ‘strong wind’ and ‘small vessel’ were defined and 
shown in Table 3.3. The CPTs of the traditional BN were also obtained and the CPT of 
‘rough sea (X2)’ is shown in Table 3.4. 
 
X2
X3
TE
X1
 
Fig. 3.5 The traditional BN for ‘severe roll’ 
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Table 3.3 Prior probability 
Factors Prior probability 
X1 0.1 
X3 0.8 
Table 3.4 The CPT for ‘rough sea (X2)’ 
 X1 X1' 
X2 0.8 0 
X2' 0.2 1 
3.4.2 The development of CBN for vessel roll 
Following the process mentioned in Section 3.2, the traditional BN for ‘severe roll’ was 
converted to CBN (Fig. 3.6). Measurable variables of causal factors and abnormal 
events were determined correspondingly (see the right two columns of Table 3.1). The 
continuous nodes of measurable variables were used to replace traditional BN discrete 
nodes. The prior and conditional distributions of these continuous nodes were assumed 
as shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. In practice, this information can be obtained through 
historical data and expert opinion.  
 
I2
I3
ITE
I1
 
Fig. 3.6 CBN for vessel roll 
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Table 3.5 Prior distributions 
Factors Prior distributions 
I1 Weibull (2, 3.780) 
I3 Gamma (15, 2) 
Table 3.6 Conditional distributions 
Factors Conditional distributions 
p(I2|I1) Lognormal (I1/20, 0.2553) 
p(ITE|I1, I2, I3) Gamma(I1*(180*I2/100/(1-(I3*2/100)*(I3*2/100))), 2) 
 
3.4.3 The calculation of traditional BN and CBN for severe vessel roll 
CBN and traditional BN can both be used to analyze the occurrence of severe vessel 
roll. Furthermore, like traditional BN, CBN can update nodes when evidence is 
available. Thus, it can dynamically assess the occurrence probabilities of abnormal 
events (forward inference) and diagnose the latest situation of causal factors (backward 
inference). More importantly, CBN can significantly reduce the uncertainty of 
traditional BN in these two types of inferences. In this study, GeNie software [21] was 
applied to perform the inference of traditional BN, and OPENBUGS software [22] was 
used to perform the CBN calculation. According to the prior probabilities and CPTs, the 
occurrence probability of ‘severe roll’ is 0.0808 from traditional BN; while that 
probability is 0.0841 from CBN, based on the prior and conditional distributions. The 
original occurrence probabilities of ‘severe roll’ obtained through traditional BN and 
CBN are very close.  
3.4.3.1 Forward inference 
In this case, the evidence includes wind speeds of 1m/s, 9.5m/s and 11m/s. This 
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evidence was used to update the distribution of roll angles in the CBN. Then the 
obtained distribution was analyzed to determine the updated probability of ‘severe roll’. 
According to the criterion of ‘strong wind’ (Table 3.2), the discrete states (‘strong wind’ 
or ‘no strong wind’) of this evidence can be respectively obtained. When the discrete 
states of wind were implemented in traditional BN, the probabilities of ‘severe roll’ 
were updated. With wind speeds of 1m/s, 9.5m/s and 11m/s, the probabilities of ‘severe 
roll’ were calculated as 0, 0 and 0.808 using traditional BN. The former two have the 
same probabilities, because their observed wind speeds belong to the same discrete state 
(‘no strong wind’) and consequently have the same conditional probability in the CPTs 
of the traditional BN. This indicates that the traditional BN cannot effectively reflect 
the influence of the change of wind speeds on vessel roll when wind speeds are in the 
same discrete states (Table 3.2). In contrast, according to the results obtained through 
the CBN, the distribution of roll angles for the wind speed of 1m/s (Fig. 3.7 (a)) has an 
obvious change compared to that corresponding to the wind speed of 9.5m/s (Fig. 3.7 
(b)) though these two wind speeds belong to the same discrete state. Furthermore, the 
probabilities of ‘severe roll’ increase significantly from 1.5075E-05 to 0.7310. In this 
way, CBN overcomes the drawback of traditional BN and captures the dynamic changes 
of causal factors. 
 
In traditional BN, the probabilities of ‘severe roll’ corresponding to 1m/s and 9.5m/s 
are the same (i.e., 0), but it has a much higher probability (0.808) given the wind speed 
of 11m/s. This result is not reasonable, because practically the probabilities of ‘severe 
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roll’ should be close for the similar levels of wind speed (9.5m/s and 11m/s) given other 
fixed causal factors. According to Fig. 3.7 (a), (b) and (c), the roll angles from CBN 
have far less change with an increase of wind speed from 9.5m/s to 11m/s than their 
change caused by the increase of wind speed from 1m/s to 9.5m/s. Unlike the results 
obtained from traditional BN, the probability of ‘severe roll’ calculated by CBN given 
the wind speed of 11m/s (0.8459) is close to that corresponding to 9.5m/s (0.7310). This 
shows CBN can better reflect the change of roll angles over the changes of causal factors 
than traditional BN. For the simulations of roll angle distributions (Fig. 3.7), two 
Markov chains were used for each scenario. Each chain generated 200000 samples and 
the first 999 ones were discarded (burn-in). It was found that the historical traces of the 
two chains of each scenario overlapped; thus, the Markov chains are believed to be 
converged [23]. Also, MC errors (0.002, 0.015 and 0.018) of roll angles for the three 
scenarios are smaller than 0.05; thus, the simulation accuracy is acceptable [23]. The 
calculation of roll angles is a forward inference. Thus, samples are obtained from 
standard distributions (i.e., Weibull, Lognormal and Gamma distributions) using 
standard algorithms [16] in the simulations, and the acceptance rate is 1. 
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Fig. 3.7 Distribution density of roll angles over different wind speeds 
Note: the practical roll angles should be within 0 to 90º. In the case study, when the result is larger 
than 90º, it is considered to be 90º. 
 
3.4.3.2 Diagnosis analysis 
One of the features of BN is the diagnosis analysis (backward inference). Normally, 
when the abnormal event has been observed, the states of its causal factors can be 
inferred using diagnosis analysis. CBN can also help to reduce the uncertainty existing 
in the diagnosis process of traditional BN. 
 
Assuming roll angles were observed as 1º, 9.5º, 10.5º and 30º, the probabilities of 
causal factors were updated. For traditional BN, the discrete states (‘severe roll’ or ‘no 
severe roll’) of these observed angles were obtained according to Table 3.2 and used as 
the evidence for the update. Meanwhile, with these observed angles, the distributions 
of causal factors were also updated using CBN.  
 
The results obtained from traditional BN are shown in the second row of Table 3.7. 
When the roll angles are 1º , 9.5º , 10.5º  and 30º , the corresponding posterior 
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probabilities of ‘rough sea’ are 0.0070, 0.0070, 0.9109 and 0.9109 respectively. Thus, 
traditional BN failed to predict the state change of causal factors given different roll 
angles (e.g., 1ºand 9.5º), because these observed angles belong to the same discrete 
state according to Table 3.2. Furthermore, when the roll angles are very close (e.g., 9.5
ºand 10.5º ), the diagnosis consequences are very different (0.0070 and 0.9109). 
However, in practice, the likely probabilities of causal factors are believed to be similar, 
given alike evidence of abnormal events. When CBN was applied to conduct the 
backward analysis, the posterior distributions of causal factors were obtained, and then 
the posterior probabilities of abnormal states of these factors were calculated depending 
on the classification criteria (Table 3.2). The posterior distribution density of wave 
heights from CBN is shown in Fig. 3.8, and the posterior probabilities of ‘rough sea’ 
are shown in row 3 of Table 3.7. The results from CBN show that the states of ‘rough 
sea’ change given different roll angles which even belong to the same discrete state (e.g., 
1ºand 9.5º), and also the posterior probabilities of ‘rough sea’ are close (0.1934 and 
0.2475) given small difference in roll angles (9.5ºand 10.5º) as evidence. The diagnosis 
results reveal that CBN is able to better capture the changes of abnormal events and 
reflect them in the state change of causal factors through backward analysis. Two 
Markov chains were used for each scenario following the slice algorithm, and each 
chain generated 20000 samples with the burn-in of 999 samples. The acceptance rate of 
simulation for all scenarios is 1. Moreover, following the procedure described in Section 
3.4.3.1, it was verified that the Markov chains converged, and the simulation accuracy 
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is acceptable. 
 
Table 3.7 The diagnosis of ‘rough sea’ from traditional BN and CBN 
Evidence (roll angles) 1º 9.5º 10.5º 30º 
Probabilities of ‘rough sea’ from traditional BN 0.0070 0.0070 0.9109 0.9109 
Probabilities of ‘rough sea’ from CBN 0.0061 0.1934 0.2475 0.9888 
 
Accurate diagnosis results are important for the prioritization of causal factors and 
development of countermeasures to effectively prevent abnormal events. After 
obtaining the posterior probabilities of causal factors according to CBN, the factors with 
bigger posterior probability can be identified, and the mean increase of roll angles can 
be respectively calculated given the unit increase of each causal factor. The causal 
factors with larger posterior probability and leading to a bigger increase of roll angles 
are critical factors. These factors should be given priority when deciding 
countermeasures. In this case, it is of little value to identify the critical causal factors, 
because none of them can be controlled in order to reduce the probability of the 
abnormal event. Since the causal factors in this case study tend to be uncontrollable, 
critical factors are not identified here. However, the way of identifying critical factors 
can be used when analyzing risks in other areas. 
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Fig. 3.8 Distribution density of wave heights 
 
3.4.3.3 Flexibility of CBN 
‘Severe roll’ can lead to different types of accidents. For different accidents, the criteria 
used to define ‘severe roll’ may differ. For example, a roll angle greater than 10º can be 
considered a ‘severe roll’ in the case of crew falling on a vessel; while for vessel 
capsizing, it is more reasonable to use a bigger roll angle (e.g., above 80º) to define 
‘severe roll’. CBN is open to the flexibility of definition of accident type and the 
associated criteria used to define abnormal states. For example, in this case, CBN is 
able to sample numerous roll angles, and once a specific type of accident is determined, 
the probability of ‘severe roll’ can be computed as the percentage of the roll angles of 
more than the defined criteria. Given the criteria defined for ‘severe roll’ mentioned 
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above, the probability of ‘severe roll’ for capsizing corresponding to the wind speed of 
11m/s is 0.0014, while the probability of ‘severe roll’ for falling down is 0.8114. 
However, traditional BN can only calculate the probability of abnormal events for one 
accident.  
3.5 Conclusions 
This paper applied a CBN-based method to predict the probability of an abnormal event 
and diagnose its causal factors to reduce the uncertainty caused by the assumption of a 
discrete state made in a traditional BN. The comparative analysis of traditional BN and 
CBN shows that CBN is able to produce a more reasonable prediction of abnormal 
events and reflect the effects of any measurable change of casual factors on the 
probability variation of abnormal events. CBN can also better infer the state of causal 
factors than traditional BN given the observation of abnormal events. Furthermore, 
CBN has flexibility that helps calculate the probabilities of abnormal events for various 
accidents. The case study presented in this paper partially validated the usefulness of 
the proposed approach. Future work will be necessary to validate the approach using a 
real-world case. Moreover, it will also be valuable to develop a generic risk management 
framework that adopts the CBN-based approach as the basis.  
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4. Security Assessment of Process Facilities－Intrusion Modeling  
Preface 
A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection 2018; 117: 639－650. As the primary author, I developed the 
models and applied them in a case study. I completed the manuscript and improved it 
according to the feedbacks of co-authors and reviewers. Dr. Faisal Khan helped to 
identify the research topic and provide suggestions for manuscript improvement. Dr. 
Ming Yang helped to revise the original manuscript. 
Abstract  
The process industry is confronted with terrorism threats. Effective security 
management demands the ability to defend facilities against different intrusion 
scenarios. This study first presented various intrusion scenarios to explain the 
corresponding intrusion process using graphical barriers. Subsequently, this work 
dynamically analyzed the successful intrusion probabilities and security potentials of 
barriers using a Bayesian network considering the dependency of barriers and 
interaction of different intrusion scenarios. It was observed that successful intrusion 
probabilities and security potentials are strong functions of intrusion scenarios. 
Therefore, extensive intrusion scenarios must be considered while assessing and 
designing the security systems of process facilities.  
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Keywords: Intrusion scenarios; Intrusion process analysis; Bayesian network model; 
Dependency modelling; Probability update 
4.1 Introduction 
Terrorism is increasingly becoming a pressing concern across the world. The attacks on 
process facilities [1－10] demonstrate that the process industry is now an attractive 
target for terrorists. The process industry plays an essential role in the social and 
economic development, and large amounts of hazardous substances are processed in 
process plants every day. Attacking a process plant not only results in substantial 
economic losses [2] but also generates severe societal impact [11]. Thus, decent security 
management is urgently needed to protect process plants from terrorist attacks. 
Vulnerability assessment provides required information for security management. 
Vulnerability constitutes of two parts: the likelihood of successful intrusion and 
successful damage. Since prevention of intentional damage is very difficult once the 
intrusion is successful, especially for attacks with weapons, intrusion prevention 
accounts for a significant part of security management. Thus, effective intrusion 
assessment greatly supports the security management of process plants. Whether the 
existing barriers can effectively prevent intrusions becomes an interesting topic. 
However, as argued in [12], the adequacy of a security system depends on what it is 
protecting against. If the threat has been underestimated, readiness could be 
overestimated [12]. One feature of a security problem is that it includes two active sides
－ attackers and defenders, making successful intrusion depend on both 
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countermeasures of defenders and the intrusion pattern of attackers. The 
countermeasures which perform well in one kind of intrusion scenario do not 
necessarily work in another one. This means a facility well secured against one intrusion 
scenario could be vulnerable to others. If the intrusion assessment is conducted without 
the consideration of intrusion scenarios, the security risk of a plant could be 
significantly underestimated. To solve this problem, this study analyzes impacts of 
intrusion scenarios on successful intrusion probabilities.  
 
The following works have conducted assessments of vulnerability and security risks. 
Reniers et al. [13] described a systematic development of a practical security system in 
the process industry. The authors stated that the probability of each type of intrusion 
scenario must be defined in the security risk assessment process [13], but they did not 
research the influence of different types of intrusion scenarios. Bajpai et al. [11] 
explained the steps of security risk management, including threat analysis, vulnerability 
analysis, security countermeasures and emergency response. Although terrorists, 
disgruntled employees, contractors and criminals were identified as sources of threats 
[11], intrusion scenarios were not discussed in their work. Argenti [14] clarified the 
collection process of related data based on expert experience to support the vulnerability 
assessment of physical protection systems. However, the influence of intrusion 
scenarios on related vulnerability data was not considered during expert surveys. 
Landucci [15] et al. investigated the possibility that a shock wave generated by 
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improvised explosives could damage process equipment and/or trigger an escalation 
sequence leading to a domino scenario. This study supports vulnerability assessments 
of industrial plants for a shock wave caused by improvised explosive devices. However, 
it did not research intrusion processes and scenarios. Van Staalduinen et al. used a 
graphical attack model to represent the process of state changes from safe conditions to 
successful attacks by breaching security barriers. Then a Bayesian network (BN) model 
was applied to calculate failure probabilities of barriers and consequence probabilities 
[5]. However, this model did not consider the influence of intrusion scenarios, and thus 
the assessment result cannot accurately reflect defensive ability for a specific intrusion 
scenario. Furthermore, not every security barrier works for all intrusion scenarios. Their 
graphical model cannot reflect how attackers achieve intrusion by destroying 
corresponding barriers in different intrusion scenarios. Thus, the intrusion process could 
not be well understood, and effective countermeasures could not be proposed for a 
specific intrusion scenario. Akgun et al. [16] presented a fuzzy integrated model to 
assess the vulnerability of a critical facility under multiple qualitative/quantitative 
criteria in a group decision-making environment. This model considered the 
interdependencies among the system functions (i.e., logical dependencies), but intrusion 
scenarios were not included in their assessment. Argenti et al. [17] applied a BN model 
to assess the vulnerability of chemical facilities to deliberate attacks quantitatively. 
However, they considered only the damage pattern (e.g., deliberate misoperation) 
instead of intrusion scenarios. Thus, the influence of intrusion scenarios on the 
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performance of physical security systems was not included. Furthermore, the 
interactions of different intrusion scenarios and dependency among causal factors (e.g., 
the dependency between CCTV and intrusion detection by security guards) were 
missing. Fakhravar et al. [18] developed a Discrete-time BN to investigate the 
vulnerability of a gas pipeline considering the performance of security countermeasures. 
This work did not analyze specific intrusion processes in different scenarios and did not 
consider the influence of intrusion scenarios on vulnerability. McGill et al. [19] assessed 
the non-performance of a security system based on the probability of adversary success 
using fuzzy logic. This work approximated the relationship between defensive 
capabilities and probability of adversary success based on the effectiveness of six 
defensive criteria. However, this model assumed a fixed initiating event; thus, it did not 
analyze the influence of intrusion scenarios on the probability of adversary success.  
 
To the authors' knowledge, few works have considered the effects of intrusion scenarios 
on the success likelihood of intrusion. Van Staalduinen et al. [2] classified the attacks 
into three scenarios (manned, vehicle, and aerial-drone), and the consequence 
probabilities of the three scenarios were respectively calculated using BN models. 
However, this work did not analyze the damage process of barriers in specific intrusion 
scenarios, nor identify the security potentials of barriers in different intrusion scenarios. 
Moreover, since their work did not include the interactions of different intrusion 
scenarios, it cannot predict the latest successful intrusion probability of a scenario given 
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evidence from another scenario. This function is vital to obtain reliable intrusion 
probabilities with limited available information. Furthermore, this work failed to 
consider important barriers (e.g., tools' availability) for specific intrusion scenarios.  
 
The current paper proposes an innovative approach to model the effects of intrusion 
scenarios on a successful intrusion. This work will help to identify critical scenarios and 
the weak links which can be strengthened to make the security system robust. 
Specifically, this study identified potential intrusion scenarios and visually represented 
specific intrusion processes by destroying corresponding barriers in a graphical model. 
Then a BN model was established based on the graphical model to assess success 
intrusion probabilities and analyze the security potentials of barriers in different 
intrusion scenarios. In this study, a barrier's security potential reflects the ability of the 
barrier to intrusion prevention in its current state. It is measured by the product of 
occurrence likelihood of an insecure barrier and the likelihood that the insecure barrier 
leads to intrusion success. The bigger the product is, the smaller security potential the 
barrier has. An insecure barrier means a barrier with a weak security state. Taking the 
barrier of workers in workplaces as an example, if the workers have a reduced ability 
to detect attackers and to timely report to security personnel, the barrier of workers in 
workplaces is an insecure barrier. Various factors can lead to the poor state of a barrier 
(i.e., an insecure barrier), which include technical factors, human factors [20] and 
organizational factors. For example, the poor state of the barrier of workers in 
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workplaces could be caused by the lack of training and regulations; the barrier of the 
fence could be in its weak state due to the design flaw, material defects or the lack of 
maintenance. Compared to previous works, this study clarifies intrusion processes by 
destroying corresponding barriers in different scenarios and quantitatively analyzes the 
influence of intrusion scenarios on the likelihood of successful intrusions and the 
security potentials of barriers. It includes attackers' features in the ability assessment of 
a defensive system. Furthermore, by including launching barriers, it can help defenders 
estimate what intrusion scenarios attackers would prefer, which will be discussed later. 
Moreover, this work enables the prediction of the latest successful intrusion probability 
in a scenario given evidence from another. Based on the updated result, the latest critical 
intrusion scenarios and weak links can be identified.  
 
To facilitate a functional demonstration of the proposed method, several assumptions 
are made in this study: a) the attack target is located inside process plants; b) the 
attackers' goal is to destroy process facilities instead of gathering intelligence; c) the 
attackers know potential intrusion scenarios, but only one intrusion scenario is applied 
per time; d) no reinforcements of attackers come after starting the intrusion; e) in an 
intrusion stage, attackers seek the largest likelihood of successful intrusion regardless 
of cost; f) for internal intrusions, the terrorists first have an attack motivation and then 
they attempt to become employees in order to launch internal attacks; and g) all 
defenders aim to protect facilities, and none of them intend to cause damage. This study 
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only focuses on the intrusion processes of physical terrorism attacks instead of cyber 
attacks, wars or other causes. The damage to targeted facilities given successful 
intrusion is not covered in this work. The methodology framework of this work is shown 
in Fig. 4.1. The novel contributions of this work are: a) quantitatively analyzing the 
impacts of intrusion scenarios on the defensive ability of process plants; b) including 
the security layer for preventing the launching of an attack; and c) demonstrating 
dynamic assessment to support the dynamic identification of critical intrusion scenarios 
and dynamic detection of weak links in a security system.  
 
Establishment of a 
BN model based on 
graphical models
Dynamic assessment of the 
successful intrusion 
probabilities and barriers’ 
security potentials  using 
the BN model
Decide defensive ability 
for potential intrusion 
scenarios
Visual demonstration 
of the intrusion process 
and dynamic security 
potentials of barriers for 
different scenarios 
Dynamic calculation of 
defensive ability for 
different intrusion 
scenarios
Dynamic identification 
of weak links within the 
security system
Achievements
Color barriers in 
graphical models 
to show dynamic 
security potentials 
Identification of 
potential intrusion 
scenarios
Identification of 
security barriers
Development of 
graphical models 
to show intrusion 
processes
 
Fig. 4.1 Methodology framework for intrusion modelling 
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 identifies intrusion scenarios and 
security barriers. Section 4.3 presents graphical intrusion models and illustrates their 
advantages compared to the Swiss cheese model. In Section 4.4, a BN model is 
established, and it is applied to calculate and update successful intrusion probabilities 
as well as the security potentials of barriers for four intrusion scenarios. Section 4.5 
provides conclusions.  
4.2 The identification of intrusion scenarios and security barriers  
4.2.1 Intrusion scenario identification 
In this study, an intrusion refers to a process in which attackers or their attack tools (e.g., 
drones) reach the target by destroying related security barriers, given an attack 
motivation. This means that the arrival of attack tools to targets is also considered as a 
successful intrusion. The significant parameters to feature different intrusion scenarios 
in this work include attackers' background (insiders or outsiders), the devices used 
during the intrusion, and whether the intrusion is direct through violence. Table 4.1 
shows the intrusion classification determined by records of previous terrorism attacks 
[3, 5－7, 21, 22] and related literature [2, 13]. 
 
Table 4.1 Intrusion classification 
Intrusion 
categories 
Intrusion types Intrusion scenarios 
External intrusion 
Creep into  
Creep in without guns 
Creep in with guns 
Direct attacks with firearms 
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Direct intrusion by 
violence 
Direct vehicle attacks with 
firearms 
Rocket attacks 
Drone attacks carrying 
explosives 
Intrusion by 
insiders 
Intrusion by insiders 
Intrusion by employees  
Intrusion by contractors 
 
The intrusion categories are divided based on the attackers' background. External 
intrusion is conducted by strangers or visitors, while intrusion by insiders is launched 
by workers or contractors. According to whether attackers need to avoid detection, the 
external intrusion is classified into two types－‘creep into’ and ‘direct intrusion by 
violence’. For the intrusion type of ‘creep into’, attackers secretly intrude to avoid 
detection, while for the latter one, attackers directly intrude and destroy activated 
security measures using violence. Normally, in direct intrusion by violence, attackers 
have the strong capacity (e.g., being equipped with weapons) to damage the plant 
defences and the security in the area is very weak. In such a case, attackers have the 
confidence to achieve their goal even if they are detected (e.g., the attacks in Algeria 
[23]). Each intrusion type includes several intrusion scenarios. The type of ‘creep into’ 
is divided into ‘creep in without guns’ and ‘creep in with guns’ considering the 
significant difference of intrusion difficulty level caused by firearms. ‘Direct intrusion 
by violence’ is classified into ‘direct attacks with firearms’, ‘direct vehicle attacks with 
firearms’, ‘rocket attacks’ and ‘drone attacks carrying explosives’, based on the 
difference of applied intrusion devices [2]. The ‘intrusion by insiders’ is divided into 
‘intrusion by employees’ and ‘intrusion by contractors’, based on the intruder's identity. 
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The employees' intrusion is considered much easier than the contractors'. Interviewing 
workers from a Chinese chemical plant, it was learned that contractors have different 
badges and work clothes from employees and that patrollers usually pay more attention 
to contractors. Compared with employees, in some companies, contractors may have 
limited access and less familiarity with the plant.  
 
Table 4.1 demonstrates that attackers have various options to reach their targets. In 
practice, plants' security measures mainly focus on thieves who creep into plants, 
without paying enough attention to potential attacks which include different intrusion 
scenarios. Such security management leaves plants with a high vulnerability level.  
4.2.2 Security barrier identification 
Three security layers are identified based on three intrusion stages－launching, entrance 
and reaching targets within plants. The definitions of the three security layers are: 
(1) Launching layer. When an attacker has an attack motivation for a given target, some 
conditions (e.g., obtaining required tools) must be satisfied to launch the attack. 
Thus, preparation of launching conditions is the first stage and the security layer 
working in this stage is called the launching layer. The launching layer comprises 
some launching barriers. 
(2) Entrance layer. The target is assumed to be inside process plants, and attackers or 
their tools must enter the plant before reaching the target. Thus, the second stage is 
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to enter the plant. The security layer preventing attackers from entering plants is the 
entrance layer, which is constituted by entrance barriers. 
(3) Interior layer. In the last intrusion stage, the attackers or their tools head for targets 
inside plants until reaching the target. The layer working in this stage is called the 
interior layer. It is made up of interior barriers.  
 
The security barriers of each security layer are identified [11, 13, 19, 24, 25] and shown 
in Table 4.2. The target is a storage tank located in open air within a process plant. The 
security layers are noted for each security barrier in Table 4.2 to support the 
establishment of the graphical models in Section 4.3. Thereinto, L is the launching layer; 
E represents the entrance layer; and I is the interior layer. 
 
Table 4.2 The identified security barriers [11, 13, 19, 24, 25] 
Symbols Meanings 
Security 
layers 
Prior 
probabilities 
of insecure 
barriers 
B1 
Intelligence collection and suppression of 
terrorism by the security agency  
L 0.300 
B2 Accessibility of intrusion tools L － 
B3 Satisfaction of ability requirements for staff L 0.100 
B4 Background screening for employment L － 
B5 
Report of abnormal words and actions of 
colleagues 
L 0.450 
B6 Fence E 0.100 
B7 Patrol E & I － 
B8 CCTV  E & I 0.010 
B9 Folding gate E 0.006 
B10 Guard E 0.150 
B11 Local police E & I － 
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B12 Workers escorting visitors I 0.001 
B13 Workers in workplaces I 0.200 
 
The practical meanings of parts of the security barriers in Table 4.2 are illustrated below. 
(1) Intelligence collection and suppression of terrorism by the security agency. The 
security agency collects terrorism intelligence, including information regarding 
terrorist groups, individuals, weapons and attack plots, to help suppress terrorist 
activities. Intense suppression can help cut the financial sources of terrorist groups, 
causing an impediment to weapons' purchase (e.g., rockets). Thus, good intelligence 
collection and suppression of terrorism can detect and destroy a potential attack in 
a timely way and limit terrorists' ability to launch attacks. 
(2) Accessibility of intrusion tools. For some intrusion scenarios, tools (e.g., firearms) 
are required to launch an attack. Thus, the accessibility of similar tools limits the 
occurrence of such intrusion scenarios.  
(3) Satisfaction of ability requirements for staff. For intrusion by insiders, attackers 
must become employees or contractors. They must satisfy the ability requirements 
to have an opportunity to be hired. 
(4) Report of abnormal words and actions of colleagues. For intrusion by insiders, when 
workers or contractors have a motivation to launch an attack, they may use abnormal 
words or actions in daily life. Other workers may notice such abnormality and report 
it to related institutions. In this way, this barrier could prevent the launching of an 
internal attack. 
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(5) Workers escorting visitors. Based on the visitor escorting policy, workers should be 
assigned to escort visitors. These workers will prevent the visitors from approaching 
unauthorized facilities. This policy is a barrier to prevent intrusion launched by a 
visitor. 
(6) Workers in workplaces. Many plants have a policy that workers take charge of their 
own work areas. Normally, when strangers enter workplaces, workers interrogate 
them and report to security personnel. These workers constitute a barrier for a 
successful intrusion.  
4.3 Intrusion process analysis for different scenarios 
4.3.1 Swiss cheese model and its limitations to represent intrusion process  
The Swiss cheese model has been applied to represent accident causation in previous 
work [26]. In the model, slices were used to model barriers which represent defences 
against failure. A hole in a slice represents a weakness in the system. Accidents occur 
when the holes in the slices are aligned [5]. If a Swiss cheese model (see Fig. 4.2) is 
used to describe the principle of the successful intrusion, ‘S’ represents security barriers 
between attack motivation and successful intrusion. It can be observed from Fig. 4.2 
that successful intrusion occurs due to the failures of security barriers. However, for 
each intrusion scenario, the corresponding barriers may be different. If existing barriers 
are analyzed without considering the intrusion scenarios, the principle and process of 
barrier damage in each intrusion scenario cannot be understood. Thus, corresponding 
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countermeasures cannot be adequately proposed for specific intrusion scenarios. For 
example, although all barriers in Fig. 4.2 can help to prevent intrusion, listing only all 
existing barriers without considering the intrusion scenario, the Swiss cheese model 
cannot clarify what barriers work for which intrusion scenario and what barriers exist 
in different intrusion stages.  
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Schematic Swiss cheese model for successful intrusion 
 
Furthermore, a Swiss cheese model has limitations to model intrusion process due to its 
linear nature, and below is a brief review of the impractical points.  
(1) The barriers are represented by a linear sequence in Fig. 4.2, but in practice, the 
barriers do not necessarily function in a strict sequence. Some barriers may have a 
parallel relationship (e.g., gates and fences). 
(2) Barriers may not be destroyed one by one, since the following barriers may be 
skipped automatically when the previous barrier fails. Fig. 4.2 cannot reflect this 
point. 
(3) Some barriers can only work together with other barriers, which cannot be 
represented in Fig. 4.2.  
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4.3.2 The establishment of graphical models and their merits 
To overcome the limitations of the Swiss cheese model, a graphical intrusion model is 
proposed in this study. Not only can the graphical intrusion model represent the 
nonlinear feature of intrusion issue, but it also clarifies the processes for specific 
intrusion scenarios. A general graphical model is shown in Fig. 4.3. This model includes 
three security layers, and corresponding security barriers are assigned inside the layers. 
The security layers are represented using large rectangles, while security barriers are 
shown as small rectangles. The intrusion is achieved through the damage of security 
barriers and the intrusion processes in a particular scenario are represented by different 
sets of arrows starting from attack motivation and ending with the successful intrusion. 
 
Launching layer Entrance layer
Attack 
motivation
Successful intrusion in 
intrusion scenario 
‘m’
Interior layer
 
Fig. 4.3 A general graphical model for an intrusion scenario 
 
This study presents graphical models for four intrusion scenarios: i) creeping in without 
guns, ii) direct vehicle attacks with firearms, iii) drone attacks carrying explosives, and 
iv) intrusion by employees. The security layers and intrusion scenarios are listed in 
Table 4.3. The attack target is a storage tank located in open air within a process plant. 
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To highlight the merits of the proposed graphical models, a Swiss cheese model is also 
established for the comparison purpose. Fig. 4.4 is a Swiss cheese model demonstrating 
the process of a successful intrusion, while Fig. 4.5 shows the graphical models 
developed for these four intrusion scenarios.  
 
Table 4.3 Successful intrusion scenarios and their security layers 
Symbols Meanings 
ML1 Launching layer for ‘creep in without guns’ 
ME1 Entrance layer for ‘creep in without guns’ 
MI1 Interior layer for ‘creep in without guns’ 
ML2 Launching layer for direct vehicle attacks with firearms 
ME2 Entrance layer for direct vehicle attacks with firearms 
MI2 Interior layer for direct vehicle attacks with firearms 
ML3 Launching layer for drone attacks carrying explosives 
ME3 Entrance layer for drone attacks carrying explosives 
MI3 Interior layer for drone attacks carrying explosives 
ML4 Launching layer for intrusion by employees 
ME4 Entrance layer for intrusion by employees 
MI4 Interior layer for intrusion by employees 
C Successful intrusion of ‘creep in without guns’ 
V Successful intrusion of direct vehicle attacks with firearms 
D Successful intrusion of drone attacks carrying explosives 
E Successful of intrusion by employees 
 
B1 B2B4 B6 B7B8B9
Attack 
motivation
B11B5 B10 B12 B13
Successful 
intrusion
B3
 
Fig. 4.4 Swiss cheese model for successful intrusion (refer to Table 4.2 for meanings of symbols) 
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Fig. 4.5 (a) Graphical intrusion model for ‘creep in without guns’  
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Fig. 4.5 (b) Graphical intrusion model for direct vehicle attacks with firearms  
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Fig. 4.5 (c) Graphical intrusion model for drone attacks carrying explosives 
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 Fig. 4.5 (d) Graphical intrusion model for intrusion by employees 
Fig. 4.5 Graphical intrusion models for different intrusion scenarios (refer to Table 4.2 for 
meanings of symbols) 
 
Unlike the Swiss cheese model in Fig. 4.4, the graphical models in Fig. 4.5 clearly show 
intrusion processes. For example, Fig. 4.5(a) includes various intrusion processes for 
‘creep in without guns’, two of which are explained below. These two processes are 
noted using ‘1’ and ‘2’ in Fig. 4.5(a). 
(1) In intrusion process 1, a person with an attack motivation overcomes the intelligence 
collection and suppression of terrorism by the security agency (B1), and launches 
the attack of ‘creep in without guns’. The person enters the plant by breaching fences 
(B6) without being detected by patrol (B7). In the plant, the attacker is detected by 
workers in workplaces (B13) who then report to the patrol (B7). Unfortunately, the 
patrols are unable to control the attacker, and they call local police (B11). However, 
before local police arrive, the attacker reaches the storage tank.  
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(2) In intrusion process 2, a person with attack motivations overcomes the intelligence 
collection and suppression of terrorism by the security agency (B1) and launches an 
attack of ‘creep in without guns’. The person enters the plant from the folding gates 
(B9) without being detected by guards (B10). In the plant, the attacker is not 
detected by workers in the workplaces or the patrol, successfully reaching the 
storage tank. 
 
Apart from this merit, the proposed graphical models (Fig. 4.5) include the nonlinear 
relationship between barriers. Specifically, they have the following advantages, 
compared to the Swiss cheese model in Fig. 4.4: 
⚫ They consider that attackers could destroy alternative barriers to reach their targets. 
For example, in Fig. 4.5(a), when attackers creep into a plant, they could enter 
through gates or, alternatively, through fences. In this scenario, the gate and fence 
are not destroyed in sequence.  
⚫ They consider that attackers could skip barriers instead of destroying one by one in 
sequence to reach their targets. In the entrance stage of Fig. 4.5(a), when the patrol 
or guards detect attackers, the local police could be informed, and they then become 
an element of the entrance layer. Otherwise, the barrier of local police is skipped. 
⚫ They represent the fact that some barriers only function while cooperating with 
other barriers. Fig. 4.5(a) shows that CCTV helps patrols and local police detect 
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attackers. However, if no officers are watching, the CCTV itself could not prevent 
intrusions. 
⚫ They identify what barriers exist in different intrusion stages for a specific intrusion 
scenario. This can help to guide the selection of a countermeasure. For example, 
managers hope to prevent an attack as early as possible. If one measure can enhance 
the interior barrier and another measure can enhance the launching barrier, both of 
which have similar prevention effects and cost, priority should be given to the latter 
one. 
⚫ They demonstrate what barriers are destroyed in different intrusion scenarios.  
This visual information can provide support to decide what barriers can be enhanced 
to prevent specific intrusion scenarios. For example, according to Fig. 4.5 (d), 
background screening could prevent the launching of an internal attack. If an 
internal attack is launched, to prevent such an attack from reoccurring, resources 
can be allocated to enhance background screening. This is consistent with the 
practical case. In the 2015 terrorist attack on a French chemical plant, the 
deliveryman of the plant was on a terrorist list but was not identified due to 
inadequate background screening [3]. 
4.3.3 The features of different intrusion scenarios 
Some features of the four intrusion scenarios are observed in Fig. 4.5. According to Fig. 
4.5(a) and Fig. 4.5(b), all three security layers work for ‘creep in without guns’ and 
direct vehicle attacks with firearms. All entrance and interior barriers contribute to the 
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intrusion prevention of ‘creep in without guns’, but only one launching barrier has 
prevention effects for that intrusion scenario. This is because the attack of ‘creep in 
without guns’ does not need many attackers and special attack tools; thus, it is easy to 
conduct and hard to detect before launching. 
 
According to Fig. 4.5(c), the entrance and interior layers do not work for the intrusion 
scenario of drone attacks carrying explosives. Existing barriers tend to be designed to 
prevent attacks launched on the ground instead of an air attack; thus, drone attacks with 
explosives have the least barriers among the four intrusion scenarios, as shown in Fig. 
4.5. Drones are emerging products, and they have been used for attacks. ISIS has 
recently conducted drone attacks in Iraq, and the FBI detected plots of launching small 
drones with bombs targeting the Pentagon and the capitol of the US in 2011 [22].  To 
prevent a drone attack carrying explosives, the existing barriers need to be enhanced, 
for example, by taking stricter control of explosives. Also, extra barriers can be added, 
such as applying interference devices to disable drone flights above the chemical plant 
area. Moreover, legislation could be passed to define process plants as no-fly zones 
(some nations have taken this measure) and to require that manufacturers design drones 
which cannot fly above process plants.  
 
Fig. 4.5(d) shows that the entrance layer also does not work for intrusion by employees, 
which is because the attackers have the authority to enter the plant in this scenario. 
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However, attackers need to overcome four launching barriers to start an internal attack 
as demonstrated in Fig. 4.5(d). This leaves more options to prevent the launching of 
intrusion by employees than other intrusion scenarios shown in Fig. 4.5. 
4.4 Quantitative intrusion assessment using a Bayesian network model  
In this section, successful intrusion probabilities of the above-mentioned four scenarios 
are calculated using a BN model. The calculation results are used to assess the defensive 
ability for each intrusion scenario. The barriers' security potentials are also analyzed 
considering the prior probabilities of insecure barriers and weights. Subsequently, the 
defensive ability and barriers' security potentials in different scenarios are dynamically 
assessed. 
4.4.1 The establishment of BN model 
Fig. 4.6 shows a general BN model of successful intrusion for ‘m’ potential scenarios. 
Within this Figure, nodes represent causal factors and target events, while arcs show 
their dependence. The relationship of dependent nodes is represented with conditional 
probability tables (CPTs). More detailed information about the basic of BN model can 
be obtained from [27, 28].   
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Fig. 4.6 A general Bayesian network model for ‘m’ intrusion scenarios 
 
The BN model as shown in Fig. 4.7 is established to conduct the quantitative assessment 
of successful intrusion for these four scenarios. As discussed in Section 4.3, successful 
intrusion is achieved once security barriers are destroyed. This means barrier failures 
contribute to the success of intrusion and thus insecure barriers can be considered as 
causal factors of the successful intrusion. The insecure barriers and failure of security 
layers serve as the primary and intermediate nodes of the BN model. Fig. 4.5 has 
provided a clear demonstration of the barriers and layers involved in each intrusion 
scenario. Based on Fig. 4.5, the related nodes are decided for each intrusion scenario. 
Then the dependencies among barriers are analyzed and represented as links among the 
nodes. For example, CCTV helps the patrol and local police to detect and locate 
attackers; thus, failure of the CCTV may contribute to a failure of the patrol and local 
103 
 
police to defend against attackers. Therefore, CCTV is linked to the patrol and local 
police in the proposed BN model. Furthermore, some barriers work for more than one 
intrusion scenario. For example, B1 (Intelligence collection and suppression of 
terrorism by security agency) influences the successful intrusion probabilities of all four 
scenarios through influencing the failure probability of their launching layers. To reflect 
this feature, B1 is linked to four launching layers in the BN. With such linking, the 
interactions between the four intrusion scenarios are established. In this way, the 
proposed BN model (Fig. 4.7) represents the quantitative dependencies among barriers 
and also includes the interactive relationship between different intrusion scenarios. The 
prior probabilities of insecure barriers are presented in Table 4.2. The prior probabilities 
could be determined by experts according to the specific situation of the plant. Experts 
need to consider the causal factors (e.g., technical, human and organizational factors) 
of insecure barriers to decide their prior probabilities. The analysis results could reflect 
the practical situation of the specifically targeted plant, and help to manage security in 
practice. Although the data used in Section 4.4 is hypothetical, it does not influence the 
function illustration of the proposed BN model. The current paper aims to explain the 
functions of this model and demonstrate its advantage instead of directly guiding the 
practical security management with the analysis results. 
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Fig. 4.7 Quantitative intrusion assessment model considering different intrusion scenarios (refer 
to Tables 4.2 & 4.3 for the meanings of symbols) 
4.4.2 The assessment of successful intrusion probabilities and security potentials 
of barriers 
4.4.2.1 The probabilities of successful intrusion in different scenarios 
The successful intrusion probabilities and the failure probabilities of security layers are 
calculated using the established BN model in Fig. 4.7, and the results are shown in rows 
2 and 5－7 of Table 4.4. To help understand the defensive ability in each intrusion 
scenario, the assessment criteria are defined in Table 4.5. “Unacceptable” means the 
success probability of intrusion cannot be accepted, while “acceptable” means the 
current defensive state for the intrusion is acceptable. “Tolerable” means the successful 
intrusion probability is tolerable when the cost of countermeasures is not proportionate 
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to the probability reduction. It is worth mentioning that the probabilities in Table 4.5 
are conditional probabilities, given a precondition that attackers have an attack 
motivation and are planning to launch an attack on a specific target. The probability 10-
4 in Table 4.5 can be understood as that for when 10,000 intrusions are planned to be 
launched, only one intrusion succeeds. The probability smaller than 10-4 is acceptable, 
while that higher than 10-3 is unacceptable. According to this explanation, 10-4 means 
that if attackers plan to attack a plant once per 30 days, they may succeed one time in 
3×105 days (i.e., 822 years). 
 
Table 4.4 The probabilities of successful intrusion and security layer failure  
in the four intrusion scenarios 
 
Creep in 
without 
guns 
Direct 
vehicle 
attacks 
with 
firearms 
Drone 
attacks 
carrying 
explosives 
Intrusion 
by 
employees 
Prior probabilities of the 
successful intrusion  
8.58×10-5 1.55×10-4 4.37×10-3 1.34×10-3 
Posterior probabilities of 
the successful intrusion 
(given successful drone 
attack) 
9.01×10-5 2.78×10-2 － 5.22×10-3 
Posterior probabilities of 
the successful intrusion 
(given launched vehicle 
attacks, but failure to enter) 
8.19×10-5 － 7.85×10-1 5.19×10-3 
Failure probabilities of 
launching layers 
8.85×10-1 4.19×10-3 4.37×10-3 5.41×10-3 
Failure probabilities of 
entrance layers 
4.77×10-3 9.75×10-2 1.00 1.00 
Failure probabilities of 
interior layers 
1.77×10-2 3.42×10-1 1.00 2.48×10-1 
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Table 4.5 Assessment criteria for defensive ability 
Defensive ability Successful intrusion probabilities 
Unacceptable >10-3 
Tolerable 10-4－10-3  
Acceptable <10-4 
 
Comparing the successful intrusion probabilities in row 2 of Table 4.4 to the criteria in 
Table 4.5, it is observed that the abilities to defend against ‘a drone attack carrying 
explosives’ and ‘intrusion by employees’ are unacceptable, while that for ‘a direct 
vehicle attack with firearms’ is tolerable. Only the successful intrusion likelihood of 
‘creep in without guns’ is acceptable. Thus, ‘a drone attack carrying explosives’ and 
‘intrusion by employees’ are critical intrusion scenarios in this case. According to rows 
6 and 7 and columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.4 it is observed that the highly successful 
probabilities given an attack motivation in the two critical scenarios are mainly caused 
by the high failure probabilities of the entrance and interior layers (all higher than 0.2). 
This is decided by the intrusion features. As explained in Section 4.3, attackers for 
internal intrusion are employees or contractors; they have the authorization to enter the 
plant. Thus, the failure probability of the entrance layer is considered as 1 in this 
scenario. When attackers are familiar with plant circumstances and patrol schedules, 
they can exploit deficiencies in the security system to avoid being detected while 
conducting an intrusion. Thus, with a failure probability of 2.48e-1, the interior layer 
does not work well for intrusion by employees. A drone attack carrying explosives 
intrudes from the air. As mentioned in Section 4.3, drone attacks have not been much 
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considered in security management and countermeasures for drones to enter plants and 
to approach the targeted facilities located in the open air are unavailable. Thus, a plant 
normally has very high failure probabilities of the entrance and interior layers for drone 
attacks carrying explosives. This is why drone attacks carrying explosives have the 
highest success likelihood (4.37×10-3). In contrast, ‘creep in without guns’ has the 
lowest successful probability (8.58×10-5) due to both its small failure probabilities of 
the entrance and the interior layers (4.77×10-3 and 1.77×10-2).  
 
The comparison of results of different intrusion scenarios in Table 4.4 reveals the 
importance of considering various potential intrusion scenarios in the security 
assessment. If a security manager only focuses on the prevention of ‘creep in without 
guns’, the defensive ability is considered as acceptable with a successful intrusion 
probability of 8.58×10-5. Therefore, the manager may conclude that no additional 
security countermeasures are needed for intrusion prevention. However, in practice, 
attackers could attempt a drone attack carrying explosives which has a high likelihood 
(4.37 × 10-3) to achieve the intrusion. Thus, the defence level of the plant is 
unacceptable in reality. Considering various potential intrusion scenarios is necessary 
for security management. Furthermore, by considering intrusion scenarios, critical 
intrusion scenarios can be identified, which provides useful guidance for the security 
resource assignment. For example, in this case study, priority should be given to 
countermeasures for drone attacks and intrusion by employees instead of evenly 
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allocating resources for all scenarios. Moreover, since this assessment model includes 
launching layers, the results could help security managers estimate what intrusion 
scenarios attackers are most likely to apply. When attackers select intrusion scenarios, 
they not only consider whether a launched intrusion could succeed, but also consider 
whether the intrusion is difficult to launch. Attackers will not prefer an intrusion 
scenario which is almost impossible to launch, even though once launched it has a high 
probability to intrude successfully. Thus, without including launching layers, estimating 
what intrusion scenarios attackers are most likely to apply is unrealistic. The proposed 
method includes the launching layer in the intrusion analysis, overcoming this drawback. 
In this case, drone attacks carrying explosives have the highest successful intrusion 
probability; thus, it is believed attackers prefer drone attacks if they seek high successful 
intrusion probabilities. 
4.4.2.2 The security potential of barriers for each intrusion scenario 
Security potential assessment of barriers can help to detect the weak links of the security 
system. If a barrier has a high probability to be in an insecure state and its insecure state 
has a significant contribution to a successful intrusion in a scenario, the barrier is 
considered to have a small security potential in that intrusion scenario. As shown in 
Table 4.6, security potentials are divided into four levels according to the product of 
occurrence probabilities of insecure barriers and weights of the insecure barriers of a 
successful intrusion. To improve the defensive ability of a security system in an 
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intrusion scenario, improvement of the barriers with small security potentials in that 
scenario has a priority. 
 
Table 4.6 The classification criteria for security potentials of barriers 
Probability * weight Classification of security potentials Expression 
[10-3,1) Very low (VL) Red 
[10-4, 10-3) Low (L) Purple 
[10-5, 10-4) Medium (M) Orange 
(0, 10-5) High (H) Green 
 
This section analyzes the security potentials of barriers in each intrusion scenario. First, 
the occurrence probabilities of insecure barriers are calculated with a BN model. The 
weight of a barrier is calculated as the probability change of successful intrusion given 
occurrence and nonoccurrence of the insecure barrier using the BN model. Compared 
to the criteria in Table 4.6, the security potentials of barriers in different intrusion 
scenarios are decided and shown in Table 4.7. The rows of Table 4.7 represent the 
security potential of each barrier in different intrusion scenarios. From rows 1 to 14, it 
can be observed that the security potential of a barrier can vary from high to very low 
in different intrusion scenarios. For example, B1 (Intelligence collection and 
suppression of terrorism by security agency) poses a high-security potential for ‘creep 
in without guns’, but has a very low one for drone attacks carrying explosives. If the 
aim is to prevent drone attacks carrying explosives, B1 could be given priority. However, 
if ‘creep in without guns’ requires better prevention, B1 does not have priority to be 
improved. Each column of Table 4.7 shows what barriers have smaller security potential 
110 
 
in each intrusion scenario. This can help to identify the weakness in each intrusion 
scenario. However, to assess the weak link of the security system, the critical intrusion 
scenarios need to be decided first. The barriers with small security potentials in critical 
scenarios are the weak links of the system. For example, drone attacks carrying 
explosives and intrusion by employees are critical intrusion scenarios in this case study. 
Barriers B1－B3 have very low-security potentials for the critical scenarios; therefore, 
they are the weak links of the security system. It is worth mentioning that the 
probability-based information could support the decision of countermeasures' priority. 
However, other factors (e.g., the cost effects) also need to be analyzed to decide the 
priority of countermeasures finally.  
 
Table 4.7 The security potentials of barriers in each intrusion scenario 
   Intrusion 
    scenarios 
 
Security 
potentials          
(prior/posterior) 
Creep in 
without guns 
Vehicle 
attacks with 
firearms 
Drone 
attacks 
carrying 
explosives 
Intrusion by 
employees 
B1 H/H L/VL VL/VL L/VL 
B2 － L/VL VL/VL － 
B3 － － － VL/VL 
B4 － － － L/VL 
B5 － － － L/L 
B6 M/M － － － 
B7 M/M H/H － M/M 
B8 H/H H/H － H/H 
B9 H/H H/H － － 
B10 M/M H/H － － 
B11 H/H M/M － M/H 
B12 H/H － － － 
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B13 H/H － － L/L 
Note: ‘－’ means the barriers do not work for that intrusion scenario. L represents low-security 
potential, and M means medium. H means high, while VL represents very low. 
 
The analysis results of security potentials can be presented in the graphical models 
proposed in Section 4.3 by representing security potentials using different colours (see 
column 3 of Table 4.6). Fig. 4.8 shows the security potentials of barriers in the scenario 
of intrusion by employees. It clearly shows all four barriers in the launching layer have 
low to very low-security potential, while only one barrier in the interior layer has low-
security potential. This provides a visual reference for security managers to understand 
the weakness for intrusion by employees. 
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Red: very low-security potential; Purple: low; Orange: medium; Green: high. B1: Intelligence 
collection and suppression of terrorism by security agency; B3: Satisfaction of ability requirements 
for staff; B4: Background screening for employment; B5: Report of abnormal words and actions 
of colleagues; B7: Patrol; B8: CCTV; B11: Local police; B13: Workers in workplaces. 
Fig. 4.8 Graphical model with security potentials for the scenario of intrusion by employees 
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4.4.3 The dynamical probability assessment 
Because of data scarcity, the prior probabilities of insecure barriers often need to be 
obtained from experts' experiences in practical assessment, which introduces 
uncertainty to assessment results. With a dynamic feature, a BN model can update the 
probability to reduce such uncertainty. Furthermore, the occurrence probabilities of 
insecure barriers may change over time, which leads to the change of successful 
intrusion probabilities for different scenarios. This is another source of uncertainty of 
assessment results. A BN model can diagnose the change of insecure barriers using 
available evidence. Then successful intrusion probabilities could be updated based on 
the posterior probabilities of insecure barriers. 
4.4.3.1 Dynamic probability assessment given a successful intrusion 
By integrating different intrusion scenarios in a BN model, the intrusion information of 
one scenario could be applied to update the probabilities of successful intrusion of other 
scenarios. For example, when attackers successfully intrude using a drone carrying 
explosives, the evidence can be set as ‘successful intrusion of drone attacks carrying 
explosives’ in the BN model of Fig. 4.7. Then the BN model is updated, and the 
posterior probabilities of successful intrusions of the other three scenarios are shown in 
row 3 of Table 4.4. Comparing rows 2 and 3 of Table 4.4, it is observed that the updated 
successful intrusion probabilities of ‘creep in without guns’, direct vehicle attacks with 
firearms and intrusion by employees become larger than their prior estimates. This is 
because when a successful intrusion of a drone attack carrying explosives occurs, 
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barriers B1 and B2 are believed to have higher probabilities within insecure states than 
the prior estimation, and their changes increase failure probabilities of launching layers 
for other scenarios and further lead to the growth of successful intrusion in those 
scenarios. When the evidence of successful drone intrusion carrying explosives is 
included in the assessment, the success probability of direct vehicle attacks with 
firearms has the largest growth, from 1.55×10-4 to 2.78×10-2. According to the criteria 
in Table 4.5, the defensive ability against vehicle intrusion is unacceptable instead of 
tolerable (the prior result obtained in Section 4.4.2.1). The vehicle intrusion with 
firearms becomes a critical intrusion scenario for the targeted facility. This analysis 
reveals that if evidence about one intrusion scenario is observed, the successful intrusion 
probabilities for other scenarios can be updated, even though evidence related to those 
intrusion scenarios is unavailable. After an update, it may be observed that more 
intrusion scenarios are critical ones for the targeted facility. Using the solid evidence to 
conduct the dynamic assessment, the BN model provides a more reliable assessment of 
defensive ability. 
4.4.3.2 Dynamic probability assessment given a failed intrusion 
Many intrusions are effectively prevented in practice. Such an event can also help to 
update probabilities of successful intrusion in different scenarios. For example, a direct 
vehicle attack with firearms was launched on a storage tank, but attackers failed to 
intrude into the plant. The evidence is set as ‘failure of the launching layer for direct 
vehicle attack with firearms’ and ‘success of the entrance layer for direct vehicle attack 
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with firearms’ in the proposed BN model of Fig. 4.7. Given this evidence, the BN model 
is updated, and the results are shown in row 4 of Table 4.4. 
 
After comparing rows 2 and 4 of Table 4.4, it can be seen that the posterior probabilities 
of successful intrusion for both the drone attack carrying explosives and intrusion by 
employees increase. The increase of success probability of a drone attack carrying 
explosives is much larger than that of intrusion by employees. This is because the 
launching barriers of drone attacks carrying explosives and direct vehicle attacks with 
firearms are the same. The launching of the two attacks can be prevented by both 
‘intelligence collection and suppression of terrorism by security agency’ and 
‘accessibility of intrusion tools’. Thus, when the launching layer for direct vehicle 
attack fails, the posterior failure probability of the launching layer for drone attacks 
carrying explosives experiences a significant increase from 4.37×10-3 to 7.85×10-1. 
Intrusion by employees has only one identical launching barrier with direct vehicle 
attacks with firearms, and the posterior probability of its launching layer increases from 
5.41×10-3 to 2.10×10-2, which is much smaller than the probability increase of the 
launching layer for drone attack carrying explosives. This model reveals that the drone 
attacks carrying explosives and direct vehicle attacks with firearms have similar features. 
Thus, when the plant is vulnerable to one intrusion scenario, it is more probable to be 
vulnerable to the other one. 
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It is interesting to observe that the posterior success probability of ‘creep in without 
guns’ has a decrease from 8.58×10-5 to 8.19×10-5. This is because of the failure 
probability of entrance layer of ‘creep in without guns’ decreases from 4.77×10-3 to 
4.28×10-3. The success of the entrance layer for direct vehicle attack with firearms 
make it believe that the insecure barriers in the entrance layer have smaller posterior 
occurrence probabilities than the prior belief. This change decreases the posterior failure 
probabilities of entrance layer of ‘creep in without guns’, which causes the reduction of 
the successful intrusion probability of ‘creep in without guns’. The updated results 
demonstrate that the entrance layer has a better ability for entrance prevention in the 
scenario of ‘creep in without guns’, and the plant has a better defence ability to prevent 
‘creep in without guns’ than the prior belief. 
4.4.3.3 Dynamic assessment for security potentials of barriers 
If a failed intrusion is observed, the security potentials of barriers can also be updated. 
For example, when the ‘failure of the launching layer for direct vehicle attack with 
firearms’ and ‘success of the entrance layer for direct vehicle attack with firearms’ are 
set as the evidence in the BN model of Fig. 4.7, the posterior occurrence probabilities 
of insecure barriers are calculated using the BN model. Then the updated security 
potentials of barriers are analyzed following the process mentioned in Section 4.4.2.2, 
and the results are shown in Table 4.7. According to Table 4.7, it is observed that the 
security potentials of B1 and B2 in the scenario of a direct vehicle attack with firearms 
become ‘very low’ instead of ‘low’ (prior security potentials), while the security 
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potentials of B1 and B4 in the scenario of intrusion by employees become ‘very low’ 
instead of ‘low’. B11's security potential in the scenario of intrusion by employees 
becomes high instead of medium. Thus, when evidence is used in the BN model, the 
posterior security potentials of barriers are obtained, which supports a more reliable 
weakness identification of a security system. After updating, it is believed B4 also has 
a very low-security potential for one of the critical intrusion scenarios－intrusion by 
employees. Thus, apart from B1－B3, B4 is also a weak link of the security system. 
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Red: very low-security potential; Purple: low; Orange: medium; Green: high. B1: Intelligence 
collection and suppression of terrorism by security agency; B3: Satisfaction of ability requirements 
for staff; B4: Background screening for employment; B5: Report of abnormal words and actions 
of colleagues; B7: Patrol; B8: CCTV; B11: Local police; B13: Workers in workplaces. 
Fig. 4.9 Updated graphical model with security potentials for the scenario of intrusion by employees 
 
Fig. 4.9 provides a visual expression of the updated security potentials of barriers for 
intrusion by employees. Compared to Fig. 4.8, it clearly demonstrates that the security 
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potentials of B1 and B4 move to very low from low, while that of B11 becomes high 
instead of medium. The visual form provides security managers with an updated 
understanding of the weakness for intrusion by employees.  
4.5 Conclusions 
This study developed a graphical model to visually express principles and processes of 
barrier damage to achieve an intrusion in different scenarios. Compared with a Swiss 
cheese model, the proposed graphical model reflected the nonlinear relationship of 
barriers. Then, a BN model was established based on the graphical model. The BN 
model has a dynamic feature and includes dependency among barriers and interaction 
between different intrusion scenarios. The successful intrusion probabilities and 
security potentials of barriers in four intrusion scenarios were assessed using the 
proposed BN model. The assessment results revealed that the defensive ability of a 
process plant and the security potentials of barriers could significantly vary in different 
intrusion scenarios. According to the assessment results of the BN model, critical 
intrusion scenarios and weak links in the security system were identified. Then dynamic 
assessments were demonstrated using the BN model to reduce the uncertainty of prior 
results. It is observed that the BN model can use evidence from an intrusion scenario to 
update successful intrusion probabilities in other intrusion scenarios. With limited 
evidence, a BN model could capture the changes of successful intrusion probabilities 
and security potentials of barriers to produce more reliable information for security 
management. 
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In future work, real-life information will be collected by interviewing related experts 
(e.g., security managers of chemical plants), and a real case will be analyzed to verify 
the model. Also, countermeasures can be proposed to address the weak links within the 
security system, and their cost and effectiveness could be analyzed.  
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5. Probabilistic Assessment of Integrated Safety and Security 
Related Abnormal Events: A Case of Chemical Plants 
Preface 
A version of this chapter has been submitted to the Journal of Safety Science. As the 
primary author, I reviewed related literatures, developed the models and conducted the 
case study. I completed the manuscript and revised following the feedbacks of Dr. Faisal 
Khan. Dr. Faisal Khan helped to decide the research topic and provided suggestions for 
manuscript improvement. Dr. Ming Yang reviewed the manuscript and helped to revise.  
Abstract  
Conventional risk assessment of chemical plants considers process accident related 
causal factors. In the current geopolitical situation, chemical plants have become the 
target of terrorism attacks, making security concerns as important as safety. To protect 
the public and environment from undue risks, security related causal factors need to be 
considered as part of the risk analysis of chemical plants. This paper presents an 
integrated approach to dynamically assess the occurrence probability of abnormal 
events. The abnormal event is a state of a process plant arrived either due to a process 
accident or an intentional (terrorist) threat. This approach considers both safety and 
security related risk factors in a unified framework. A Bayesian network is used to 
model specific evolution scenarios of process accidents directly initiated from security 
related factors and the interaction of causal factors. This model enables to dynamically 
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analyze the occurrence probabilities of abnormal events and causal factors given 
evidence; it could also capture the impacts of interaction among safety and security 
related causal factors on these occurrence probabilities. The proposed approach is 
applied to an oil storage tank to demonstrate its applicability and effectiveness. It is 
observed that the effect of dependency between correlative accidental and security 
related factors significantly change the occurrence probability of abnormal events in 
dynamical assessment.   
Keywords: Safety & security; Interaction effect; Integrated assessment model; 
Dynamic assessment; Bayesian network  
5.1 Introduction  
Probabilistic analysis helps generate a risk profile, which supports decision making in 
chemical process design and operation. Such analysis is essential for chemical plants 
where large inventories of hazardous materials pose the potential of fires, explosions, 
or the leak of toxic gases [1]. The high-pressure and high-temperature operational 
conditions of chemical plants tend to exacerbate the consequences of chemical process 
accidents [1－3]. For this reason, much research has been presented to analyze the 
accidental risks of chemical plants [4]. However, these methods only consider 
accidental causes and ignore the intentional threat [5, 6]. The 9/11 attack causing 2996 
deaths called people's attention to security [7]. The past years have seen terrorists using 
chemical plants as targets. Van Staalduinen et al. have listed some attacks on chemical 
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plants which have occurred in recent years [6, 8]. Besides their listed ones, more attacks 
have occurred. A chemical plant explosion caused intentionally by a delivery person in 
France in 2015 resulted in one death and two injuries [9]. Also, suspected Basque 
separatists detonated bombs at two chemical plants in Spain in 2005, resulting in 
injuries from toxic fume inhalation [10]. In 2015, Islamic State militants detonated 
explosives and set fire to the key infrastructure in Iraq's largest refinery in Baiji [11] 
which once produced 300,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per day, meeting 
50 percent of the country's needs [12]. The attacks closed the plant for several years 
[11]. These attacks indicate that chemical plants are becoming attractive targets for 
terrorists these days. In such a situation, even if the accidental process risks are reduced 
to an extremely low level, the plants could still be exposed to high risks due to the 
vulnerability of chemical plants. Thus, security related causal factors should not be 
ignored in the risk assessment system. 
 
In this study, the abnormal event is a state of a process plant arrived either due to a 
process accident or an intentional (terrorist) threat. Two paths can lead to the occurrence 
of abnormal events in chemical plants, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The first path has been 
much studied [4, 5], while the second path needs increasing attention considering the 
increasing occurrence of terrorist attacks across the world. Some research was 
undertaken to conduct a security analysis. Bajpai proposed an analysis method of 
security risk in which a security risk factor table and rankings were applied to determine 
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security risk status [13]. Van Staalduinen et al. have used the sequential barrier approach 
to explain the attack process, and fault trees (FTs) and event trees (ETs) have been used 
to calculate the probabilities of barrier failure and consequence occurrence [6]. Then 
FTs and ETs were converted into Bayesian networks (BNs) to better reflect reality using 
the Noisy-AND technique and to dynamically update the probability considering the 
dependency. In another paper [14], Van Staalduinen et al. conducted both threat and 
vulnerability assessments concurrently rather than sequentially using BNs. After the 
risk was assessed, potential countermeasures were proposed and a cost analysis of the 
countermeasures was completed to decide the optimal solution. Khalil has proposed a 
probabilistically timed dynamic model for physical security attack scenarios on critical 
infrastructures [15]. He assumed the time for attackers to compromise specific security 
layers follows distributions. For each attack trial, the Monte-Carlo method is used to 
sample the time to compromise the security layer and the time is compared with the 
estimated mission time. If the attacker can successfully compromise his high-value 
targets and realized his malicious intent within the estimated mission time, the attack is 
considered as successful. With numerous attack trial simulations, the probability of 
successful attack was obtained. Feng et al. have used a game-theoretic method 
considering the strategic interactions between defenders and attackers to optimize the 
allocation of defensive resources [16]. Zhang et al. applied game theory for security 
management. They explored pure and mixed strategies in an illustrative case. [17] In 
another work, Zhang et al. proposed a game theoretic model (Interval CPP Game) to 
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deal with the defender’s distribution-free uncertainties on the attacker’s parameters. [18] 
McGill et al. [19] proposed a model for assessing system vulnerability given an 
initiating event based on the subjective evaluation of several security effectiveness or 
defensive criteria. The approach is “model-free” with fuzzy logic techniques, enabling 
quick implementation given sufficiently trained security experts. In another work [20], 
McGill et al. developed a quantitative risk assessment and management framework 
supporting strategic asset-level security resource allocation decision for critical 
infrastructure and key resource protection with quantitative benefit-cost analysis. This 
work provided an in-depth development of an asset-driven risk analysis focusing on 
security threats. Florentine et al. [21] developed a security risk analysis methodology 
for meat supply. Bayes theorem was applied to assess the likelihood of terrorist attack 
by analyzing the observables. The application of Bayesian equation provides an option 
to deal with the issues of credibility of the information source and help update the 
likelihood of an attack. Haimes et al. [22] developed a modeling roadmap for strategic 
responses to terrorism risks of water systems. In this roadmap, state variables reflecting 
the state of security risks were identified from three major systems－geopolitical 
environment, terrorism networks and the homeland. These previous works make 
corresponding contributions to the security risk analysis, but they did not consider 
accidental factors. As argued in [23], safety and security issues are supposed to be 
considered together, not only because they concern the same systems in an increasing 
number of sectors, but also because they have strong interconnections which need 
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consideration [23]. Safety factors interact with security factors; thus, their states could 
change vulnerability and further influence the real intentional risks confronted by 
chemical plants. Above works do not include safety factors, thus some uncertainty could 
be introduced to their assessment results. 
 
Normal 
operations
Abnormal 
state
P2: intentional threats
P1: accidents
 
Fig. 5.1 Basic damage pathways in chemical plants  
 
Limited efforts have explored the integrated risks of process accidents and intentional 
threats. Reniers et al. have developed a security risk assessment and protection 
methodology which combined the rings-of-protection approach with generic security 
practices [24]. The authors have briefly described the interaction of safety and security 
[24], but they have not further quantitatively studied the interaction. Aven has argued 
that intentional threats need to be included in risk assessment and proposed a unified 
framework for safety and security [5]. However, this framework only describes a 
general conceptual procedure for assessing either safety or security risk. The interaction 
of safety and security has not been studied to obtain integrated risks. Ayyub et al. [25] 
developed a common quantitative framework accommodating both natural and human-
caused hazards for critical asset and portfolio risk analysis to support the cost-effective 
decision making of risk reduction. This framework could assess risks of natural and 
intentional hazards. Although this work includes two types of hazards (natural hazard 
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and intentional hazards), it only considered the dependencies of different assets within 
a portfolio instead of dependencies of different hazards, and this work does not include 
process accidents in the safety perspective. Moreover, this work uses equations to 
calculate risks, thus the accident evolution process and relationships between factors 
are not visual. Furthermore, the proposed model could not backward update the 
probabilities of causal factors. Thus, it cannot infer the latest situation of causal factors 
to guide the risk reduction given different situation (e.g., observing the occurrence of 
an abnormal event). Fovino et al. have integrated attack trees (ATs) into a pre-existent 
FT to include potential malicious attacks in the risk analysis [26]. However, they only 
studied cyber-security, without considering physical attacks. Furthermore, they 
assumed that the goal of the sub-attack-tree is the causal event of the FT, without 
considering the scenario that accidental factors can also affect security. Also, they only 
considered the scenario where attacks destroyed the safety system (e.g., remote 
shutdown system), making it failed to prevent an accidental initiation. However, they 
did not consider the specific scenario where an (unintentional) process accident is 
directly initiated from a poor security factor. Moreover, FTs and ATs used in that work 
cannot clearly reflect the dependencies of causal factors, and are not capable of updating 
the predicted probabilities given new information due to their static structures. Pietre-
Cambacedes et al. have used Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) to model 
safety and security interdependencies in critical systems [23]. However, this work did 
not explore the capacity of dynamical assessment given evidence, and did not include 
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the scenario where process accidents directly initiate from security related factors. 
Moreover, this research focus on facility failure related to poor accidental and 
intentional factors, without considering the intrusion process of attackers. Intrusion 
prevention is the major strategy to control security risk. Without including the intrusion 
analysis, the assessment results cannot reflect the real intentional risk. Furthermore, the 
BDMP model has its limitations as explained by the authors. [23] The situations 
appropriate for the native Markovian framework of BDMP are limited [23]; the ability 
of BDMP to conduct sensitivity analysis of different factors is not well established [23]. 
According to above literature review, the works dealing with both safety and security 
risks are limited. To the authors' knowledge, no research has conducted a dynamic 
integrated risk assessment considering the interaction of safety and security with a 
robust model.  
 
This paper presents a new approach for establishing an integrated dynamic model to 
help analyze integrated accidental and intentional process risks confronted by chemical 
plants considering the interaction of safety and security related factors. This work has 
the following features: (1) the proposed model simultaneously considers accidental and 
security related causal factors and quantitatively represents their interactions. Thus, it 
reflects the real-life condition of the correlative causal factors and assists in quantifying 
the impact of interactions on the occurrence probabilities of causal factors and end 
events. (2) this model includes the security related factors existing in the intrusion 
process to conduct a complete probability assessment of abnormal events. (3) this 
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Bayesian-network-based model could visually represent the relationships between 
correlative accidental and security related factors, thus it enables to clearly show the 
specific process accident evolution path directly initiated from security related factors. 
(4) because the inclusion of safety and security interaction, this model could reflect the 
real significance of causal factors with sensitivity analysis. (5) this model has dynamic 
feature and thus it could update the states of abnormal events and causal factors given 
evidence, especially enables to update states of both types of factors (i.e., accidental and 
security related factors) given evidence of one type of factors. This dynamic feature not 
only helps managers learn the latest situation of abnormal events and causal factors, but 
also assists to reduce the uncertainty caused by scarce data of security issues. Bayesian 
network has been used to analyze process accidents, occupational accidents and security 
issues [27－32], but to the best of our knowledge, no work is conducted using BN to 
exploit the interaction of safety and security. A comparison of current method and 
previous work described above is shown in Table 5.1. A novel point of this research is 
the consideration of both safety and security related risk factors in a robust framework, 
and the quantitatively dynamical analysis of impacts of interactions between safety and 
security. Note that this research focuses on physical abnormal events related to a 
chemical plant. It does not consider external threats related to cyber attack, war or other 
causes.  
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Table 5.1 Comparison of the current method and related previous work 
Methods 
Quantitative 
analysis of 
impacts of 
the 
interaction 
of safety and 
security 
Dynamic 
probability 
assessment 
using 
evidence 
Visually show 
the specific 
accident 
evolution 
directly 
initiated from 
a poor security 
factor  
Inclusion 
of 
physical 
intrusion 
process 
Bajpai [13]    √ 
Van Staalduinen [6]  √  √ 
Van Staalduinen [14]  √  √ 
Khalil [15]    √ 
Feng [16]    √ 
Zhang [17-18]    √ 
McGill [19]    √ 
McGill [20]    √ 
Florentine [21]  √   
Haimes [22]    √ 
Reniers [24]    √ 
Aven [5]    √ 
Ayyub [25]    √ 
Fovino [26] √    
Pietre-Cambacedes 
[23] 
√    
Current method √ √ √ √ 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 explains the approach to establish the 
integrated dynamic model. In Section 5.3, a case study on the probability assessment of 
an oil storage tank fire is conducted to demonstrate the proposed approach. Section 5.4 
presents the conclusions. 
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5.2 The proposed integrated dynamic probability assessment approach 
The approach to obtain the integrated dynamic probability assessment model is shown 
in Fig. 5.2. FTs are established first and then are converted to BN. After involving the 
dependency caused by common factors and correlative accidental and security related 
factors in the BN, the integrated dynamic model is obtained. The detailed process is 
demonstrated in the following subsections and the schematic diagrams of the FT and 
BNs are shown in Fig. 5.3 to facilitate the clarification of the approach.  
A probability 
assessment model 
for the process 
accident
A dynamic probability 
assessment model for 
abnormal process 
events with actual 
logic relationships 
A dynamic probability 
assessment model for 
abnormal process events 
with the dependency 
caused by common 
factors
An integrated dynamic 
probability assessment 
model for abnormal 
process events
Relax logic 
relationships 
between 
causal 
factors
A probability 
assessment model 
for abnormal 
process events
Represent 
the common 
factors with 
one node
Identify and 
link correlative 
accidental and 
security related 
factors
A probability 
assessment 
model for the 
intentional threat
 
Fig. 5.2 The approach to obtain the integrated dynamic probability assessment model  
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(a) Schematic FT for the abnormal event         (b) Schematic BN for the abnormal event  
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(d) Schematic integrated BN model (c) Schematic BN with dependence caused by common factors 
Fig. 5.3 Schematic diagrams of the FT and BNs  
 
5.2.1 FT establishment for integrated probability assessment and its limitation 
relaxation  
Many accidental and security related factors needs to be considered to predict the 
probability of an abnormal event. FT is an appropriate tool to deal with large numbers 
of causal factors, and thus it is applied to identify causal factors and clarify their 
relationships in the proposed approach. First, the process accident and intentional threat 
are respectively analyzed with FTs and then the two FTs are combined using an OR 
gate. In this way, the FT of the abnormal event is obtained and its schematic diagram is 
shown in Fig. 5.3(a). However, as discussed in [29], the logic gates of the FT have 
limitations to express the actual logic relationships. Furthermore, FTs have static 
structures and thus they could not conduct dynamic assessment. To accurately represent 
the logic relationships of causal factors [29] and to obtain the dynamic feature, the 
schematic FT in Fig. 5.3(a)) is converted to BN (Fig. 5.3(b)) following the procedure 
mentioned in [33]. The BN in Fig. 5.3 (b) not only represents the NOISY-OR and 
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NOISY-AND logic gates with conditional probability tables (CPTs) [29], but also 
enables assessment in a dynamic manner [33].  
5.2.2 The involvement of dependence caused by the common factors 
Some basic events (e.g., H2 and S2) contribute to various intermediate events, which 
leads to dependency. The probability calculation of BN in Fig. 5.3(b) cannot involve 
such dependency. The dependence caused by the common factor H2 can change the 
probability of a process accident P(A), while the dependence caused by the common 
factor S2 changes that of an intentional threat P(T). Consequently, the probability of the 
abnormal event P(AE) is changed by these common factors. The principle related to 
how the common factor H2 changes P(A) is as follows:  
 
P(A)= P(I1I2 )*P(A I1I2 )+P(I1 ' I2 )*P(A I1 ' I2 )+P(I1I2 ')*P(A I1I2 ')+P(I1 ' I2 ')*P(A I1 ' I2 ') 
(5.1) 
 
Since 1I  and 2I are considered as independent in the BN of Fig. 5.3(b), equation (5.1) 
can be converted to equation (5.2).  
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However, since 2H  simultaneously contributes to 1I  and 2I , 1I  and 2I  are not 
independent in practice. This means that )(*)()( 2121 IPIPIIP   and the result from 
equation (5.1) does not equal that from equation (5.2). The BN in Fig. 5.3(b) assumes 
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the independence of 1I  and 2I , which introduces uncertainty when the occurrence 
probability of the process accident is assessed.  
 
Another drawback of the model in Fig. 5.3(b) is that the common factors are represented 
separately, thus the common factor (e.g., 2H ) may have various posterior probabilities, 
when the probability of the common factors is updated with the evidence of the 
occurrence of an abnormal event. However, one causal factor obviously has only one 
occurrence probability in practice. 
 
To overcome these drawbacks, the common variable needs to be represented with one 
node in the BN. This not only makes the probability assessment of abnormal events 
more accurate, but also ensures that one common variable has one posterior value. Thus, 
the nodes of the common factors in Fig. 5.3(b) are combined to one and the BN 
considering dependence from common factors is obtained, as shown in Fig. 5.3(c). The 
occurrence probabilities of the process accident, intentional threat and abnormal event 
can be calculated respectively according to Fig. 5.3(c). However, the calculation 
assumes that accidental factors and security related factors do not interact, which is not 
the case in practice. 
5.2.3 Link the correlative accidental and security related factors 
By linking the correlative accidental and security related factors of Fig. 5.3(c), the 
integrated dynamic model is obtained as Fig. 5.3(d). The major reason to study security 
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and safety in an integrated framework is that the security related factor may influence 
the accidental factor and vice versa. Because of this, the correlative security related 
factors can be treated as causal factors of the process accident. If the influence of 
security related factors on the process accident is not considered, it seems that the causal 
factors of the process accident are not completely involved. Moreover, if the security 
related factors are not considered, the state of the correlative accidental factors cannot 
be specified. Furthermore, process accident evolution path directly initiated from poor 
security factors could not be identified without considering accidental and security 
related factors in one framework, which will affect the intervention design. These points 
are explained through Fig. 5.3(c) and Fig. 5.3(d). In Fig. 5.3, it is assumed S3 is the 
security related factor ‘lax entry control’; H3 is the accidental factor ‘the lack of 
professional knowledge’; and I2 is the accidental factor ‘human errors’. As an initiating 
event, the security related factor ‘lax entry control’ contributes to ‘the lack of 
professional knowledge’ and causes ‘human errors’, because the chemical plant 
becomes more accessible to non-employees (e.g., staff's children) when chemical plants 
have lax entry control. These people may not intend to cause damage in the plant, but 
they have a high likelihood to cause process accidents due to the lack of required 
professional knowledge. If the security perspective is not considered while analyzing 
the probability of the process accident, lax entry control will not be included, and thus 
the causal factors for the process accident are not complete. This will affect the accuracy 
of probability prediction of the process accident. Furthermore, in Fig. 5.3(c), managers 
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may estimate the probability of human error considering accidental factors (e.g., 
experience related factors). However, practically, human error is also influenced by 
entry control, as shown in Fig. 5.3(d). For instance, the probability of human error could 
be 0.1 [34, 35] given good entry control, while its probability may increase to 0.2 given 
poor entry control. Human error likelihood changes with entry control, and without 
consideration of the state of the entry control, the probability of human error may not 
be specified. Moreover, Fig. 5.3(d) reveals the specific process accident evolution path 
that lax entry control (initiation) is propagated through accidental factors (lacking 
professional knowledge and human errors), and terminates as process accidents. This is 
consistent with the process accident in a practical case. In 1998 in Iowa, two teens 
driving a vehicle approached and destroyed the pipeline by accident and caused a tank 
explosion, killing two volunteer fire fighters and injuring seven more. The cause was 
that no fence existed for aboveground propane pipes and tanks [36]. Through above 
analysis, it can be clearly seen that both accidental and security related causal factors 
should be considered in an integrated framework to accurately predict the probability 
of process accidents and effectively design the intervention. With the integrated 
framework, the impact of each factor could be better reflected. For example, some 
security related factors such as lax entry control exacerbate both safety and security. 
The probability growth of such factors can increase both the probabilities of intentional 
threats and process accidents. Thus, the probability increase of the abnormal event from 
the integrated dynamic model will be greater than that from Fig. 5.3(c), given the 
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probability growth of such factors. Sometimes the security related factor may have 
opposite effects on safety and security, which means it improves safety but exacerbates 
security or exacerbates safety but improves security. For such factors, only improving 
their states may not effectively reduce the integrated probabilities of abnormal events. 
A potential way to deal with these factors is to change their form and remove their 
contradictory effects, which will be explained in section 5.3.2.2.2.  
 
Another advantage of considering accidental and security related causal factors in an 
integrated framework is that the observation of a factor could be used to update the 
probabilities of accidental and security related factors at the same time. In this way, the 
latest states of both accidental factors and security related factors are obtained from the 
integrated dynamic model. Consequently, the poor factors can be detected from both 
safety and security perspectives to help prevent abnormal events.  
 
Through the established models in this paper, the calculation and update results from 
the models with and without considering the interaction can be compared to 
quantitatively study the influences of interaction on the probabilities of abnormal events 
and causal factors. Furthermore, with sensitivity analysis of causal factors on an 
abnormal event, the correlative causal factors' significance can be identified. The 
difference between the correlative causal factors' significance obtained with and without 
the involvement of interaction is studied.  
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5.3 Case study 
The occurrence probability of an oil storage tank fire was analyzed to demonstrate the 
strength of the integrated dynamic probability assessment model. For the sake of clear 
demonstration of effects of interaction between safety and security related factors, some 
simplification is made. The attractiveness and vulnerability altogether influence the 
occurrence probability of intentional events. Attractiveness could be assessed based on 
factors like deterrence and visibility [20] and previous work has conducted 
attractiveness analysis [37]. This case study did not deal with attractiveness assessment 
and it assumed the storage tank farm is in an area with an attack probability 0.1.  
Furthermore, attack types (e.g., explosive born vehicle or creep in without guns) could 
also influence the occurrence probabilities of intentional events [19]. In this case study, 
the attack type is creeping in without guns, and the influence of different attack types 
could be included in future work. With this simplification, the considered security 
factors in this case study are those related to vulnerability.  
5.3.1 The establishment of the integrated dynamic probability assessment model 
To analyze the probability of an oil storage tank fire, an FT is used first to identify the 
accidental and security related factors and to determine their logic relationships. The 
basic events (see Table 5.2) and the intermediate events (see Table 5.3) are identified 
referring to [24, 38, 39] and the prior probabilities of basic events are assumed partly 
based on previous literature [30－32]. Then, as mentioned in Section 5.2, the FT is 
converted to a BN, shown in Fig. 5.4(a). After combining the common factor into one 
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node, the model becomes the form of Fig. 5.4(b). Then the relationships between the 
accidental and security related factors are identified and correlative factors are linked 
to obtain the integrated dynamic model shown in Fig. 5.4(c). As indicated with red 
arrows in Fig. 5.4(c), a process accident evolution path directly initiating from a security 
related factor and terminating with a process accident is demonstrated. Along the path, 
the termination (accidental oil storage tank fire TE1) initiates from X52, and propagates 
through IE32, X20, IE10, IE9, IE27 and IE23. The practical meaning of this evolution path 
is that guards with poor ability create a chance for non-employees to enter chemical 
plants, and these untrained people trigger human errors which causes an oil leak and 
further propagates to become an oil fire. According to this evolution process, two types 
of countermeasures can be proposed for different stages of the process accident 
evolution. The first is to prevent the initiation occurrence (e.g., hiring guards with good 
security skills), and the second option is to block the propagation (e.g., applying safety 
devices to prevent accidents given human errors). 
 
Table 5.2 Basic events and their prior probabilities [24, 30－32, 38, 39] 
Symbols Details of the activity/event or state 
Prior 
probability 
X1 No level measurement device 6.70E-02 
X2 Failure of level measurement device 1.40E-04 
X3 No overflow alarm 4.50E-02 
X4 Failure of overflow alarms 9.80E-02 
X5 Failure of worker to monitor level 1.25E-01 
X6 No level control device 1.45E-01 
X7 Failure of level control device 2.52E-03 
X8 No routine inspection 1.00E-02 
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X9 No proper maintenance 1.00E-02 
X10 Aging 1.00E-02 
X11 Corrosion 7.80E-03 
X12 Fatigue 1.00E-01 
X13 Material deficiency 1.58E-03 
X14 Installation deficiency 5.61E-03 
X15 Manufacture deficiency 2.12E-03 
X16 Design deficiency 4.00E-02 
X17 Earthquake 1.30E-04 
X18 Subsidence of foundation 3.40E-02 
X19 
High pressure liquid backing up from 
downstream vessels 
2.30E-04 
X20 Lack of knowledge of operations on site 1.00E-01 
X21 Not following operational procedures on site 1.00E-03 
X22 Lack of knowledge of remote operations 2.58E-01 
X23 Not following dress regulations 1.50E-01 
X24 No effective elimination of static 1.00E-02 
X25 
Static occurrence in equipment operation 
(e.g., transfer and improper sampling 
procedures) 
4.50E-02 
X26 
Failure of anti-static measures like grounding 
of equipment 
5.50E-02 
X27 
Poor signs to help operations and remind of 
potential hazards 
1.20E-01 
X28 Non-explosion-proof motor and tools used 3.00E-04 
X29 Short Circuit 5.00E-02 
X30 Mechanical frictions 6.00E-02 
X31 Poor safety awareness 2.68E-02 
X32 Not following open fire rules 5.00E-02 
X33 Poor monitoring of potential hazardous acts 3.00E-03 
X34 No warning sign for open fire 1.00E-02 
X35 
Spark caused by operations like welding and 
hitting 
2.00E-01 
X36 Checking without blind flange 6.00E-03 
X37 Hot operation not following procedure 4.50E-02 
X38 Lightning 1.00E-06 
X39 No lightning arresters 3.00E-05 
X40 Improperly placed lightning arresters 1.50E-04 
X41 Poor grounding of tanks 2.60E-04 
X42 Rim seal leak 6.00E-02 
X43 Exothemic runaway  reactions 8.90E-04 
X44 Heat accumulation to fire point 2.18E-01 
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X45 
Failure of alarm of combustible gas 
concentration 
4.28E-02 
X46 Workers do not respond following procedure 1.03E-01 
X47 Get keys from staff 1.41E-02 
X48 Skills to directly open locks without keys 3.51E-02 
X49 Destroy locks using tools like shears 1.53E-01 
X50 No effective hindering facility 1.21E-03 
X51 Poor security awareness of guard 8.00E-03 
X52 Poor ability of guards 1.62E-02 
X53 Poor security knowledge of guard 1.42E-03 
X54 Bride guard 1.26E-03 
X55 Fake identity 1.62E-02 
X56 Accidentally destroyed 1.93E-02 
X57 Destroyed by attackers 2.51E-01 
X58 Insufficient wall height 3.26E-03 
X59 No barbed wire on top 2.16E-02 
X60 
Not following procedures for remote 
operations 
1.00E-03 
X61 No receptionist on duty 2.58E-02 
X62 Receptionist is controlled by attackers 2.53E-01 
X63 No security alarm 5.86E-02 
X64 Improperly placed security alarms  1.26E-01 
X65 Poor quality of security alarm system 4.32E-02 
X66 Poor inspection of security alarm system 2.13E-02 
X67 Poor maintenance of security alarm system 2.48E-02 
X68 
Location of security alarm accessible to 
attackers 
2.14E-01 
X69 
Attackers are familiar with security alarm 
system 
2.43E-02 
X70 No video surveillance 3.54E-02 
X71 Improperly placed video surveillance  1.98E-02 
X72 
Staff in charge of video surveillance does not 
observe in time 
2.02E-01 
X73 Poor quality of video surveillance system 1.21E-02 
X74 Poor inspection of video surveillance system 2.13E-02 
X75 
Poor maintenance of video surveillance 
system 
1.28E-02 
X76 
Location of video surveillance system 
accessible to attackers 
1.04E-01 
X77 
Attackers are familiar with video surveillance 
system 
4.15E-02 
X78 Insufficient frequency of patrol 1.26E-03 
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X79 Improper patrol route 2.54E-03 
X80 Attackers know the patrol schedule 4.30E-04 
X81 Dark circumstances 3.05E-02 
X82 Too many obstacles 8.63E-03 
X83 Attackers know the work time and area 1.23E-01 
X84 Poor education 5.00E-02 
X85 Poor reporting regulations   4.72E-02 
X86 Poor reporting education   5.00E-02 
X87 Destroy pumps 1.02E-01 
X88 Attackers have fake badge and work clothes 2.43E-02 
X89 Open valves 7.23E-01 
X90 Destroy pipes 2.29E-01 
X91 Destroy tank body 2.15E-03 
X92 Open cover using control button 2.37E-01 
X93 
Common workers do not have work clothes 
and badges 
6.28E-02 
X94 Setting spark by hitting 2.15E-03 
X95 Lighter 4.92E-01 
X96 Match 4.61E-01 
X97 Setting static spark 5.23E-02 
X98 Setting electronic spark of equipment 6.85E-02 
X99 Loading or transferring oil to storage tank 2.04E-01 
X100 Spark from vehicle emission 1.52E-01 
X101 Electricity leakage 3.67E-03 
X102 Heat caused by overload 2.56E-02 
X103 Leak is not observed by workers in time 2.64E-01 
X104 Overflow caused by intentional operations 8.00E-02 
X105 Attack 1.00E-01 
Table 5.3 Intermediate and top events [24, 38, 39] 
Symbols Meaning 
IE1 No effective level measurement device 
IE2 Overflow alarms do not work effectively 
IE3 Level control devices do not work effectively 
IE4 Overflow 
IE5 Valves cannot close 
IE6 Corrosion damage 
IE7 Too heavy force on the facility 
IE8 Facility leak 
IE9 Leak caused by unintentional human error 
IE10 Human error for operation on site (e.g., valves open accidently on site) 
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IE11 
Human error in remote operations (e.g., press control button to open 
valves mistakenly) 
IE12 Ignition source 
IE13 Static spark 
IE14 Static from workers 
IE15 Static from equipment 
IE16 Clothes or shoes generate static 
IE17 Spark or heat from electronic equipment 
IE18 Open flame caused unintentionally by individuals 
IE19 
Fire on facility caused by operation against rules (rule-based human 
error) 
IE20 Fire caused by lightning 
IE21 
Spark resulted from direct stroke or secondary 
effects (e.g., the bound charge) on tank 
IE22 No effective lightning arrester 
IE23 Leaked oil on fire 
IE24 Workers do not recognize attackers 
IE25 Spontanous combustion 
IE26 Leak and ignition not managed in time 
IE27 Oil leak 
IE28 Open or destroyed locks 
IE29 Pass fence 
IE30 Via entry 
IE31 Via wall of wire 
IE32 Lax entry control 
IE33 Wall destroyed 
IE34 Pass receptionist 
IE35 Security alarm does not work properly 
IE36 Failure of security alarm system 
IE37 Natural failure of security alarm system 
IE38 Security alarm system destroyed by attackers 
IE39 Improper response of workers to overflow alarm 
IE40 Success of attackers to access oil 
IE41 Intrusion into storage area without being detected 
IE43 
Destroy facilities (e.g., tank) or intentionally conduct operations to 
access oil 
IE44 Video surveillance does not catch attackers 
IE45 Failure of video surveillance system 
IE46 Natural failure of video surveillance system 
IE47 Video surveillance system destroyed by attackers 
IE48 Successfully ignite oil 
IE49 Setting open fire 
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IE50 Patrol does not find attackers 
IE51 Patrol does not meet attackers 
IE52 Attackers successfully hide 
IE53 Workers do not find attackers or incorrectly report the attack 
IE54 Workers do not find attackers 
IE55 Workers do not correctly report the attack 
IE56 Patrol does not recognize attackers 
IE57 Poor security awareness of workers 
IE58 Poor security of wall 
IE59 Go through security defensive line 
IE60 Attackers are not detected 
IE61 Workers do not meet attackers 
TE1 Accidental fire of the oil storage tank 
TE2 Intentional fire of the oil storage tank 
TE Fire of the oil storage tank 
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(a) The BN for oil storage tank fire directly converted from the FT 
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(b) The BN for oil storage tank fire with dependency caused by common factor 
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(c) The integrated BN for the oil storage tank fire 
Fig. 5.4 The models for oil storage tank fire 
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5.3.2 Probability analysis with the established BNs 
5.3.2.1 Probability calculation and comparison 
The probabilities of storage tank fire, accidental storage tank fire and intentional storage 
tank fire are respectively calculated with the BNs shown in Fig. 5.4, and the results are 
shown in Table 5.4. Comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.4, the probability of the oil 
storage tank fire decreases when the common causal factor is treated as one node in the 
model shown in Fig. 5.4(b). In other words, when the dependence caused by common 
factors is not considered, the probability of the abnormal event is overestimated. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.4 indicate that after considering the dependency among 
correlative accidental and security related factors, the probability of an accidental 
storage tank fire increases. This is because the correlative security related factors (e.g., 
IE32) also serve as causal factors of an accidental storage tank fire and their poor states 
increase the occurrence probability of the correlative accidental factors (e.g., X20). The 
model in Fig. 5.4(b) does not consider the correlative security related factors as causal 
factors of an accidental storage tank fire; thus, the causal factors of accidental fire are 
not completely involved and its assessment result is underestimated. The probability of 
intentional storage tank fire decreases, because the accidental factor X27 reduces the 
occurrence likelihood of the poor security related factors (i.e., X89, X90, X92 and X104). 
The increase of the probability of an accidental storage tank fire is much larger than the 
reduction of its intentional counterpart; thus, the integrated probability of the storage 
tank fire increases. According to Table 5.4, the dependency caused by common factors 
149 
 
and by interaction among correlative accidental and security related factors can cause 
the probability changes of abnormal events, although in this case, such changes are 
minor due to the small occurrence probability of related causal factors. The occurrence 
of those causal factors can influence safety and security at the same time and thus 
changes the probability of an abnormal event. However, when their occurrence 
probabilities are very small, such influences are weak in a static assessment. If the 
related causal factors are observed in a dynamic assessment, their effects could be more 
obvious. This point will be further explained in subsection 5.3.2.2.2. 
 
 
Table 5.4 The probabilities of storage tank fire, accidental storage tank fire and intentional 
storage tank fire from different BN models 
 Results of 
model in Fig. 
5.4(a) 
Results of 
model in Fig. 
5.4(b) 
Results of the 
integrated dynamic 
model 
Probability of storage 
tank fire 
1.7833E-02 1.7429E-02 1.7433E-02 
Probability of 
accidental storage 
tank fire 
1.3991E-02 1.3584E-02 1.3589E-02 
Probability of 
intentional storage 
tank fire 
3.8959E-03 3.8976E-03 3.8972E-03 
5.3.2.2 Probability update and comparison 
Dynamic assessment is important for effective risk management, since the management 
measures may need modification with the state change of causal factors and abnormal 
events over time. Furthermore, the security data is scarce, which causes uncertainty to 
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the prior probabilities. After updating the prior probability with evidence in a dynamic 
assessment, the obtained posterior probabilities become more realistic. This integrated 
dynamic model has more obvious advantages in dynamic assessment. 
5.3.2.2.1 The posterior probability calculation of common factors 
When the occurrence of an oil storage tank fire is observed as evidence, the integrated 
dynamic model and BN model of Fig. 5.4(a) are used to update the causal factors. The 
posterior probability of the common factor X33 (poor monitoring of potential hazardous 
acts) from the integrated dynamic model is 3.44E-03. However, X33 has three posterior 
probabilities (3.04E-03, 3.06E-03 and 3.32E-03) according to the BN model of Fig. 
5.4(a). It reveals the integrated dynamic model has the advantage to correctly update 
the probability of common factors. 
5.3.2.2.2 The effects of interaction of correlative causal factors on posterior probability 
From columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.4, it is observed that the probability change of storage 
tank fire caused by the interaction between correlative accidental and security related 
factors is small. This is because the occurrence likelihood of those correlative factors is 
small, limiting the influences of their interactions on a storage tank fire. However, when 
evidence of the correlative factors that exacerbate both safety and security is observed, 
their influences may significantly change the probability of a storage tank fire. For 
example, when IE32 as ‘lax entry control’, X28 as ‘non-explosion-proof motor’ and X93 
as ‘common workers do not have work clothes and badges’ are observed, the 
151 
 
probabilities of storage tank fire, accidental storage tank fire and intentional storage 
tank fire from the model of Fig. 5.4(b) and the integrated dynamic model are shown in 
Table 5.5. Comparing the values between columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.5, all the posterior 
probabilities of storage tank fire, accidental storage tank fire and intentional storage 
tank fire from the integrated dynamic model have a much bigger increase than those 
from Fig. 5.4(b). Among them, the posterior probability of storage tank fire from the 
integrated dynamic model is 11.3% larger than that from Fig. 5.4(b). This is because 
the probability growth (from prior probabilities to 100%) of these observed factors can 
simultaneously increase the probabilities of accidental fire and intentional fire in the 
integrated dynamic model. However, because of lack of interaction of correlative 
accidental and security related factors in the model of Fig. 5.4(b), the probability growth 
of those observed causal factors can only increase the probability of either an accidental 
or an intentional storage tank fire.  
 
The analysis above shows that, although the interaction between safety and security has 
little influence on the prior occurrence probability of the abnormal event, when evidence 
of the factors which simultaneously deteriorate safety and security is observed, the 
probability of the abnormal event can have big change due to the interaction of safety 
and security. This reveals the importance of considering the interaction between safety 
and security while dynamically assessing the occurrence probability of the abnormal 
event. 
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Table 5.5 The posterior probability of storage tank fire, accidental and intentional storage tank fire 
 Results from model 
in Fig. 5.4(b) 
Results from the integrated 
dynamic model 
Probability of storage tank 
fire 
1.842E-02 2.051E-02 
Probability of accidental 
storage tank fire 
1.451E-02 1.635E-02 
Probability of intentional 
storage tank fire 
3.973E-03 4.224E-03 
 
Moreover, changes of some causal factors can have opposite effects on changes of 
accident probability and intentional threat probability. If the dependency between 
correlative accidental and security related factors is not considered (e.g., the model 
shown in Fig. 5.4(b)), the effects of such factors cannot be represented. The integrated 
dynamic model can reflect the effect that when the states of such factors change, the 
occurrence probabilities of process accidents and intentional threats have opposite 
changes. Taking X27 (poor signs to help operations and remind of potential hazards) as 
an example, from columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.6, when X27 is observed as good signs, 
the probability of accidental storage tank fire decreases, but that of the intentional 
storage tank fire increases. Comparing the values in columns 2 and 4, when X27 is 
observed as poor signs, the probability of accidental fire grows, and that of intentional 
fire decreases. However, no matter how the state of X27 changes, it generates either an 
extra process accident likelihood or an additional threat probability. Fortunately, in this 
case, the probability reduction of accidental storage tank fire is much bigger than the 
probability increases of intentional storage tank fire if the state of X27 is improved. 
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However, in some cases, when causal factor states are improved to reduce process 
accidents, the integrated probability of an abnormal event may increase due to the 
growth of intentional threat probability. To effectively avoid the conflict effect, the form 
of such factors needs to be changed. For example, the form of X27 can be changed to 
‘poor guide signs of operations that only staff can read’. In this way, improving X27 can 
help staff operate safely and avoid guiding attackers to destroy facilities. 
 
Table 5.6 The probability comparison of storage tank fire, accidental storage tank fire and 
intentional storage tank fire given different states of X27 from the integrated dynamic model 
 X27 (No 
evidence) 
X27 (good 
signs) 
X27 (poor 
signs) 
Probability of storage tank fire 1.7433E-02 1.7295E-02 1.8443E-02 
Probability of accidental storage 
tank fire 
1.3588E-02 1.3450E-02 1.4607E-02 
Probability of intentional storage 
tank fire 
3.8972E-03 3.8978E-03 3.8931E-03 
 
Furthermore, the model in Fig. 5.4(b) cannot update security related factors using the 
evidence of accidental factors, and the observation of security related factors cannot be 
applied to update accidental factors. This is because the model presented by Fig. 5.4(b) 
is not capable of modeling the interaction between correlative accidental factors and 
security related factors. In contrast, the integrated dynamic model can use evidence of 
either correlative accidental or security related factors to update both correlative 
accidental factors and security related factors. For example, when the model in Fig. 
5.4(b) is updated given the occurrence of the accidental factors X20 (Lack of knowledge 
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of operations on site) and X23 (Not following dress regulations), the posterior 
probability of the security related factor IE32 (Lax entry control) is the same as its prior 
probability. However, when the same evidence is used in the integrated dynamic model, 
not only can the accidental factors be updated, the posterior probability of the security 
related factor IE32 becomes 1.517E-02, 7.6 times of its prior probability (1.983E-03) as 
shown in row 2 of Table 5.7. This means when human error occurs on site, and people 
in the chemical plant do not dress following regulations, the lax entry control is believed 
to have a bigger occurrence probability. The result from the integrated dynamic model 
is consistent with practice. In this way, the accidental and security related factors are 
updated given evidence of accidental factors X20 and X23, and then both poor accidental 
and security related factors can be detected. Similarly, when X104 (Overflow caused by 
intentional operations) is observed, the posterior probabilities of IE2 (Overflow alarms 
do not work effectively) and IE3 (Level control devices do not work effectively) are the 
same as their prior probabilities based on the model in Fig. 5.4(b). However, their 
probabilities increase to 2.206E-01 and 4.023E-01 from 1.386E-01 and 1.472E-01 
respectively (see rows 3 and 4 of Table 5.7) using the integrated dynamic model. When 
X23 (Not following dress regulations) is observed, the probability of IE24 (Workers do 
not recognize attackers) increases from 2.992E-01 to 3.330E-01 (see row 5 of table 5.7) 
according to the integrated dynamic model. This means when most employees do not 
wear work clothes, it is believed workers can hardly detect intruders according to 
clothing, which lowers the likelihood for workers to recognize attackers.  
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Table 5.7 The effects of interaction between correlative accidental factors and security related 
factors in dynamic assessment 
Factors Prior probability Posterior probability Evidences 
IE32 1.983E-03 1.517E-02 Occurrence of X20 & X23 
IE2 1.386E-01 2.206E-01 Occurrence of X104 
IE3 1.472E-01 4.023E-01 Occurrence of X104 
IE24 2.992E-01 3.330E-01 Occurrence of X23 
5.3.2.2.3 Significance analysis of correlative factors 
The contribution amount of a causal factor to the abnormal event is an important index 
of this factor's significance, which could guide the decision making of prevention 
measures. It can be reflected by the probability change of the abnormal event given the 
occurrence and nonoccurrence of the causal factor. In this section, the contribution 
amount of correlative accidental and security related factors is calculated to study the 
effect of their interactions on these factors' significance. For the sake of this study, a 
critical value of 1.50E-03 was set for the probability change of the abnormal event. 
When considering the dynamic integrated models, changes of factors X10, X20, X22, X31, 
X32 and IE32 (1.82E-03) produced a variation of the abnormal event exceeding the 
critical value. On the other hand, changes of factors X10, X20, X22, X31 and X32, but not 
IE32 (1.11E-05), produced a variation of the abnormal event exceeding the critical value 
when the model represented by the picture in Fig. 5.4(b) was applied. This is because, 
when the interaction between safety and security is not considered, IE32 is assumed not 
to influence safety, and the importance of IE32 is significantly underestimated. In this 
way, some important factors could be incorrectly ignored when the prevention resources 
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are assigned. In comparison, the integrated dynamic model can more accurately reflect 
the significance of correlative factors, and thus can effectively guide the decisions for 
prevention measures. For example, according to the result from the integrated dynamic 
model, IE32 (the entry control) needs more resources to be strengthened.  
 
It is worth noting that conditional probabilities of BNs in this case study were assumed, 
while theoretically these values could be obtained from historical data or expert 
experiences. However, since the three BNs presented in Fig. 5.4 have the same variables 
and almost the same conditional probabilities (all the same CPTs for the three models 
except that the integrated dynamic model has additional ones for the links of correlative 
accidental and security causal factors), the comparison of their results could reflect the 
effects of the interaction of safety and security related factors. The case study is for 
illustration purposes, the results do not mean to directly guide practice. Once data from 
practice or experts are inputted to the proposed model, it could generate more real 
results to guide practice.  
5.4 Conclusions 
This study presented a new approach for modeling accidental and security related 
factors in an integrated dynamic framework to assess the probabilities of abnormal 
events. The established model reflected the actual relationship of the correlative causal 
factors, process accidents, intentional threats and abnormal events, and quantified the 
effects of the interactions on their occurrence probabilities. The necessity and merits of 
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considering correlative accidental and security related factors together are clarified. An 
oil storage tank is studied for fire occurrence probability using the proposed model. The 
main highlights of the study are:  
• The proposed model visually provides specific (unintentional) process accident 
evolution scenarios from initiation caused by security related factors to propagation 
and final termination. This helps to design intervention at different stages of event 
propagation.  
• The integrated dynamic model considers dependency caused by common factors, 
which improves the assessment accuracy of abnormal events and avoids double 
counting of posterior values of common factors. 
• According to the integrated dynamic model, the probability growth of the causal 
factors which simultaneously exacerbate safety and security results in a larger 
probability increase of abnormal events compared to that without considering the 
safety and security dependency. This provides clear evidence of the improved 
predictability of the model.  
• The integrated dynamic model identifies causal factors whose state changes 
oppositely affect the process accident probability and intentional threat probability. 
This work helps quantify the impact of such factors and proposes a method to 
eliminate their opposite impacts on safety and security.  
• This integrated dynamic model has dynamic feature; thus, it could obtain the latest 
states of variables and reduce uncertainty caused by scarce data through probability 
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update with evidence. A great point is that by considering the interaction between 
accidental and security related factors, the integrated dynamic model enables to 
update states of both types of factors (i.e., accidental and security related factors) 
given evidence of one type of factors. This state updating means the model can 
identify both accidental and security related factors which are more probable to be 
of poor states. 
• The integrated dynamic model can capture the actual significance of correlative 
causal factors contributing to the abnormal events by including the interaction of 
accidental and security related factors.  
 
The current work is mainly aimed to quantitatively show the difference of probabilities 
of abnormal events and causal factors with and without considering the interaction of 
safety and security. To clearly demonstrate this point, this paper made some 
simplification as explained in Section 5.3. In the future work, apart from relaxing those 
simplification, we could also conduct cost-effective analysis to understand how the 
interaction of safety and security could influence the cost effect of countermeasures. In 
this way, the research results will have more direct guidance to risk management and 
resource assignment. Moreover, a case study containing more factors which have 
opposite effects on safety and security could be conducted to magnify the effects of 
such factors. 
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6. Integrated Risk Management of Hazardous Processing Facilities 
Preface 
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decided research methods, established models and analyzed the case study. I completed 
the manuscript and revised according to Dr. Faisal Khan's suggestions. Dr. Faisal Khan 
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Yang provided valuable suggestions in the topic decision and manuscript writing. 
Abstract 
Processing facilities handling large amounts of hazardous substances are attractive 
targets for terrorists. Thus, these work sites are exposed not only to accidents but also 
to intentional threats. Some research has separately studied risk caused by either 
potential accidental events or terrorist acts. However, studies focusing on integrated risk 
assessment and management (dealing with both safety and security issues) are lacking. 
This paper proposes an approach to assess and manage integrated risks. This method is 
based on an influence diagram which incorporates safety and security-related factors 
into one framework. It considers the effects of management actions on both accidental 
and intentional risks. This method can help to detect hidden risk (i.e., the risk not 
recognized during design and operation stages) and ensure to reduce the real risk to an 
acceptable level by guiding the selection of management actions. The effectiveness of 
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the proposed method is demonstrated using the overfilling risk management of an oil 
tank.  
Keywords: Decision making; safety and security; influence diagram; multi-criteria; 
hidden risk 
6.1 Introduction 
Terrorism is increasingly threatening the world, and attacks on process plants have 
repeatedly occurred in recent years [1]. In June 2015, a terrorist attacked a U.S.-owned 
chemical plant in France and caused an explosion in gas canisters, leaving one person 
dead and two injured [2]. Three weeks later, two explosions were caused by malicious 
acts at a petrochemical plant in southern France [3]. In 2016, an Algerian gas plant was 
hit by terrorists using rockets [4]. In the same year, suicide car bombers attacked Libya's 
main oil terminals (Es Sider oil export terminal), and an oil storage tank at Ras Lanuf 
was set on fire after a rocket hit [5]. In 2017, an attack was launched to blow up an 
Aramco fuel terminal in southern Saudi Arabia using a speedboat laden with explosives 
[6]. Process facilities are thus exposed to not only accidental but intentional risks as 
well, which raises challenges to risk management. The accidental and intentional risks 
are synergistic [7], influencing their causation and the effects of risk prevention 
measures, and thus affecting the decision making of risk management. In this paper, the 
term measure is used to represent a management action to minimize risk.  
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Some researchers have argued that it is not sufficient to address accidental hazards; 
integrated risks including accidental and intentional ones need to be studied to ascertain 
the real risks confronted by the process industry [7－10]. Compared to the work on 
separate assessment of either safety or security related risks [11, 12], relatively limited 
work has been conducted using integrated risk assessment considering the dependency 
of safety and security [7]. Fovino et al. [13] incorporated intentional factors into 
traditional risk analysis by integrating attack trees into a pre-existent fault tree (FT). 
Their approach considered the dependency of intentional acts and accidental failures to 
obtain the integrated risk. Pietre-Cambacedes et al. [7] modelled the dependency of 
safety and security of critical systems using Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes. 
This model analyzed risk scenarios in a qualitative and quantitative form, combining 
safety and security aspects. As for integrated risk management, to the authors' 
knowledge, no specific decision model exists for integrated risks considering both 
safety and security aspects.  
 
Previous works have studied the decision making for accidental risk. Yuan et al. [14] 
proposed a Bayesian network (BN)-based method to help allocate safety measures for 
dust explosions considering both available budget and acceptable residual risk. Sedki et 
al. [15] proposed an influence diagram (ID)-based approach to study the consequences 
of deviant actions of operators based on three parameters: benefit, cost and deficit. This 
model enables managers to rank a set of actions through the utility calculation of each 
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action pertaining to the criteria. However, these works only consider accidental risks, 
ignoring intentional ones. Thus, their selected management actions to minimize risk 
cannot solve the problem of hidden risks, which will be discussed in this paper. The 
hidden risk refers to that which managers do not recognize while conducting risk 
management. Aside from the works about safety-oriented concerns, some research has 
analyzed the measure decision for security issues. Villa et al. [16] proposed a method to 
conduct cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis for the allocation of physical 
security measures. The approach helps to select economically feasible security 
measures with a maximum net present value considering the budget constraints of a 
chemical plant. Stewart et al. [17] described risk-informed decision support for 
assessing the costs and benefits of counterterrorism protective measures for 
infrastructure. This research showed under what combination of risk reduction, threat 
probability, and fatality and damage costs, the counterterrorism protective measures 
would be cost-effective for infrastructures through three illustrative examples. However, 
these studies did not consider the influence of interaction of safety and security on risk 
reduction effects of measures. Thus, the efficiency of measures may be underestimated, 
negatively influencing the decision making for minimizing risk.   
 
This paper proposes a risk-based measure decision method for integrated risk 
management. It discusses the process and principles of measure decision and clarifies 
the influence of the interaction of safety and security on decision making. This method 
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includes the dependency of safety and security-related factors and visually shows how 
measures work to reduce integrated risks. By managing risks from an integrated 
perspective, the method avoids the underestimation of measures' effects. Furthermore, 
this method can detect the hidden risk to ensure that the real risk confronted by facilities 
is reduced to an acceptable level. The new point is that the proposed risk-based method 
can effectively manage integrated risks considering the dependency of safety and 
security. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the background of integrated 
risk, an influence diagram and the effects of measures. Section 6.3 explains the risk-
based decision-making method. A case study of overfilling of a gasoline tank is 
demonstrated in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 provides discussion and conclusions.  
6.2 Background 
6.2.1 Integrated risk 
To facilitate the study of integrated risk, both safety-related events (i.e., accidents, 
incidents, mishaps and near misses) and security-related events (i.e., terrorism, 
vandalism and mischief) are called abnormal events. Safety-related events are called 
accidental abnormal events, while security-related events are called intentional 
abnormal events. The risk is defined as probability multiplied by consequences (losses) 
[8, 18]. Following this definition, the integrated risk is the product of probability and 
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consequence of an abnormal event. Integrated risk constitutes an accidental risk and 
intentional risk (see Fig. 6.1). The basic difference between accidental and intentional 
risks is whether it includes harmful human intentions [19]. The accidental risk is caused 
by random failure (accidental abnormal events), while the intentional risk includes 
intentional acts (intentional abnormal events).  
 
Oil fire is taken as an example to explain integrated risk. As shown in Fig. 6.1, oil fire 
can occur in an accidental scenario where oil leaks due to corrosion and the leaked oil 
are accidentally ignited by the spark of electronic equipment; it can also occur in an 
intentional scenario where attackers destroy the tank to expose oil and ignite it using a 
lighter. The accidental scenario and intentional scenario can both lead to an oil fire. The 
product of probability and consequence of oil fire in both accidental and intentional 
scenarios is the integrated risk of an oil fire. Managing oil fire risk through an integrated 
perspective is necessary because accidental and intentional oil fires are dependent as 
shown in Fig. 6.1, and thus a risk measure may have effects on both an accidental and 
intentional oil fire. For example, an effective fire suppression system can mitigate not 
only an accidental oil fire but also an intentional oil fire. The goal of this study is to 
demonstrate the advantage of integrated risk management considering the synergy of 
accidental and intentional abnormal events. To clearly demonstrate the function of the 
proposed method, some simplifications are made. The consequences (i.e., damage of 
abnormal events to facilities) are considered as fixed, and probabilities of abnormal 
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events are considered as the only variable reflecting integrated risks. Thus, this study 
focuses on discussion about the management of occurrence probabilities of abnormal 
events. 
 
Integrated oil 
fire risk
Accidental oil 
fire risk
Intentional oil 
fire risk
 
Fig. 6.1 Integrated oil fire risk 
6.2.2 Influence diagram 
An ID is a probabilistic graphical model used to help decide risk management measures 
under uncertainty, considering the utility (e.g., efficiency and cost) of measures. 
Compared to a risk assessment model like BN, besides chance nodes, ID (see Fig. 6.2) 
contains two extra types of nodes－decision nodes and utility nodes [15]. Decision 
nodes represent the decision to apply or not to apply certain measures, while utility 
nodes represent the utility of decision alternatives or strategies. By analyzing the utility 
values of different decision alternatives, the measures reducing risks to an acceptable 
level are selected. Also, since the budget is limited in practice, the selected measures 
need to satisfy budget requirements, which can be analyzed by comparing utility values 
to the budget. The chance nodes, decision nodes and utility nodes are linked using arcs. 
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The arcs among chance nodes of an ID have the same properties as the arcs in a BN, 
representing that the linked chance nodes are dependent [20]. The arcs from decision 
nodes to chance nodes mean the decision of measures to be taken can change the 
occurrence probabilities of the linked chance variables. For example, safety training 
may reduce the occurrence probabilities of human error; thus, the decision node ‘safety 
training’ needs to be linked to the chance node ‘human error’. Their quantitative 
relationship is represented using a conditional probability table (CPT) in which the 
decision to ‘not provide safety training’ corresponds to a high occurrence probability of 
human error (e.g., 0.45), while the decision to ‘provide safety training’ corresponds to 
a smaller occurrence probability such as 0.1 [21, 22]. In this way, the ID establishes a 
link between a decision and the causal factor. When the measure ‘provides safety 
training’ is analyzed by a manager, the state of the decision node is set as ‘provide safety 
training’. Then the ID is updated, and it obtains the updated risks after application of 
the measure. The arcs from chance nodes and decision nodes to utility nodes 
demonstrate that the utility values are influenced by the state combination of chance 
nodes and decision nodes. Their relationships are represented by conditional tables 
which show the utility values corresponding to different state combinations of chance 
nodes and decision nodes. When different measures are applied, the ID is updated to 
obtain new utility values based on which the measures are assessed and the decision is 
made. The dashed arcs among decision nodes represent the decision sequence of 
different measures [15, 23]. The shapes of chance, decision and utility nodes in an ID 
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are different. Chance nodes are oval, while decision nodes are rectangular [24]. The 
utility nodes are hexagons [15]. The values of chance nodes are probabilities, ranging 
from 0 to 1, while those of utility nodes do not have the range limitation. The decision 
nodes represent the proposed measures; thus, they only have two states, ‘application of 
the measure’ or ‘no application of the measure’ without numerical values. The ID 
including decision and utility nodes is an excellent tool for decision making. It can 
represent the dependency of safety and security-related factors and facilitate measure 
selection considering measures' effects on accidental and intentional risks. 
 
Chance 
node 4
Decision 
node 1
Utility 
node
Chance 
node 1
Chance 
node 2
Chance 
node 3
Decision 
node 2
  
Fig. 6.2 A general influence diagram 
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6.2.3 Effects of measures on accidental and intentional risks 
A measure 
of risk 
management
Accidental 
risk change
Intentional 
risk change
Effect
Effect
Integrated 
risk change
A criterion for measure assessment
 
Fig. 6.3 The effects of measures on accidental and intentional risks 
 
Safety and security are dependent, as shown in Fig. 6.3; thus, the safety measures may 
influence security, while security measures influence safety. For example, the safety 
measure of a high-level alarm can also inform the high level caused by intentional acts, 
and thus prevent the intentional damage. The security measure of unauthorized access 
control can not only prevent attackers but also reduce human-induced unintentional 
events (human error), since it can avoid accidents by preventing unauthorized or 
untrained personnel from entering specific workplaces. However, some measures may 
have conflicting effects on safety and security. The security measure ‘non-explosion-
proof security surveillance facilities’ may cause an accidental explosion of released 
flammable substances. Since measures have effects on both safety and security, the 
decision needs to be made from an integrated perspective. Fig. 6.3 also demonstrates 
that integrated risk change reflects the efficiency of measures which serves as one of 
the criteria for measure assessment.  
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A real accident is analyzed to explain how risk management measures can influence 
safety and security. According to a CSB report [25], a toxic chemical release occurred 
during an unloading operation at the MGPI Processing, Inc. in Atchison, the US in 2016. 
The driver of the cargo tank motor vehicle (CTMV) incorrectly connected the discharge 
hose of sulfuric acid to the unsecured fill line for the sodium hypochlorite bulk tank. 
This led to the inadvertent mixing of sulfuric acid and sodium hypochlorite, which 
caused a reaction in the sodium hypochlorite bulk tank. This reaction promoted the 
release of a cloud containing toxic chlorine gas and other compounds. Because of this 
gas release, over 140 individuals sought medical attention and six of them were 
hospitalized. In this toxic gas release, some measures influenced safety and security-
related risks. The padlock on the cam lever dust cap that secures the fill line is designed 
to prevent unauthorized access. It can not only prevent human error (incorrect 
connection) as occurred in the MGPI accident, but can also prevent the damage caused 
by intentional acts. Thus, the measure ‘install padlock on the cam lever dust cap’ can 
reduce both accidental and intentional risks. Another measure has opposite effects on 
accidental risk and intentional risk. To protect the respirators from theft and intentional 
damage, operators have a practice of locking respirators between shelves. Thus, in an 
emergency condition, operators would be unable to access their respirators, thereby 
worsening the severity of the injuries and becoming a source of potential fatality. The 
measure ‘locking respirators’ benefits security to some degree, but it increases the 
safety-related risk. The accident occurred because the driver mistook the sulfuric acid's 
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fill line for the sodium hypochlorite's. If the measure ‘add markers of the chemical at 
fill line connections’ is applied, this error can be avoided. However, such markers may 
provide information for attackers to cause damage. Thus, the measure ‘add markers of 
the chemical at fill line connections’ can reduce the accidental risk, but may increase 
the intentional risk. Another measure, ‘install additional monitoring and emergency 
shutdown devices’, as applied by MGPI after the accident, can detect a release caused 
by either accidental or intentional events and shut down the operation to minimize the 
damage. Thus, this measure can reduce the accidental and intentional risks at the same 
time. Through the analysis of the MGPI toxic gas release incident, it is evident that a 
measure can simultaneously influence safety and security-related risks. Thus, a measure 
decision of risk management needs to consider the measure's effects on accidental and 
intentional risks. The effects of measures on integrated risk can be treated as a criterion 
for measure assessment and decision making.    
6.3 Method description 
6.3.1 Methodology framework  
This ID-based risk management method is divided into two stages. As mentioned in 
Section 6.2.1, the consequences (i.e., damage of abnormal events to facilities) are 
considered as fixed, and then the integrated probability of abnormal events reflects 
integrated risk. Thus, this study focuses on discussion about the management of 
probabilities of abnormal events. The first stage is integrated probability assessment, 
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while the second is measure decision. In the first stage, a BN was established for the 
assessment of an integrated probability of an abnormal event. If the probability is 
unacceptable, potential measures are proposed and an ID is established in stage two 
based on the BN of stage one. The rationality analysis of proposed measures is 
conducted first. Rationality of measures is explained in Section 6.3.2.1. Then the effects 
and costs of reasonable measures are assessed using the ID, based on which the decision 
is made. The methodology framework is shown in Fig. 6.4.  
 
Is integrated probability of 
abnormal events acceptable?
Engineering-economic 
step: decision making 
considering cost & 
efficiency of measures
Proposal of management 
actions (measures)  to 
minimize probability of 
abnormal events
No
End 
Stage 2: 
Measure 
decision using 
ID
Yes
Scenarios of 
abnormal events
Unintentional 
scenarios
Intentional 
scenarios
Integrated probability 
assessment of abnormal 
events using BN
Screening step: measure 
screening according to the 
rationality of measures
Stage 1: 
Integrated 
probability 
assessment 
using BN
 
Fig. 6.4 Methodology framework  
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6.3.2 Approach for risk-based measure decision 
6.3.2.1 Criteria of measure assessment 
Three criteria are applied for measure decisions: rationality, risk reduction efficiency 
and cost. 
(1) Rationality: Rationality of measures means that measures do not influence the 
normal operation of the process plant. For example, attackers may release oil 
through valves. If all valves are removed, it causes problems for the oil release by 
attackers, but the function of valves necessary for normal production is missing. 
Thus, this measure is not rational. To conserve assessment resources, such measures 
are discarded in the screening step of decision making.  
(2) Risk reduction efficiency: The goal of measures is to reduce risks. Thus, the selected 
measures (strategies) need to reduce risk to an acceptable range effectively. 
(3) Cost: Risk can be reduced with the increase of investment for risk management. In 
an extreme case, the process plant is protected by the security measures used to 
protect the military base and the security risk may be reduced to close to 0. However, 
those measures are too expensive to apply. Practically, risk management has the 
limitation of budget, and the cost of measures cannot exceed the budget allocation. 
The cost of measures should be a criterion of measure selection. Thus, when several 
measures (strategies) can reduce risks to an acceptable range, the economic ones are 
preferred. 
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6.3.2.2 Risk assessment 
BN is applied to assess the integrated probability of the abnormal event considering the 
dependency of safety and security, as shown in Fig. 6.5(a). First, an abnormal event 
(e.g., gas release or explosions) is defined, and then the accidental and intentional causal 
factors are identified. These causal factors and the abnormal event are represented using 
chance nodes in BN. According to the dependency among causal factors and abnormal 
events, these nodes are linked by arcs, and their quantitative relationship is represented 
using CPTs [20]. In this way, the dependency between safety and security is included 
(see the green arcs in Fig. 6.5(a)), and the integrated probability of the abnormal event 
is obtained. If the calculated probability is higher than the accepted standard, risk 
management measures are requested.  
6.3.2.3 Decision making  
1) Measure proposal. Experts propose potential measures for integrated risk reduction 
based on the causal factors. The measures can be inherent, engineered, or procedural 
[14].   
2) Measure assessment. Decision nodes and utility nodes are added to the BN to obtain 
an ID (see Fig. 6.5(b)). The decision nodes representing measures are linked to 
related chance nodes. Their effects on the linked chance nodes are represented using 
CPTs. Besides adding cost as a utility node, the node ‘abnormal event’ changes from 
a chance node to a utility node, since the probability change of the abnormal event 
is a parameter for effect assessment of the measure. Thus, there are two utility nodes 
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in the ID. To assess the cost of these measures, these decision nodes are also linked 
to the utility (cost) node. After establishing the ID, measures are assessed in two 
steps based on the criteria. 
 
Screening step: Proposed measures are analyzed to see whether they influence normal 
operations. If a measure influences normal operations, it is not rational and needs to be 
discarded. The screening process makes the analysis of the next step clearer. 
 
Engineering-economic step: This step includes the efficiency and cost assessment of 
measures. The decision nodes are set as ‘application’ or ‘no application’; then the 
updated integrated probability of the abnormal event and costs of measures is obtained. 
The updated probability of the abnormal event and cost of measures is compared to the 
accepted standard and budget to select management measures. If several measures 
(strategies) satisfy the requirement of risk reduction, the economical one is selected. 
The cost cannot exceed the budget designation.  
 
This method uses a graphical model to clearly show how the measures reduce the 
integrated risks in a visual form. For example, the red arcs in Fig. 6.5(b) represent how 
measure 2 reduces the integrated risk. Measure 2 works on the accidental causal factor 
3 which contributes accidental and intentional abnormal events; thus, measure 2 can 
influence the occurrence probabilities of both accidental and intentional abnormal 
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events. This visual form can assist experts to propose further measures, which are 
explained in Section 6.4. Furthermore, using CPTs, this model has a flexible form to 
represent the relationship between measures and causal factors. The relationships 
between measures and factors have two types. The first is that the measure eliminates 
causal factors [26], while the second improves the state of factors. For example, if the 
avoiding safety measure 2 [26] in Fig. 6.5(b) eliminates the safety-related causal factor 
3. The proposed model uses a CPT (see Table 6.1) to represent this relationship without 
a structural change of the model. Table 6.2 shows another relationship: the application 
of measure 1 reduces the occurrence probability of accidental causal factor 1 to a smaller 
value (0.05) instead of eliminating this causal factor.  
 
Table 6.1 CPT for accidental causal factor 3 
Measure 2 Application No application 
Poor state of accidental causal factor 3 0 0.10 
Good state of accidental causal factor 3 1 0.90 
Table 6.2 CPT for accidental causal factor 1 
 
Measure 1 Application No application 
Poor state of accidental causal factor 1 0.05 0.10 
Good state of accidental causal factor 1 0.95 0.90 
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(a) BN for risk assessment          (b) ID for risk management 
Fig. 6.5 The establishment of ID based on BN 
6.4 Illustrative example 
Overfilling of storage tanks is a potential hazard for offloading operations of gasoline. 
It can lead to fire and explosions, causing severe damage to the community and 
environment [27, 28]. Thus, controlling the occurrence of overfilling to an acceptable 
level is very important for the safe offloading operation in an oil storage depot. An 
illustrative example of overfilling a gasoline storage tank is analyzed to demonstrate the 
function of the proposed method. This case study is analyzed based on a practical 
overflow accident which occurred at the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation facility [27]. 
In 2009, an overflow occurred in San Juan Bay when the Cape Bruny cargo ship was 
unloading more than 11.5 million gallons of gasoline to various tanks on site. Tank 409 
started to overflow between the 11 p.m. and 12 a.m. check on October 22. The released 
gasoline formed a vapour and exploded, burning 17 of the 48 tanks. The CSB report 
[27] revealed the following causes for the overfilling. The level measure gauge and 
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transmitter did not work; thus, operators could not obtain accurate tank levels. In this 
situation, operators incorrectly estimated the tank fill time due to lacking the ability to 
identify and incorporate the flow rate change in real time into tank fill time calculations. 
No independent alarm existed to inform operators about the high level of gasoline. 
Therefore, the operators failed to shut down or divert the flow before overfilling. After 
failing to shut down the flow manually, no automatic overfilling prevention system 
existed to prevent potential overfilling, rendering the occurrence of overfilling.  
6.4.1 Overfilling probability assessment 
As described in Section 6.3, BN is applied to assess the occurrence probability of 
gasoline overfilling. This model not only considers the accidental factors identified 
based on the practical case [27], but also includes the security factors. For the intentional 
perspective, this case study considers a specific attack scenario where an outsider creeps 
into a storage farm without firearms and attempts to cause an overflow. To achieve this 
goal, attackers need to launch attacks, enter the storage farm and successfully cause the 
overflow. Thus, lax entrance control and lax security inside the farm contribute to the 
intentionally caused overfilling. The identified root causal factors and their prior 
probabilities are shown in Table 6.3. These prior probabilities are decided through an 
informed estimation based on the available literature [29, 30]. The storage farm has a 
much weaker security level than chemical plants; thus, its probabilities of lax entrance 
control and lax security inside the farm are considered to be high. According to [27], 
since the plant does not have an independent high-level alarm and automatic overfilling 
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prevention system, the prior probabilities of these two factors are 1.  
 
Table 6.3 Root causal factors and prior probabilities [29, 30] 
Root causal factors Prior probabilities 
Malfunction of the level measure gauge 1.05E-1 
Failure of the transmitter 2.43E-2 
Incorrect estimation of the level 1.10E-1 
Failure of the independent high-level alarm 1.00 
Failure of the automatic overfilling prevention system 1.00 
Attack 1.00E-1 
Lax entrance control 3.00E-1 
Lax security inside the farm 2.50E-1 
 
After identifying causal factors and analyzing their relationships, the BN is established 
and shown in Fig. 6.6. This model includes the dependency of safety and security-
related factors (see the blue, green and orange arcs). Specifically, when attackers 
attempt to cause overfilling, the automatic overfilling prevention system prevents their 
success by diverting the flow to another tank. Furthermore, when the level reaches a 
critical value, the independent high-level alarm can inform operators about the danger 
of overfilling. By this, the operators may detect the intentional acts and prevent the 
intentionally caused overfilling. Moreover, when attackers operate the valves to divert 
the flow to full tanks, the attackers' acts may be detected in time by operators in the 
control room by monitoring the abnormal level change. Thus, the three accidental 
factors, ‘failure of the automatic overfilling prevention system’, ‘failure of the 
independent high-level alarm’ and ‘not obtaining gasoline level’ contribute not only to 
accidental overfilling but also to overfilling caused by attackers. By linking the three 
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accidental causal factors to the security node ‘successfully cause overflow’, the 
dependency between safety and security is established in the model.  
 
 
Fig. 6.6 The BN for gasoline overflow assessment 
 
The occurrence probability of gasoline overfilling is calculated using the BN of Fig. 6.6. 
As shown in row 2 and column 4 of Table 6.5, the occurrence probability of gasoline 
overflow is 1.48E-2. In this case, the accepted standard for gasoline overflow is 
considered as 1.00E-3. Then, it is observed that the occurrence probability of overfilling 
is unacceptable; thus, measures are needed to manage the risk of overflow. 
6.4.2 Risk management 
Potential measures are proposed to reduce the overflow probability.  
(1) Removing all valves. Attackers can operate valves to divert flow to full tanks, 
thereby causing overfilling. Thus, when removing all valves, a hazardous factor for 
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intentional overfilling is eliminated. 
(2) Education for level estimation. When the level measure gauge fails, workers need 
to estimate the gasoline level and calculate filling time. If the estimation is correct, 
the flow can be manually diverted before a tank is full. Therefore, educating 
operators to estimate levels correctly can help to avoid accidental overfilling.  
(3) Installation of an independent high-level alarm. The independent high-level alarm 
can inform operators to stop or divert flow to avoid overfilling when a level reaches 
the critical value, even if the primary system of level measure fails.  
(4) Installation of an automatic overfilling prevention system. The automatic overfilling 
prevention system can automatically stop or divert the flow to another tank when 
the level is beyond the critical value to avoid overfilling.  
(5) Inspection and maintenance of level measure gauge. The level measure gauge 
provides required level information for operators to divert the flow in time. As a 
procedural measure, ‘inspection and maintenance of level measure gauge’ improves 
the operation of the level measure gauge, which helps to reduce the overfilling 
probability. 
  
These measures are assessed based on the criteria (rationality, risk reduction efficiency 
and cost) explained in Section 6.3. First, the rationality of measures is analyzed. For the 
measure ‘removing all valves’, if all valves are removed, operators cannot control the 
flow, negatively influencing the offloading operation. Thus, this measure is not rational 
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in this case study, and it needs to be discarded. The remaining measures (education for 
level estimation, installation of an independent high-level alarm, installation of an 
automatic overfilling prevention system, and inspection and maintenance of level 
measure gauge) do not influence the required operations; thus, they are rational. The 
effects and cost of these reasonable measures are further analyzed to select the proper 
measures. After linking these reasonable measures with corresponding causal factors in 
Fig. 6.6, the ID is obtained, as shown in Fig. 6.7. It is worth noting that the chance node 
‘gasoline overflow’ of BN is converted to a utility node in the ID since the probability 
of gasoline overflow serves as an index for measure assessment. Besides the utility node 
‘gasoline overflow’, another utility node ‘cost’ is added in the ID. Then CPTs of causal 
nodes influenced by measures are decided according to the related literature [29] and 
experts' opinion. Taking the CPT of failure of an independent high-level alarm as an 
example, its CPT is shown in Table 6.4. It shows that when the measure installation of 
an independent high-level alarm is applied, the probability of failure of the independent 
high-level alarm is reduced from 1 to 0.043 [29].  
 
Table 6.4 The CPT for the failure of the independent high-level alarm [29] 
Installation of an independent high-level 
alarm 
Application No application 
Failure of an independent high-level alarm 0.043 1 
Success of an independent high-level alarm 0.957 0 
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Fig. 6.7 The ID for overfilling of a storage tank 
 
The obtained ID in Fig. 6.7 visually shows the risk reduction process with the proposed 
measures. For example, the measure ‘education for level estimation’ reduces the 
integrated overfilling risk by reducing the incorrect estimation of the level. This visual 
diagram helps to detect which causal factors still do not have measures, thereby 
providing help for further measure proposal. For instance, the causal factor ‘failure of 
the transmitter’ does not have a reduction measure. It reminds experts whether measures 
are available to reduce the failure of the transmitter when additional measures are 
needed. Furthermore, when numerous factors and measures are involved in a 
189 
 
complicated problem, it is difficult for managers to select proper strategies which 
include multi-measures. This model can conveniently calculate the cost and effects of 
strategies on accidental and intentional risks. Thus, this model facilitates strategy 
selection for complicated problems. 
 
The management measures need to reduce the probability of overfilling to an acceptable 
level. Furthermore, the cost of selected measures needs to be smaller than the budget 
allocation. Thus, the measures (strategies) should first satisfy the requirement of a 
probability reduction of overfilling. Then, among all the satisfied measures (strategies) 
for probability reduction, the economical ones are selected to manage overfilling risk. 
Assume that the budget for risk management is $10,000. To analyze efficiency and cost 
of measures, each of the four measures is set as ‘application’ by turn, while the other 
three measures are set as ‘no application’. The cost of each measure and corresponding 
probabilities of overfilling, intentional overfilling and accidental overfilling are 
obtained and shown in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5 The effect and cost of each measure 
Measures 
Intentional 
overfilling 
probability 
Accidental 
overfilling 
probability 
Overfilling 
probability 
Cost of 
measures 
No 2.35E-3 1.25E-2 1.48E-2 0 
Education for level 
estimation 
2.35E-3 2.70E-3 5.03E-3 $500 
Inspection and 
maintenance of 
1.67E-3 1.24E-3 2.91E-3 $1000 
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level measure 
gauge 
Installation of an 
independent high-
level alarm 
1.00E-3 1.41E-3 2.41E-3 $2000 
Installation of an 
automatic 
overfilling 
prevention system 
1.43E-4 7.59E-4 8.96E-4 $20,000 
 
The overfilling probabilities after using corresponding measures are displayed in rows 
3－6 and column 4 of Table 6.5, while the overfilling probability without applying 
measures is shown in row 2 and column 4 of Table 6.5. Comparing the overfilling 
probabilities before and after applying corresponding measures, it shows that all 
measures can significantly reduce the probability of overfilling. However, the measure 
‘education for level estimation’ only reduces the probability of accidental overfilling 
(see row 3 and columns 2, 3 of Table 6.5), while the other three measures reduce both 
accidental and intentional overfilling probabilities (see rows 4－6 and columns 2, 3 of 
Table 6.5). If the security risk is not included in this analysis, the effects of those three 
measures are underestimated. For example, after applying the independent high-level 
alarm, the overfilling probability reduces from 1.48E-2 to 2.41E-3. If the security risk 
is not considered, the effect of the measure ‘installation of the independent high-level 
alarm’ is underestimated by 1.35E-3. The error value is even more substantial than the 
acceptance criteria (1.00E-3). Thus, the error cannot be ignored. Since risk reduction 
efficiency is an essential criterion for measure selection, if the effects of measures are 
underestimated, it may negatively influence the decision of risk reduction measures. 
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This proposed model avoids such underestimation and thus helps to select appropriate 
measures based on their actual effects. 
 
According to the overfilling probabilities in rows 3－6 and column 4 of Table 6.5, only 
the measure ‘installation of an automatic overfilling prevention system’ reduces the 
probability of overflow to an acceptable level. However, its cost exceeds the budget 
allowance. This means that no single measure can satisfy the requirements of risk 
reduction efficiency and cost control. Thus, the strategy which includes two measures 
is analyzed. Since the measure ‘installation of an automatic overfilling prevention 
system’ cannot satisfy the budget requirement, only three measures are left to form 
strategies. Three strategies are obtained by combining two of the three measures. These 
strategies are set as applications by turn in the ID, and the effects and costs of the three 
strategies are shown in Table 6.6.  
 
Table 6.6 Effects and costs of different strategies 
Number Strategies 
Intentional 
overfilling 
probability 
Accidental 
overfilling 
probability 
Overfilling 
probability 
Cost of 
strategies 
1 
Inspection and 
maintenance of 
level measure 
gauge & 
Education for 
level estimation 
1.67E-3 5.53E-4 2.22E-3 $2000 
2 
Education for 
level estimation 
& Installation of 
1.00E-3 4.29E-4 1.43E-3 $2500 
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an independent 
high-level alarm 
3 
Inspection and 
maintenance of 
level measure 
gauge & 
Installation of an 
independent 
high-level alarm 
7.12E-4 2.68E-4 9.79E-4 $3000 
 
As Table 6.6 demonstrates, the probability of overfilling (9.79E-4) reduces to an 
acceptable level, and the cost ($3000) is kept within the budget requirement only after 
the application of strategy 3. Thus, strategy 3 is selected to protect the storage tank from 
overfilling. To avoid overfilling, measures ‘inspection and maintenance of level 
measure gauge’ and ‘installation of an independent high-level alarm’ are applied in the 
tank farm. 
6.4.3 Discussion 
Rows 2－4 and column 6 of Table 6.6 show the cost increases from strategy 1 to strategy 
3. According to an interview with a safety manager of Yancon Cathay Coal Chemicals 
CO., LTD in China, the plant prefers typically conservative measures for safety 
management. For some potential hazards, they only take simple measures such as 
‘recording the abnormal event to remind workers to be cautious’. Comparing the effects 
of strategies 1 and 3 in rows 2 and 4 and column 5 reveals that if only pursuing less cost, 
the strategy (measure) may not achieve the expected goal of risk reduction. The facility 
may still be exposed to unacceptable risk with the applied measures. Thus, the effect 
193 
 
assessment of measures is essential. This was demonstrated by a rupture of the heat 
exchanger at Tesoro Anacortes Refinery of Washington that occurred in 2010 [31]. The 
heat exchanger catastrophically ruptured due to a High Temperature Hydrogen Attack 
(HTHA), and the highly flammable hydrogen and naphtha were released and ignited. 
This caused an explosion and an intense fire, burning for more than three hours. The 
rupture fatally injured seven employees, and it became the largest fatal incident at a US 
petroleum refinery since the BP Texas City accident in March 2005 [31]. According to 
the CSB investigation [31], mechanical integrity programs at the Tesoro Anacortes 
refinery emphasized inspection strategies to control the HTHA mechanism that 
ultimately caused the major process incident. However, inspection for HTHA is tough 
because the damage can be microscopic and may exist only in small localized areas of 
equipment. Furthermore, to identify HTHA by inspection, equipment must already be 
damaged by HTHA [31]. Thus, the inspection was unreliable and failed to prevent the 
rupture. The Tesoro Anacortes refinery simply cited non-specific, judgment-based 
qualitative measures to reduce the risk of HTHA mechanisms without rigorous analyses 
of their effects [31]. This practical event reveals the importance of assessing the effects 
of measures before making the decision instead of focusing on the measures' cost. The 
proposed method provides a tool for managers to assess the effects of potential measures 
(strategies). 
 
The results in Table 6.5 can guide strategy selection since they show the specific 
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probabilities of either accidental overfilling or intentional overfilling. For example, 
among all the financially acceptable measures, the installation of an independent high-
level alarm has the best effect of risk reduction. However, after its application, the 
intentional overflow probability is 1.00E-3, which is not smaller than the accepted 
standard. This means if a measure is selected to form a strategy with the installation of 
an independent high-level alarm, the measure must enable the reduction of intentional 
overfilling. Thus, the safety measures which only work for accidental overfilling are not 
considered. This guides measure selection to form an effective strategy. This point is 
confirmed by the application results of the strategies in rows 3 and 4 and columns 3－
5 of Table 6.6. 
 
If intentional overfilling is ignored while conducting risk analysis and only accidental 
risk is considered as in previous research [14, 15], the accidental overfilling probability 
is seen as the overfilling probability. According to row 3, column 4 and row 4, column 
4 of Table 6.6, strategies 2 and 3 can reduce the overfilling probability (i.e., accidental 
overfilling probability) to 4.29E-4 and 2.68E-4, respectively. These overfilling 
probabilities are acceptable compared to the acceptance standard (1.00E-3). Thus, both 
strategies 2 and 3 can satisfy the risk reduction requirement. Since the cost of strategy 
2 is smaller than that of strategy 3, the conclusion would be to select strategy 2. However, 
this decision leaves the storage tank with an unacceptable risk, since the hidden risk 
(security risk) after applying strategy 2 is ignored. This proposed model can detect the 
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hidden risk and help conduct effective risk management.   
 
This model clearly shows the component change in the overfilling risk after the 
application of different strategies. According to rows 2－4 and columns 3－4 of Table 
6.6 and row 2 and columns 2－3 of Table 6.5, after the application of safety strategies, 
the accidental overfilling probability has more significant reduction than that of 
intentional overfilling. Consequently, although in the original state, accidental 
overfilling is the significant hazard with an occurrence probability 1.25E-2, after 
application of each of the three safety strategies, the probability of intentional 
overfilling becomes higher than that of accidental overfilling. This means that 
intentional acts become the major contributor to the occurrence of overfilling. For 
example, when strategy 2 is applied, the probability of intentional overfilling is 1.00E-
3, while its accidental counterpart reduces to 4.29E-4. These results provide an 
opportunity for managers to learn significant risk sources.   
6.5 Conclusions and future work 
This study proposed a risk-based decision-making method for integrated risk 
management of hazardous processing facilities. This ID-based method incorporated 
security risk into the risk management system. It considered the dependency of safety 
and security-related factors and demonstrated how measures reduce accidental and 
intentional risks. Potential measures (strategies) were assessed using the proposed 
method according to three criteria. A case study of the overfilling of storage tanks was 
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analyzed to demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of the proposed method. The key 
highlights of the proposed method are:  
(1) Visually representing the dependency between safety and security, and showing the 
relationship between measures and causal factors. 
(2) Flexibly representing the effects of measures on causal factors. Thus, the model 
structure does not need to change when avoiding measures are applied. 
(3) Avoiding underestimation of the efficiency of measures. This provides the real 
measure effect which is essential for decision making.  
(4) Detecting the hidden risk, thereby ensuring that the selected measures (strategies) 
reduce the real risk to an acceptable range. 
(5) Enabling obtaining the accidental and intentional risks before and after the 
application of different measures (strategies). Not only can this inform the managers 
about the significant risk source, but it can also guide the selection of measures to 
form an effective strategy. 
 
In future work, more interactive relationships of safety and security can be analyzed 
using complex engineering cases. Specifically, an engineering case can include 
measures with opposite effects on safety and security. Furthermore, in the complex and 
highly digitized modern plant, cybersecurity and physical security are also highly 
dependent. For example, by breaking cybersecurity, hackers can cause fire and 
explosion (physical events) [32]. In future work, cyber security can also be included in 
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the integrated risk management. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1 Contributions and novelty 
7.1.1 Model development for occupational risks of hazardous operations in harsh 
environments 
The logic relationships between causal factors and occupational accidents are more 
complicated than OR (AND) logic. BN uses the CPTs to express the real logic 
relationships (Noisy-OR), which is important for accurate risk assessment. Furthermore, 
the harsh environmental factors are included in the assessment model. Thus, the 
proposed model also satisfies the risk assessment requirements for hazardous facilities 
in a harsh environment.  
7.1.2 Dynamic risk assessment 
The proposed assessment models have a dynamic feature. They can use the evidence of 
causal factors to forward infer the occurrence probabilities of abnormal events, and can 
also use the observation of abnormal events to backward infer the states of causal factors. 
Thus, these models can provide the latest risk updates for effective risk management 
and also can diagnose new states of causal factors to provide guidance for resource 
assignment. 
7.1.3 The inclusion of continuous variables 
Conventional models apply the discrete nodes to approximate the continuous variables, 
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which deteriorates the assessment accuracy. This research use CBN to represent the 
continuous variables and capture their continuous changes in a dynamic assessment. 
This reduces the uncertainty caused by the discrete assumption of conventional 
assessment models.  
7.1.4 Influence analysis of intrusion scenarios 
Different intrusion scenarios have different intrusion processes and principles. This 
research indicates how attackers can achieve their intrusions in different scenarios in a 
visual form. The influence of intrusion scenarios on the successful intrusion 
probabilities and security potentials is quantified, based on which the critical intrusion 
scenarios and weak links of the security system are decided.  
7.1.5 The exploration of integrated risk assessment and management 
The area of integrated risk for safety and security is a new and promising realm. With 
the increasing severity of terrorism activities, the security risk needs focused attention. 
Since safety and security have interactions which may influence the assessment results 
and measure decision, the integrated risk assessment and management become an 
interesting topic. This research conducted a dynamic assessment of integrated risk by 
analyzing safety and security-related factors in a framework. The interaction principle 
of safety and security is explained and its influence on risk level and the significance of 
causal factors are dynamically quantified. The cost and effects of measures are analyzed 
in an integrated framework to demonstrate how the interaction of safety and security 
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can influence decision-making. By managing the risk in an integrated way, the hidden 
risks can be detected and the proposed measures can reduce real risk to an acceptable 
level.  
7.2 Conclusions 
Hazardous operations face three major risks－occupational, process and intentional 
damage risks. The first two risks (i.e., safety risk) have been long studied. However, the 
issues including the emerging challenges of a harsh environment, the static feature of 
assessment results and the discrete assumption of assessment models have limited the 
application of existing works and deteriorated their assessment accuracy. The 
intentional risk of hazardous facilities has caused researchers' attentions after 9/11. 
However, previous studies on security analysis do not consider the influence of 
intrusion scenarios. Furthermore, existing works normally study risks caused by either 
accidents or intentional threats separately. In such a situation, even if a risk is strictly 
controlled, the hazardous facilities may still be exposed to another major risk. The safety 
and security risks have interactions which could change both the risk level and the 
impacts of measures. Works on dynamic risk assessment considering the interaction of 
safety and security are lacking. The influence of the interaction of safety and security 
on measure selection has not been studied. 
 
The risk of three occupational accidents (STFs) is assessed first in this thesis. The BT 
is applied to systematically identify causal factors and clearly represent the evolution 
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process of STFs. The BN model is established based on BT to dynamically assess the 
occupational risks and decide the critical causal factors. The harsh environmental 
factors are included in these assessment models. Then the discrete assumption of 
traditional assessment models is relaxed by representing continuous variables with CBN. 
As a result, the uncertainty caused by the discrete assumption of variables is overcome. 
To improve the security risk assessment, intrusion scenarios are included in the security 
assessment. The influence of intrusion scenarios on the successful intrusion 
probabilities and the security potentials of barriers are analyzed. The critical intrusion 
scenarios and weak links of the security system are dynamically decided. These works 
have reduced the uncertainty of conventional assessment methods. A robust framework 
is proposed for the dynamic assessment of integrated safety and security risks and the 
influence of the interactions of security and safety on risk level and the significance of 
causal factors are analyzed. Then the measure selection for integrated risk management 
is analyzed using an ID containing safety and security-related factors. The management 
actions are decided based on their costs and effects on both accidental and intentional 
risks. 
 
The methods proposed in this thesis would help providing the latest risk confronted by 
workers and facilities in hazardous operations. They enable the analysis of risk for 
operations in a harsh environment, and improve assessment accuracy by relaxing the 
limitations of previous methods. Furthermore, since this thesis studies risk in an 
206 
 
integrated way, considering interaction of safety and security, it can provide the real risk 
of hazardous operations and ensure the reduction of real risk to an acceptable level with 
the selected management actions. 
7.3 Future work 
This research makes contributions to dynamic risk assessment with high accuracy and 
integrated risk management considering safety and security related issues. However, the 
following points can be further improved in the future. 
7.3.1. Dependency between different occupational accidents 
This research separately studied the risk of three main occupational accidents (STFs). 
In practice, there may be dependency between different occupational accidents, because 
various occupational accidents may share the same causal factors. For example, when 
employees are tired, the likelihood that they suffer from both slips and falls from heights 
may increase. This means that the control of fatigue can reduce risks of slips and falls 
from height at the same time. If the dependency of different occupational accidents is 
studied, such common factors could be identified to more effectively reduce 
occupational risks. 
7.3.2 Distribution decision of continuous variables based on data 
In this research, the distributions of continuous variables in CBN are assumed. The case 
study on vessel roll is conducted for demonstration purposes. If this method is used to 
solve a practical issue, the data need to be collected and analyzed to make decisions 
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about distributions of variables and relationships between nodes.  
7.3.3 The inclusion of consequence analysis 
This research focuses on the dynamic assessment of the probabilities of abnormal events. 
Since risks are reflected by both probability and consequences, consequence analysis 
can be included in future work. For example, the influence of interaction of safety and 
security on consequences of abnormal events can be analyzed. With consequence 
analysis, the research can provide better guidance for the risk management of hazardous 
operations.  
7.3.4 Inclusion of cyber security risks 
For the security perspective, this research focuses on physical attacks. However, in the 
highly digitized modern plant, cyber attacks are also a security concern. Cyber security 
could also be incorporated into the integrated risk assessment system in future work. Its 
dependency with safety and physical security and its influence on the integrated risk 
can be analyzed. 
7.3.5 Development of a software 
Since this research deal with multi-risks, many factors and dependency relationships 
need to be analyzed. This significantly increases the workload. If the methods are used 
by industry, we cannot expect workers to establish complex models and do probabilistic 
analysis. Thus, a software including the proposed models could be developed in the 
future. The workers would only need to input the required parameters; the software can 
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provide the risk level, measures and visual evolution process of abnormal events.   
 
